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Fundamental Tradeoffs for Modeling Customer Preferences in Revenue Management
Antoine Désir
Revenue management (RM) is the science of selling the right product, to the
right person, at the right price. A key to the success of RM, which now spans a
broad array of industries, is its grounding in mathematical modeling and analytics.
This dissertation contributes to the development of new RM tools by: (1) exploring
some fundamental tradeoffs underlying any RM problems, and (2) designing efficient
algorithms for some RM applications. Another underlying theme of this dissertation
is the modeling of customer preferences, a key component of any RM problem.
The first chapters of this dissertation focus on the model selection problem: many
demand models are available but picking the right model is a challenging task. In
particular, we explore the tension between the richness of a model and its tractability.
To quantify this tradeoff, we focus on the assortment optimization problem, a very
general and core RM problem. To capture customer preferences in this context, we
use choice models, a particular type of demand model. In Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 we
design efficient algorithms for the assortment optimization problem under different
choice models. By assessing the strengths and weaknesses of different choice models,
we can quantify the cost in tractability one has to pay for better predictive power.
This in turn leads to a better understanding of the tradeoffs underlying the model
selection problem.
In Chapter 5, we focus on a different question underlying any RM problem: choos-
ing how to sell a given product. We illustrate this tradeoff by focusing on the problem
of selling ad impressions via Internet display advertising platforms. In particular, we
study how the presence of risk-averse buyers affects the desire for reservation con-
tracts over real time buy via a second-price auction. In order to capture the risk
aversion of buyers, we study different utility models.
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Introduction
Revenue management (RM) is the science, some would say the art, of selling the right
product, to the right person, at the right price. The delicate task of RM is to allo-
cate a finite inventory of products to some uncertain demand and is most of the time
addressed by carefully modeling the problem at stake and casting it into a well formu-
lated optimization problem. Analyzing such problem and providing efficient solutions
is the crux of RM and what has lead to helping practitioners make better decisions.
RM now spans across a broad array of industries and the tools of RM have been used
to optimally sell airline tickets, hotel rooms, fashion goods and more recently online
advertisements. My dissertation contributes to the development of RM technologies
by applying mathematical modeling and analytics to different RM problems with an
aim to: (1) quantify fundamental tradeoffs, and (2) design efficient algorithms to find
(near)-optimal solutions. An underlying theme of this dissertation is the modeling of
customer preferences, a key component of any RM problem. Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4
explore discrete choice models which aim at predicting customer choices when faced
with a set of different alternatives. Chapter 5 studies the presence of risk-aversion in
customers preferences and uses various utility models to capture such behavior.
Choice model and assortment optimization. For a given problem, many de-
mand models can be used. Deciding on the right model is a complex task. In
Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4, we study the fundamental tradeoffs underlying the model
selection problem. In particular, we focus on the tension between expressiveness and
tractability of a model. The richness of the model allows capturing fine nuances of
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customer behavior. On the other hand, looking at the tractability of the model is
equally important: does this model lead to a mathematical model that can be solved
efficiently? Typically, simple models, from the predictive standpoint, lead to easy
problems, from the tractability standpoint. On the other hand, rich models lead to
hard problems. To explore these tradeoffs, we focus on a core RM problem known
as the assortment optimization problem. In this problem, the decision maker needs
to decide on a subset of products to offer arriving customers in order to maximize
expected revenue. In this RM problem, the prices are assumed to be given and the
decision maker’s lever is to decide which products to offer. For example, this situation
holds in the context of airline tickets, where a menu of fares is designed to allow the
same capacity to be sold at different prices. By nature, this is a hard combinatorial
problem as the number of possible offer sets grows exponentially with the number of
products. Moreover, the choice of demand model heavily affects the tractability of
the assortment optimization problem. Because of the nature of the problem, we use
particular demand models known as choice models. By designing efficient algorithms
for the assortment optimization problem under various choice models, we quantify
the cost in tractability one has to pay for better predictive power. Thus, we assess
the strengths and weaknesses of different choice models which lead to better under-
standing of the tradeoffs underlying the model selection problem. Chapter 1 provides
an introduction to choice models and assortment optimization. It introduces three
main families of model. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are then each devoted to one paticular
model.
Risk averse buyers in online advertising. In Chapter 5, we do not assume
that the selling mechanism is fixed but rather explore a different tradeoff in RM,
that of choosing how to sell a given product. We illustrate this tradeoff by focusing
on the problem of selling ad impressions via Internet display advertising platforms.
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Advertisers’ buying choices typically include two options: either they commit to
a reservation contract in advance or they buy programatically in real time via an
exchange. The former case is a manual, time-consuming, and expensive process which
comes with a guarantee on the impressions. In the latter case, advertisers typically
bid in a second-price auction and they may therefore experience significant allocation
uncertainty stemming from the randomness in the number of advertisers participating
in the auction as well as the uncertainty in their valuation. Furthermore, the second-
price auctions comes with a price uncertainty. In contrast, reservation contracts
provide price and allocation guarantees. In Chapter 5, we study how the presence
of risk-averse buyers affects the desire for guarantees as well as how to price such
reservation contracts. In order to capture the risk aversion of buyers, we use different




Choice models and assortment optimization
1.1 Choice models: introduction and taxonomy
Choice is ubiquitous and pervades everyday life. Am I in the mood for thai food or
sushi tonight? Would this black shirt look better on me than this blue one? Should I
take the subway or a taxi? Who should I vote for? We make choices multiple times a
day. Not surprisingly, trying to model how we choose among possible offered options
has been a fundamental topic of research in many different academic fields including
marketing, transportation, economics, psychology and operations management.
In many applications, our choice heavily depends on the menu of available options.
Did you take this cab because the subway was not running? What happens when your
favorite coffee brand is stocked out at the grocery store? Do you buy another brand or
do you walk out without anything? Underlying our choice is the substitution effect :
when our most preferred option is not available we substitute to another option.
Modeling this phenomenon is at the heart of the theory of discrete choice modeling
which we now discuss. To make things concrete and because of the focus on revenue
management applications, we will refer to these options as products and we will think
about modeling how customers choose among different offered products. However it
should be clear that these models have much broader applications.
Unlike traditional demand models, choice models make the demand for each prod-
uct a function of the entire offer set. This flexibility allows capturing behaviors such
as the substitution effect but also significantly increases the complexity of the demand
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model. Mathematically, a choice model specifies customer preferences in the form of
a probability distribution over products in a subset. More precisely, the choice model
will be defined by the following choice probabilities:
π(i, S) = Pr(customer selects product i from offer set S),
where we assume that we have a universe N consisting of n products such that i ∈ N
and S ⊆ N . We refer to π(i, S) as a choice probability. This quantity can equivalently
be thought of as the probability that some random customer chooses product i when
the offer set is S or as the fraction of customers who will choose product i if the subset
S is offered. Such a model allows us to model the substitution effect. For example,
having π(i, S) > π(i, S ∪ {j}) captures a cannibalization of product i by product j:
when j is offered, the demand for product i drops. However, this flexibility comes at
a cost. Indeed, note that such a model needs to specify the demand of each product
for each of the 2n possible subset S ⊆ N . The theory of discrete choice modeling
provides more parsimonious descriptions of these models by adding some assumptions
on the form of the choice probabilities. In this dissertation, we study three main
families of choice models: random utility models, a Markov chain based choice model
and distributions over rankings. Each of these models addresses the modeling of
customer preferences in a distinct fashion. Classical economic theory postulates that
individuals select an alternative by assigning a utility to each option and selecting
the alternative with the maximum utility. This is the basis for the family of random
utility models which we study in Chapter 2. More recently, different approaches
coming from the operations literature have emerged. The other two models that we
consider, a Markov chain based model in Chapter 3 and distribution over rankings in
Chapter 4, belong to this stream. We now give a brief literature review for each of
these three types of model where we try to highlight how these models relate to each
other. We do not introduce the mathematical details of each model and postpone
this to their corresponding chapter.
5
1.1.1 Random utility models
The class of random utility maximization (RUM) models was formally introduced by
Nobel prize winner economist Daniel McFadden [53]. They have a long history and
have been extensively studied in the literature in several areas including marketing,
transportation, economics and operations management (see [54], [8]). In this frame-
work, each customer assigns a random utility Ui to each product i. When the utilities
are realized, he/she then chooses the product which maximizes his/her utility among
all offered products. More formally, the choice probabilities take the following form
under this framework:
π(i, S) = Pr(Ui = max
j∈S
Uj).
Specifying the joint distribution of the random variables Ui generates different RUM
models.
Multinomial logit model. The multinomial logit (MNL) model has by far been
the most popular model in practice. It was introduced independently by Luce [50]
and Plackett [62] and was referred to as the Plackett-Luce model. It came to be
known as the MNL model after the work of McFadden [53] who gave it this modern
interpretation through the lens of RUM theory. Indeed, the MNL model is an RUM
model where the random utilities Ui are assumed to be i.i.d. across products and
distributed according to a Gumbel distribution.
Informally, the MNL model assigns a score to each product. Each product is
then chosen with probability proportional to its score. This simplicity makes the
expression of the choice probabilities very easy to write down but also limits the
ability of the model to faithfully capture complex substitution patterns present in
various applications. In particular, a commonly recognized limitation of the MNL
model is the so-called “Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives” (IIA) property (see
[8]), which specifies that the odds of choosing among two products are not affected
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by the presence of a third product. Recognizing these limitations, researchers have
proposed more complex models to capture a richer class of substitution behaviors.
We now discuss two such models which uses the MNL model as a building block.
Nested logit model. In a nested logit (NL) model, the products are clustered
into different nests. Customers first choose a nest and then choose among products
in the chosen nest according to an MNL model. The NL model was introduced by
Williams [75] and its justification as a RUM model was later provided in [11]. The NL
model alleviates the IIA property by introducing some some correlation between the
utilities of products in the same nest. More recently, [48] introduce a generalization of
this model called the d-level nested logit (dNL) model. In the same fashion, customers
now choose a particular nest by going down a decision tree of depth d. These models
are particularly interesting when some predefined nest structure exists on the set of
products as it is unclear how to learn the nest structure of these models efficiently.
Mixture of MNL model. Another approach to breaking the IIA property is as-
suming that there are several classes of customers, each of which choosing according
to a different MNL model. Such mixture of MNL (mMNL) model (also sometimes
referred to as mixed logit) was introduced in [55] where the authors show that any
choice model arising from the random utility framework can be approximated as
closely as required by a mixture of a finite (but unknown) number of MNL models.
This makes the mMNL model the most general model in the class of RUM models.
There are other RUM models that we do not consider in this work such as the
exponomial model [2] and refer to [72] for a detailed overview of these models. We
now turn to two different approaches to generating choice model coming from the
operations literature.
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1.1.2 Markov chain model
Introduced in [10], the main idea motivating the Markov chain (MC) model is to model
a customer’s choice by explicitly modeling his substitution behavior. Here, customer
substitution is captured by a Markov chain, where each product corresponds to a state
of the Markov chain, and substitutions are modeled using transitions in the Markov
chain. Given an offer set, the states corresponding to the offered products become
absorbing. A random customer arrives to each product according to some arrival
probabilities. Upon arrival, the customer chooses the product if offered. Otherwise,
the customer then substitutes according to the underlying transition probabilities of
the Markov chain and continues to do so until he reaches an offer product. At this
point, he chooses that product. In other words, in order to determine the chosen
product for some random customer, we perform a random walk on the Markov chain
and stop when we first hit one of the absorbing state. The corresponding product is
chosen. Under this model, we can reformulate the choice probabilities as:
π(i, S) = Pr(customer gets absorbed in state i when subset S of nodes is absorbing).
Interestingly, despite being motivated from a completely different point of view, a
salient feature of the MC model is that it generalizes several known model (see [10])
including MNL, generalized attraction model [33], and the exogenous demand model
[43]. Moreover, [10] show that the MC model provides a good approximation in choice
probabilities to the class of RUM.
Interpretability of parameters. Another very interesting feature of this model
is that its parameters have a very nice interpretation as they directly model substitu-
tions. To illustrate this, we use a publicly available data set consisting of preference
lists over different sushi types. The Sushi data set consists of 5,000 complete rankings
over 10 varieties of sushi (http://www.kamishima.net/sushi/ [42]). Each ranking cor-
responds to the preferences of one person who was asked to rank the different types
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of sushis. We use 1,500 rankings for training and 3,500 rankings for validation. In
particular, we fit a MC model (using the procedure described in [10]) and a simple
MNL model on the training samples. Using those fitted models, we compute the
choice probabilities over all possible subsets and compare them to the choice prob-
abilities computed over the 3,500 validation rankings. We report the average error
in choice probabilities in Table 1.1. We also report the average error made by the
empirical distribution (ED) (on the 1,500 training rankings). The improvement that
Model MNL MC ED
MAPE 15.8 % 8.3 % 6.9 %
Table 1.1: Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) of various models on the Sushi
data set.
we observe using the MC model over the MNL model is significant: the average error
is almost reduce by half. Moreover, the error in prediction using the MC model is
quite close to the error of the ED. However, the really interesting part consists at
looking at the fitted parameters of the MC model. To highlight the flexibility of the
MC model, we contrast it with a simple MNL model (a special case of MC model).
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the parameters of the fitted models in the form of a matrix
where each entry of the matrix corresponds to the transition probability of the un-
derlying Markov chain. For instance, the cell at the intersection of the row “tuna”
and “shrimp” represents the probability of substituting from tuna to shrimp. The
color represents the intensity of the substitution.
First note that the MNL model only allows a very limited behavior. This is a
consequence of the IIA property. In particular, the substitutions under an MNL model
are independent of the product we are substituting from. Hence, all the columns of
the matrix have the same color. Secondly, the gradient of color, from left to right,
indicates that the strength of the substitution is dictated by the popularity or market
share of a product: the sushi are ordered by popularity on each axis.
9
Figure 1.1: Substitution behavior under MNL model.
Now, we turn to the matrix representing the MC model (Figure 1.2). We immedi-
ately observe that the captured behavior is much richer. Moreover, several interesting
phenomenon are captured. First of all, we observe that all the tuna variations of
sushis (fatty tuna, tuna, tuna roll) exhibit strong mutual substitutions. For instance,
there is a much higher substitution from fatty tuna to tuna than to any other type
of sushis. Similarly, the substitution from tuna roll is highest towards fatty tuna and
tuna. This is particularly helpful as we can detect clusters of products customer tend
to substitute among just by looking at the parameters of the fitted model. Another
interesting phenomenon is the behavior toward the sea urchin sushi, a very atypical
sushi. Note that the substitution to the sea urchin sushi are relatively low despite
the sea urchin being the second most popular sushi. This is because people tend to
exhibit very strong preferences for this sushi: they either rank it first or last, i.e. they
10
Figure 1.2: Substitution behavior under MC model.
do not substitute to the sea urchin. Note that this phenomenon cannot be captured
by a simple MNL model since by IIA, the substitution has to be proportional to the
popularity.
1.1.3 Distribution over rankings
In the most general case, a choice model is given by a distribution over preference lists
or rankings [26, 73, 36]. A preference list is a ranked ordering of the products of N .
Given an offered subset of products, when a random customer arrives, a preference
list is sampled from the distribution. The customer then purchases his most preferred
item from the offered products using the sampled preference list.
π(i, S) = Pr(product i is ranked first among product in S).
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The rank-based model is very general and accommodates distributions with exponen-
tially large support sizes and, therefore, can capture complex substitution patterns.
However, available data are usually not sufficient to identify such a complex model.
Therefore, sparsity is used as a model selection criterion to pick a model from the set
of models consistent with the data. Specifically, it is assumed that the distribution
has a support size K, for some K that is polynomial in the number of products.
Sparsity results in data-driven model selection [26], obliviating the need for imposing
arbitrary parametric structures.
The need for smoothing. Despite their generality, however, sparse rank-based
models cannot account for noise or any deviations from the K ranked-lists in the
support. This limits their modeling flexibility, resulting in unrealistic predictions and
inability to model individual-level observations. Specifically, because K  n!, the
model specifies that there is a zero chance that a customer uses a ranking that is
even slightly different from any of the K rankings in the support and a zero chance of
observing certain choices. However, choices may be observed in real (holdout) data
that are not consistent with any of the K rankings, making the model predictions
unrealistic. In addition, a natural way to interpret sparse choice models is to assume
that the population consists of K types of customers, with each type described by one
of the ranked lists. When this interpretation is applied to individual-level observa-
tions, it implies that all the choice observations of each individual must be consistent
with at least one of the K rankings, which again may not be the case in real data.
Mallows-smoothed model. In order to address these issues, we generalize the
sparse rank-based models by smoothing them using the Mallows kernel. Specifically,
we suppose that the choice model is a mixture of K Mallows models.
The Mallows distribution was introduced in the mid-1950’s [51] and is the most
popular member of the so-called distance-based ranking models, which are character-
12
ized by a modal ranking ω and a concentration parameter θ. The probability that a
ranking σ is sampled falls exponentially as e−θ·d(σ,ω), where d(·, ·) is the distance be-
tween σ and ω. Different distance functions result in different models. The Mallows
model uses the Kendall-Tau distance, which measures the number of pairwise dis-
agreements between the two rankings. Intuitively, the Mallows model assumes that
consumer preferences are concentrated around a central permutation, with the likeli-
hood of large deviations being low. The mixture of Mallows model with K segments
is specified by the modal rankings: ω1, . . . , ωK , concentration parameters: θ1, . . . , θK
and probabilities: µ1, . . . , µK where for any k = 1, . . . , K, µk specifies the probability
that a random customer belongs to Mallows segment k with modal ranking ωk and
concentration parameter θk. This mixture model is a more natural model allowing
for deviations from the modal rankings and assigning a non-zero probability to every
choice. Further, it is a parsimonious way to extend the support of the distribution
to an exponential size, and as θk →∞ for all k, the distribution concentrates around
each of the K modes, yielding the sparse rank-based model. We refer the interested
readers to a large body of existing work in the literature on estimating such models
from data [49, 4, 22, 46].
1.2 Fundamental tradeoffs in model selection
Which model should ultimately be used for a given problem is a very important yet
challenging question. Indeed, the complexity of the choice models presented above is
motivated by the need for greater predictive power in order to, for instance, break the
IIA property. However, how does this richness affects the tractability of these models?
Can we solve any decision problems using these models? This is especially important
in revenue management as the goal is often to use these models to formulate some
mathematical program which one ultimately would like to solve. Typically, simple
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models, from the predictive standpoint, lead to easy problems, from the tractability
standpoint. On the other hand, rich models lead to hard problems.There is no free
lunch: a more complex choice model can capture a richer substitution behavior but
leads to increased complexity of the optimization problem. We explore and quantify
these tradeoffs in the context of the assortment optimization problem, a core revenue
management problem, which we introduce in the next section.
Many other dimensions are important in practice. We do not study them in this
dissertation but would like to emphasize that the model selection problem involves
carefully balancing all these tradeoffs. For instance, of the utmost importance is the
estimation of these choice models from data. In this dissertation, we assume that the
models are given and we try to assess the tractability of the associated assortment
problem. However, estimating the parameters of the model from data is equally
important. Moreover, this task is highly non trivial as in most settings, we are trying
to infer customer preferences from very limited information, mainly their purchase
data.
1.3 The assortment optimization problem
What subset (or assortment) of product to offer is a fundamental decision problem
that commonly arises in several application contexts. A concrete setting is that of
a retailer who carries a large universe of products but can offer only a subset of the
products in each store, online or offline (see [44], [27]). The objective of the retailer is
typically to choose the offer set that maximizes the expected revenue/profit1 earned
from each arriving customer, under stochastic demand. Another example is display-
based online advertising where a publisher has to select a set of ads to display to
1Note that conversion-rate maximization can be obtained as a special case of revenue/profit
maximization by setting the revenue/profit of all the products to be equal.
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users. In this context, due to competing ads, the click rates for an individual ad
depends on the overall subset of ads to be displayed.
We assume that we have a universe N = {1, . . . , n} consisting of n products.
Moreover, there is always an outside option modeling the fact that a customer could
decide not to purchase anything. We denote it by 0. Each product i has an exogenous
price pi. Under this notation, the expected revenue R(S) of the assortment S ⊆ N




pi · π(i, S).
For a given choice model, the associated assortment optimization problem consisting




Note that this is a combinatorial problem for which trying all 2n possible assortment is
not an scalable solution. We also consider variants of Assort where we add constraints
on the assortment with the aim of capturing more realistic situations. There will be
a particular emphasis on the capacity constrained version of the assortment problem.
In that context, every product i is associated with a weight wi, and the decision maker
is restricted to selecting an assortment whose total weighs is at most a given bound
W . This is also sometimes referred to as a knapsack constraint. We can formulate










For the special case of uniform weights (i.e. wi = 1 for all i), the capacity constraint
reduces to a constraint on the number of products in the assortment. We refer to
this setting as the cardinality constrained assortment optimization problem:
max
S⊆N
{R(S) : |S| ≤ k} . (Card)
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Both of these constraints on assortments arise naturally, allowing one to model prac-
tical scenarios such as shelf space constraint or budget limitations. We will also
consider the case of totally-unimodular constraints. Let xS ∈ {0, 1}|N | denote the in-
cidence vector for any assortment S ⊆ N where xSi = 1 if i ∈ S and xSi = 0 otherwise.
The assortment optimization problem subject to a totally-unimodular constraint can




R(S) : AxS ≤ b
}
. (TU)
Here, A is a totally-unimodular matrix, and b is an integer vector. Note that Card
is a special case of TU. These capture a wide range of practical constraints such as
precedence, display locations, and quality consistent pricing constraints [23]. Finally,
we will study at a robust version of the assortment optimization problem (Rob). In
this variant, we capture the presence of uncertainty in the model parameters which
can come, for instance, from their estimation from data. A common approach in that
case it to resort to robust optimization, i.e. finding the assortment which maximizes
the worst-case revenue under the uncertainty.
1.4 Summary of contributions of Chapters 2, 3
and 4
We summarize the main contributions of Chapters 2, 3 and 4. By collecting these
results together, we can better contrast and compare them. Each of the following
chapter will focus on a single model and will be self contained.
For the RUM models and the MC model (Chapters 2 and 3), the results presented
in this thesis have the same flavor and are two-fold. On the one hand side, we
design efficient algorithms with provable guarantees to address different variants of
assortment problems. On the other hand, we complement these algorithms with
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hardness results which helps understanding what is the best possible approximation
for a given problem. All our results are tight: the performance of our proposed
algorithms matches the best possible lower bound prescribed by the hardness result.
Together these results therefore allow us to better understand the limitations and
tradeoffs inherent to different models. On the technical side, both these chapters
introduce algorithmic frameworks which give unified approaches to various problems.
In Chapter 4, the challenges are slightly different. Indeed, unlike previous chap-
ters, under a mixture of Mallows model computing the choice probabilities is already
a non-trivial task because of the exponential support of the distribution. The main
message of Chapter 4 is that despite this exponential support the Mallows-smoothed
model choice probabilities can be computed efficiently. This in turns leads to efficient
algorithms to solve assortment optimization problems.
Notations. To ease the reading and avoid repeating long expressions such as “the
cardinality constrained assortment optimization problem under the MNL model”,
we will use the notation Model− Problem to denote a particular problem under a
given choice model. For instance, MNL-Card will refer to the cardinality constrained
assortment problem under the MNL choice model. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 list all the




d-level nested logit dNL
Mixtures of MNL mMNL
Markov chain MC
Table 1.2: Abbreviations for different choice models
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Robust assortment optimization Rob
Table 1.3: Abbreviations for various assortment problems
1.4.1 Random utility models
The popularity of the MNL comes from its tractability. In particular, MNL-Assort is
tractable (see [71] for instance): the optimal assortment can be found in polynomial
time. The structure of the optimal assortment is well understood: for MNL-Assort,
the optimal assortment consists of the top k most expensive products for some k.
There are many proofs of this beautiful result and we provide yet another one in
Appendix B.5. [23] give an exact algorithm for MNL-Card, and more generally, for
MNL-TU. [67] characterize the optimal assortment for MNL-Rob.
For more general RUM models, [24] give an exact algorithm for NL-Assort. [34]
propose an exact algorithm for NL-Card , when the cardinality constraint affects each
nest separately, and a constant factor approximation for NL-Capa under the same
assumption. [31] present an exact algorithm when the cardinality constraint is across
different nests. Under a mixture of MNL model, mMNL-Assort becomes NP-hard,
even under a mixture of two MNL [66]. [64] devise a polynomial-time approximation
scheme (PTAS) for mMNL-Card.
Contributions. As previously discussed, MNL-Assort and MNL-Card are tractable.
However, we show that MNL-Capa is NP-hard. In light of this hardness result, we
present a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for MNL-Capa. In
other words, for any ε > 0, our algorithm computes a (1 − ε)-approximation of
the optimal assortment in time polynomial in the input size and 1/ε. This is the
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best possible approximation for a NP-hard problem. Therefore, our algorithm gives
the best possible approximation for MNL-Capa. Our algorithmic approach is very
flexible and also gives near-optimal algorithms for NL-Capa, dNL-Capa under some
mild assumptions.
When the number of mixtures is constant, we can also give a near-optimal al-
gorithm for mMNL-Capa. [65] give a PTAS for a more general capacitated sum of
ratio optimization problem based on a linear programming formulation. [57] give an
FPTAS for the same problem. However, they use a black-box construction of an
approximate Pareto-optimal frontier introduced by [60]. We would like to note that
the running time of our algorithm is polynomial in the input size and 1/ε, but is
exponential in K (number of mixtures in the mixture of MNL model). Therefore, we
obtain an FPTAS only when the model is a mixture of a constant number of MNL
models. To complement this result, we show that mMNL-Assort is hard to approx-
imate within any reasonable factor when the number of mixtures is not constant.
More specifically, there is no polynomial time algorithm (polynomial in number of
items and mixtures: n,K and the input size) with an approximation factor better
than O(1/K1−δ) for any constant δ > 0 for mMNL-Assort unless NP ⊆ BPP . This
implies that if we require a near-optimal algorithm for the assortment optimization
over the mixture of MNL model, a super-polynomial dependence on the number of
mixtures is necessary.
1.4.2 Markov chain model
[10] show that MC-Assort is polynomial time solvable. [76] also consider the Markov
chain model in the context of airline revenue management, and present a simulation
study. In a recent paper, [30] study the network revenue management problem under
the Markov chain model and give a linear programming based algorithm.
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Contributions. We show that MC-Card is NP-hard to approximate within a fac-
tor better than some given constant, even when all items have uniform prices. It
is interesting to note that, while MC-Assort can be solved optimally in polynomial
time, MC-Card is APX-hard. In contrast, in both the MNL and NL models, the
unconstrained assortment optimization and the cardinality constrained assortment
problems have the same complexity. We also consider the case of totally-unimodular
(TU) constraints on the assortment. We show that MC-TU is hard to approximate
within a factor of O(n1/2−ε) for any fixed ε > 0, where n is the number of items. This
result drastically contrasts with [23] where the authors prove that MNL-TU can be
solved in polynomial time.
On the positive side, we develop a new algorithmic technique that gives, through
a unified approach, a new alternative strongly polynomial algorithm for MC-Assort,
a constant factor approximation for both MC-Card and MC-Capa as well as an exact
algorithm for MC-Rob. Moreover, we consider a special case of MC model where
the underlying Markov chain has constant rank. Under this additional assumption,
we can leverage the tools from Chapter 2 and design a near optimal algorithm for
MC-Capa.
1.4.3 Distribution over rankings
The intractability of the problem comes in two folds. First of all, specifying a general
distribution over permutations may be expensive, as we may have to explicitly list
exponentially many values along with their probabilities. Secondly, even for a general
distribution over a small number of preference lists, [3] recently prove that it is NP-
hard to compute a subset of products whose expected revenue is within factor better
than O(n1−ε)2, for any accuracy level ε > 0. This hardness of approximation result
2The reduction is from the independent set problem to an assortment optimization problem
under a distribution over only n rankings.
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discourages the hope of coming up with any reasonable approximation heuristic with
a provably good approximation guarantee in the worst case. Nonetheless, with certain
additional structural assumptions, certain special subclasses of such models can be
shown to be tractable [3], [35], [36].
Contributions. We address the two key computational challenges that arise when
using a mixture of Mallows model: (a) efficiently computing the choice probabilities
and hence, the expected revenue/profit, for a given offer set S and (b) finding a
near-optimal assortment. We also present a compact mixed integer program (MIP)
and present a variable bound strengthening technique that leads to a practical ap-
proach for the constrained assortment optimization problem under a general mixture
of Mallows model.
We present two efficient procedures to compute the choice probabilities π(i, S)
exactly under a general mixture of Mallows model. Because the mixture of Mallows
distribution has an exponential support size, computing the choice probabilities for
a fixed offer set S requires marginalizing the distribution by summing it over an ex-
ponential number of rankings, and therefore, is a non-trivial computational task. In
fact, computing the probability of a general partial order under the Mallows distri-
bution is known to be a #P hard problem [49, 13]. The only other known class of
partial orders whose probabilities can be computed efficiently is the class of parti-
tioned preferences [46]; while this class includes top-k/bottom-k ranked lists, it does
not include other popular partial orders such as pairwise comparisons.
We present a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for a large class
of constrained assortment optimization for the mixture of Mallows model including
cardinality constraints, knapsack constraints, and matroid constraints. Our PTAS
holds under the assumption that the no-purchase option is ranked last in the modal
rankings for all Mallows segments in the mixture; such assumptions are necessary
21
because of hardness of approximation for Assort under a sparse rank-based model
mentioned above. Under the above assumption and for any ε > 0, our algorithm
computes an assortment with expected revenue at least (1− ε) times the optimal in
running time that is polynomial in n and K but depends exponentially on 1/ε.
1.4.4 Summary
We summarize some of the main results of the following chapters in Table 1.4 to
help the reader better navigate through this thesis but also to help compare and
contrast the results. No single model dominates the others on all accounts. Rather,
we try to understand the price one has to pay, in terms of tractability, for increased
predictive power. The hope is that this grid can guide practitioners in the selection
of choice model depending on their application. For instance, if time is a constraint
and the assortment optimization problem needs to be solved in split seconds (such as
an online application for instance), then having a simpler but more tractable model
may be interesting. However, if the assortment problem needs to be solve every other
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Summary of contributions
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Chapter 2
Near optimal algorithms for capacity constrained
assortment under random utility models
In this chapter, we examine the capacity constrained assortment optimization problem
(Capa) under various random utility models. We first show, in Section 2.1, that
MNL-Capa is NP-hard. In light of this hardness result, we present a fully polynomial
time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for the problem. In other words, for any ε > 0,
our algorithm computes a (1 − ε)-approximation of the optimal assortment in time
polynomial in the input size and 1/ε. This is the best possible approximation for a
NP-hard problem. Therefore, our algorithm gives the best possible approximation for
MNL-Capa. Our framework is flexible and can be extended to more general random
utility models. In particular, we also derive FPTAS for NL-Capa (Section 2.2) and
dNL-Capa (Section 2.3).
For the mixture of MNL model, we also obtain an FPTAS for mMNL-Capa (Section
2.4). However, the running time of our algorithm is exponential in the number of
mixtures. Therefore, we obtain an FPTAS only when the model is a mixture of
a constant number of MNL models. We further show that this super-polynomial
dependance is necessary. In particular, even without any constraint, we show that
mMNL-Assort is hard to approximate within any reasonable factor when the number
of mixtures is not constant. More specifically, there is no polynomial time algorithm
with an approximation factor better than O(1/K1−δ), where K is the number of
mixtures, for any constant δ > 0 for mMNL-Assort unless NP ⊆ BPP.
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2.1 Multinomial logit model
In this section, we examine the assortment optimization problem under the MNL
model. The MNL model is given by (n + 1) parameters u0, . . . , un which represent
the preference weights of each product as well as the preference weight of the no







Each product i ∈ [n] is also assigned a price pi and a weight wi. We denote by W
the total available capacity. The capacity constrained assortment optimization can















We would like to note that both MNL-Assort and MNL-Card are tractable under the
MNL model (see, [71] and [23] respectively). We begin by giving an alternative proof
for the LP based algorithm proposed in [23] for MNL-Card.
2.1.1 Cardinality Constraint: LP based Algorithm
As a warmup, we first consider MNL-Card, where there is an upper bound on the
number of products in the assortment. We present an LP based optimal algorithm
for this case. Our proof is different than [23] and is based on the properties of an
optimal basic solution. In particular, we prove the following theorem.














≤ kq0 , 0 ≤ qj ≤ ujq0
}
, (2.1)
where k is the upper bound on the number of items in the assortment. Furthermore,
if q∗ is an optimal solution, then S∗ = {j | q∗j = ujq∗0} is an optimal assortment.
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Proof. We first show that the above LP is a relaxation of MNL-Card. For any feasible












if j ∈ S
0 otherwise
∀j ≥ 1.
Moreover, the two solutions give the same objective value which implies that zLP ≥ z∗.
We now show that any basic solution q∗ to (2.1) satisfies q∗j ∈ {0, ujq∗0} for all
j = 1, . . . , n. We have n + 1 variables in (2.1) and only one equality constraint.





≤ kp0 and 0 ≤ qj ≤ ujq0 ∀j ≥ 1.
Consequently, qj ∈ {0, ujq0} for at least (n − 1) variables. Suppose exactly (n − 1)




















= ρq0 + k
′q0
where k′ is an integer and 0 < ρ < 1. This yields a contradiction. Therefore, any
basic solution leads to an integral solution of the original problem which means that
zLP ≤ z∗.
2.1.2 Hardness under a general capacity constraint
We now show that MNL-Capa, is NP-hard. We prove this by a reduction from the
knapsack problem.
Theorem 2.2. MNL-Capa is NP-hard.
Proof. We give a reduction from the knapsack. In an instance of the knapsack prob-
lem on n items, we are given weights c1, . . . , cn and profits r1, . . . , rn and a knapsack
capacity C. The goal is to find the most profitable assortment of items.
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Consider the following instance for MNL-Capa:
u0 = 1, W = C and ∀j ≥ 1, uj = rj, pj = 1, wj = cj.
















Note that the function f(x) =
x
1 + x
is increasing in x. Therefore, maximizing f(rTx)
is equivalent to maximizing rTx, hence the reduction to the knapsack problem.
2.1.3 FPTAS for MNL-Capa
We present an FPTAS for MNL-Capa. Note that in view of Theorem 2.2, this is best
possible for MNL-Capa. Our algorithm utilizes the rational structure of the objective
function and is based on solving a polynomial number of dynamic programs. Since







uj), for an optimal solution, S
∗ within a factor of (1 + ε).
We then try to find a feasible assortment (satisfying the capacity constraint) with
the numerator and denominator values approximately equal to the guesses using a
dynamic program. We would like to note that these dynamic programs are similar to
multi-dimensional knapsack problems for which there is no FPTAS [32]. However, in
our problem, we are allowed to violate the constraints which allows us to obtain an
FPTAS.
Let p (resp. P ) be the minimum (resp. maximum) revenue and u (resp. U) be the
minimum (resp. maximum) MNL parameter. We can assume wlog. that p, u > 0;
otherwise, we can clearly remove the corresponding product from our collection and
continue. For any given ε > 0, we use the following set of guesses for the numerator
and denominator.
Γε = {ru(1 + ε)`, ` = 0, . . . , L1} and ∆ε = {u(1 + ε)`, ` = 0, . . . , L2}, (2.2)
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where L1 = O (log (nPU/(ru)) /ε) and L2 = O (log ((n+ 1)U/u) /ε). The number of
guesses is polynomial in the input size and 1/ε. For a given guess h ∈ Γε, g ∈ ∆ε, we
try to find a feasible assortment S with∑
j∈S
pjuj ≥ h and
∑
j∈S
uj ≤ g, (2.3)
using a dynamic program. In particular, we consider the following discretized values












Note that we round down the numerator and round up the denominator to maintain
the right approximation. For a given set of guesses, note that the problem can
be reduced to a multi-dimensional knapsack for which there exists a PTAS, see for
example [32]. The main difference is that we do not have hard constraints like in the
knapsack. This allows us to round the coefficients while still maintaining feasibility.
Also, note that we discretize the product pjuj for all j instead of considering separate
discretizations for rj and uj.
We can now present our dynamic program. Let I = bn/εc − n and J = d(n +
1)/εe+ (n+ 1). For each (i, j, `) ∈ [I]× [J ]× [n], let F (i, j, `) be the minimum weight
of any subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , `} such that∑
s∈S




We compute F (i, j, `) for (i, j, `) ∈ [I]× [J ]× [n] using the following recursion.
F (i, j, 1) =

w1 if 0 ≤ i ≤ p̃1 and j ≥ ũ0 + ũ1
0 if i ≤ 0 and j ≥ ũ0
∞ otherwise
F (i, j, `+ 1) = min{F (i, j, `), w`+1 + F (i− p̃`+1, j − ũ`+1, `)}
(2.5)
Note that this dynamic program is similar to the one for the knapsack problem. Using
this dynamic program, we construct a set of candidate assortments Sh,g for all guesses
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(h, g) ∈ Γε×∆ε. Algorithm 1 details the procedure to construct the set of candidate
assortments.
Algorithm 1 Construct Candidate Assortments
1: For (h, g) ∈ Γε ×∆ε,
(a) Compute discretization of coefficients p̃i and ũi using (2.4).
(b) Compute F (i, j, `) for all (i, j, `) ∈ [I]× [J ]× [n] using (2.5).
(c) Let Sh,g be the subset corresponding to F (I, J, n).
2: Return A = ∪(h,g)∈Γε×∆εSh,g.
Let us show that Algorithm 1 correctly finds a subset satisfying (2.3). In partic-
ular, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Let A be the set of candidate assortment returned by Algorithm 1. For
any guess (h, g) ∈ Γε × ∆ε, if there exists S such that W (S) ≤ W and (2.3) is
satisfied, then W (Sh,g) ≤ W . Moreover, Sh,g satisfies (2.3) approximately, i.e.
∑
j∈Sh,g
pjuj ≥ h(1− 2ε) and
∑
j∈Sh,g
uj ≤ g(1 + 2ε).















Rounding down and up the previous inequalities gives
∑
j∈S








+ (n+ 1) = J,













≤ g(1 + 2ε).
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Algorithm 2 FPTAS for MNL-Capa
1: Construct a set of candidate assortment A using Algorithm 1.
2: Return the best feasible solution to MNL-Capa from A.
Now that we have constructed a set of candidate assortment, the second part of
the algorithm consists of returning the best possible feasible assortment. Algorithm
2 presents a complete description of the algorithm.
Theorem 2.3. Algorithm 2 returns an (1− ε)-optimal solution to MNL-Capa. More-
over, the running time is O (log(nPU) log(nU)n3/ε4).
Proof. Let S∗ be the optimal solution to MNL-Capa and (ˆ̀1, ˆ̀2) such that





riui ≤ pu (1 + ε)
ˆ̀





ui ≤ u (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
2+1 .
From Lemma 2.1, we know that for (h, g) = (ru (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
1 , u (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
2), A contains an
assortment S̃ such that∑
i∈S̃
piui ≥ ru (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
1 (1− 2ε) and
∑
i∈S̃+
ui ≤ u (1 + ε)
ˆ̀








f(S∗) ≥ (1− 4ε)f(S∗).
Running Time. Note that in Algorithm 1, we try L1 ·L2 guesses for the numerator
and denominator values of the optimal solution. For each guess, we formulate a
dynamic program with O (n3/ε2) states. Therefore, the running time of Algorithm 2
is O (L1L2n
3/ε2) = O (log(nPU) log(nU)n3/ε4) which is polynomial in input size and
1/ε. Note that logP and logU are both polynomial in the input size.
2.2 Nested logit model
We now consider the capacitated assortment optimization problem for the nested
logit (NL) model. In a NL model, the set of products is partitioned into nests (or
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subsets) and the choice probability for any product j is decomposed in the probability
of selecting the nest containing j and the probability of selecting j in that nest.
Suppose there are K nests N1, . . . , NK and each nest Nk contains n products with
price pi,k and utility parameter ui,k. As in the MNL model, we assign a utility of
U0 to the no-purchase alternative. We assume that there is no no-purchase option
within each nest, i.e. u0,k = 0 for all k ∈ [K]. Each nest Nk has a dissimilarity
parameter, γk ∈ [0, 1] that models the influence of nest k over others. Note that
these two assumptions are necessary to make NL-Assort tractable [24]. For a set of
assortments (S1, . . . , SK), the probability that nest k is selected is given by










i∈Sk ui,k for all k ∈ [K]. Let Rk denote the expected revenue of












Additionally, each product is assigned a weight wi,k. Let Wk be the available capacity
for nest k for k ∈ [K]. We also assume that there is total available capacity W . We





Qk(S1, . . . , SK)Rk(Sk)
W (Sk) ≤ Wk, ∀k ∈ [K]
K∑
k=1
W (Sk) ≤ W,
(NL-Capa)
where W (Sk) =
∑
i∈Sk wi,k for all k ∈ [K]. Note that [34] give a 2-approximation
when W =∞ and [31] give a 4-approximation when Wk =∞ for all k ∈ [K]. Here,
we allow both a constraint on each nest as well as a constraint across all nests.
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Before we describe the algorithm, we first reformulate the problem. The epigraph









(S1, . . . , SK) ⊆ [n]k,W (Sk) ≤ Wk, ∀k ∈ [K],
K∑
k=1
W (Sk) ≤ W
}
.






γk(Rk(Sk)− z), ∀(S1, . . . , SK) ⊆ S.
From that formulation, we can see that the optimal revenue z∗ is the unique fixed










Note that this reformulation was first used in [34]. We present it here for completeness.
The algorithm consists of performing a binary search on z and for each fixed value of










Since our goal is to design a near-optimal algorithm, we will aim at getting a (1− ε)-















where Ak is a set of candidate assortments for nest k, for all k ∈ [K]. Moreover, for





Lemma 2.2. Assume that the collection of candidate assortment Ak includes a (1−ε)-
approximate solution (Childk) for any b ∈ R+. Then, a (1− ε)-approximate solution
to (Root) also gives a (1− ε)-approximate solution to (2.6).
Proof. For a fixed z, let (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
K) be the optimal solution to (2.6) and let b
∗
k =









Therefore, if for k ∈ [K], we let Ŝk ⊆ Ak be the best candidate assortment for b∗k,
then (Ŝ1, . . . , ŜK) is a (1 − ε)-approximate solution to (2.6). The optimal solution
to (Root) is therefore a (1 − ε)-approximate solution to (2.6). This concludes the
proof.
We can now give a high-level description of the FPTAS for NL-Capa. It consists
of a binary search on z. Then, for each fixed value of z, we perform the following
steps.
• For all k ∈ [K], construct a set of candidate assortments Ak for all k ∈ [K] such
that Ak includes a (1− ε)-approximate solution to (Childk) for any b ∈ R+.
• Construct a (1− ε)-approximate solution (Ŝ1, . . . , ŜK) to (Root).




We now give more details for each part of the algorithm.
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2.2.1 Binary search and preprocessing
In order to perform a binary search on z, our guess on the optimal revenue z∗, we
first provide upper and lower bounds on z. For each k ∈ [K], let S∗k be the optimal
solution to MNL-Capa, i.e. the constrained assortment that maximizes Rk(Sk) for









R(Si∗) ≤ z∗ ≤ R(Si∗) = zmax (2.8)
Having both a lower and upper bound on the optimal z∗, we can perform a binary
search on z. Moreover, this allows us to prune products with too little revenue within
each nest. To do so, we first show that we can always remove nest with too little
revenue from any assortment.
Lemma 2.3. Let (Ŝ1, . . . , ŜK) be a (1 − ε)-approximate solution to (Root). For all,
k ∈ [K] such that
Uk(Sk)
γk(Rk(Sk)− z) ≤ εU0zmin/K, (2.9)
replacing Ŝk by ∅ also give a (1− ε)-approximate solution to (Root).
Proof. Let (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
K) be the optimal solution to parent. For all k ∈ [K], let Ŝk be













Let K̂ be the set of indices such that (2.9) holds. We have∑
k∈K̂
Uk(Ŝk)























This implies the following corollary that allows us to prune products whose revenue
is too small.
Corollary 2.1. For a given value of z, we can remove products such that




and still approximate (Root) within factor (1− ε).
2.2.2 Constructing Candidate Assortments for (Childk).












We use Algorithm 1 to construct candidate assortments. Indeed, note that we need
to guess the quantities (
∑
i∈S ui) and (
∑
i∈S ui(pi − z)). In order to use Algorithm
1, we need to specify the sets Γε and ∆ε that we use for the guesses. Note that by
Corollary 2.1, we can assume that for all i ∈ [n], ui,k(pi,k− z) > hmin,k. Therefore, we
can use the following set of guesses.
Γε = {hmin,k(1 + ε)`, ` = 0, . . . , L1} and ∆ε = {u(1 + ε)`, ` = 0, . . . , L2}, (2.10)
where L1 = O(log(nPU/hmin,k)/ε) and L2 = O(log(nU/u)/ε) and u, U and P and
respectively the minimum utility, maximum utility and maximum revenue of an item
in the nest k.





k) − z) >
εU0zmin/K, then the set A returned by Algorithm 1 using the set of guesses (2.10)
contains a (1 − ε)-optimal solution to (Childk) for any b ∈ R+. Moreover, both the
size of A and the running time of Algorithm 1 are polynomial in the input size and
1/ε.
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ui,k(pi,k − z) ≤ hmin,k (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
1+1 , and





ui,k ≤ u (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
2+1 .
From Lemma 2.1, we know that for (h, g) = (hmin,k (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
1 , u (1 + ε)
ˆ̀




ui,k(pi,k − z) ≥ pu (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
1 (1− 2ε) and
∑
i∈Sh,g
ui,k ≤ u (1 + ε)
ˆ̀









 ≥ 1− 2ε
(1 + 2ε)1−γk
f(S∗k) ≥ (1− 4ε)f(S∗k).
Both the size of A and running time of Algorithm 1 being polynomial in the input
size and 1/ε follow from the proof of Theorem 2.3.
2.2.3 FPTAS for (Root)
We show how to approximately maximize (Root) for a given value of z and given
sets Ak for all k ∈ [K] of candidate assortments for each nest. Note that we have
candidate assortments for each nest and we are trying to stitch together an assort-
ment (S1, . . . , SK). Also, note that candidate assortments satisfy individual nest
constraints. We will now need to make sure that the assortment (S1, . . . , SK) satisfies
the constraint across the different nests. Again, we use ideas similar to Algorithm 2
by guessing the value of the objective function. Consider the following set of guesses.
Γ = {U0zmin(1 + ε)`, ` = 0, . . . , L},
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and L = O(log(zmax/zmin)/ε). For each guess v ∈ Γ, we use a dynamic program to




γk(Rk(Sk)− z) ≥ v.
For every candidate assortment Sk ∈ Ak, we consider the following discretized values













Let I = bK/(εz)c − K. We can compute F (u, v) for (u, v) ∈ [K] × [I] using the
following recursion. Let Λ = {S1 ∈ A1 : W (S1) ≤ W1, rS1 ≥ v}.
F (1, v) =

min{W (S1) : S1 ∈ Λ} if v > 0 and Λ 6= ∅
0 if v ≤ 0
∞ otherwise
(2.12)
F (u+ 1, v) = min
F (u, v), minSu+1∈Au+1
W (Su+1)≤Wu+1
W (Su+1) + F (u, v − rSu)
 (2.13)
Algorithm 3 details the procedure.
Algorithm 3 FPTAS for (Root)
1: For h ∈ Γε,
(a) For k ∈ [K], let Ak be the set of candidate assortment returned by Algorithm
1.
(b) For k ∈ [K] and Sk ∈ Ak, compute discretization of coefficients r̃Si using
(2.11).
(c) Compute F (u, v) for all (u, v) ∈ [K]× [I] using (2.12).
(d) Let Sh be the subset corresponding to the state F (K, I).
2: Return the best feasible solution to (Root) from ∪h∈ΓεSh
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Lemma 2.5. Algorithm 3 returns a (1−ε)-approximate solution to (Root). Morever,
the running time is polynomial in input size and 1/ε.
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.4. Putting together the different
results yields the following result.
Theorem 2.4. There is an FPTAS for NL-Capa with running time polynomial in n,
K and the input size when γk ∈ [0, 1] and u0,k = 0 for all k ∈ [K].
2.3 d-level nested logit
We also extend our FPTAS to the setting where the choice model is given by a d-level
nested logit (dNL) model. [48] show how to solve dNL-Assort in polynomial time. We
adapt the technique used in the previous section to approximate dNL-Capa. We have
n products indexed by {1, 2, . . . , n} and the no purchase option denoted by 0. We
additionally have a d-level tree denoted by (T, V ) with vertices V and edges E. The
tree has n leaf nodes at depth d, corresponding to the n products. We use Children(j)
to denote the set of child nodes of node j in the tree and Parent(j) to denote the
parent node of node j. Each node v ∈ V has nv children and is associated with a set
of products, or leaf nodes, that are included in the subtree rooted at node j. Each
assortment S ⊆ [n] defines a collection of subsets (Sv : v ∈ V ) at each node of the
tree. If v is a leaf node, then
Sv =
 {j} if j ∈ S∅ otherwise .
When v is not a leaf node, we define Sv recursively by setting Sv =
⋃
w∈Children(v) Sw.
Each node is associated with a dissimilarity parameter γv ∈ [0, 1]. We define the
38
utility of each leaf node v as
Sv =
 uj if j ∈ S∅ otherwise ,













Furthermore, each assortment Sv has a weight W (Sv) equal to the sum of the weights
of all the leave nodes includes in the subtree rooted at v. We assume that there is a ca-
pacity constraint Wv associated with each node v ∈ V . The assortment optimization




We use a similar approach where we construct candidate assortments at each node
using a dynamic program . To construct the set of candidate assortments, we use the
sets of candidate assortments of the children nodes.
Theorem 2.5. There is an FPTAS for dNL-Capa with running time polynomial in
n, d,and the input size.
Moreover, note that this framework can be used to solve NL-Capa with additional
constraints on the nests as long as they are representable in a tree structure.
Corollary 2.2. There is a FPTAS for NL-Capa with additional capacity constraints
when those constraints have a nested structure.
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We now present the algorithm for dNL-Capa. As for the NL model, the problem
can be formulated as a fixed point equation. More precisely, the optimal revenue z∗




























where Ak is a set of candidate assortments for node v, for all v ∈ V . Moreover, for














Inductively using the the proof of Lemma 2.2, we have the following lemma which
allows us to construct a near optimal solution starting from the lower levels of the
trees and building up a solution.
Lemma 2.6. Assume that the collection of candidate assortment Av includes a (1−ε)-
approximate solution (Nodev) for all v ∈ V \{Root} and any b ∈ R+. Then, a (1− ε)-
approximate solution to (d-Root) also gives a (1− ε)-approximate solution to (2.14).
For a given z and node v ∈ V , we construct candidate assortments sequentially
from the candidate assortment from Children(v). We only detail this step as the rest
of the algorithm is similar to the algorithm for the NL model.
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Constructing Candidate Assortment. For a fixed node v ∈ V , the objective







We use a dynamic program to construct a set of candidate assortment for node v
based on candidate assortment of its children. The algorithm is similar in spirit
to Algorithm 1. The only difference is that instead of items, we have candidate
assortments. For each guesses (h, g), we discretize the revenues and utilities of the













Note that as for the NL model, we can preprocess the quantities and get a universal
lower bounds on our guess in order to have polynomially many guesses (h, g). The
rest of the construction is exactly similar to Algorithm 3 where instead of returning
the best feasible solution, we store all the candidate assortment into a set Av.
2.4 Mixtures of multinomial logit model
We next study the assortment optimization problem for a mixture of MNL (mMNL)
model which is given by a distribution over K different MNL models. For all k ∈ [K]
and j ∈ [n], let uj,k denote the MNL parameters for segment k and θk denote the
probability of segment k. For any S ⊆ [n], j ∈ S+ = S ∪ {0}, the choice probability









Each product i ∈ [n] has a price pj and weight wi. Let W denote the total available

















[66] show that without any constraint mMNL-Assort is NP-hard even when K = 2,
i.e. for a mixture of two MNL models. We present a FPTAS for the mMNL-Capa
problem when the number of mixtures is constant. The idea is similar to the FPTAS
for MNL-Capa. Since the objective function is a sum of ratios instead of a single ratio,
we guess the value of each numerator (
∑
j∈S∗




for an optimal solution, S∗ within a factor of (1 + ε). We then try to find a feasible
assortment (satisfying the capacity constraint) with the numerator and denominator
values approximately equal to the guesses using a dynamic program. The algorithm
is very similar to the FPTAS for MNL-Capa and we defer the details of the algorithm
to Appendix A.1.
Theorem 2.6. There is a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for
mMNL-Capa when the number of mixtures, K, is constant.
The running time of our algorithm is exponential in the number of mixtures K.
We next show that a super polynomial dependence on K is necessary for any near-
optimal algorithm. In other words, there exist no near optimal algorithm whose
running time depends polynomially on K.
2.4.1 Hardness for arbitrary number of mixtures
We show that even without any constraint, mMNL-Assort is hard to approximate
within any reasonable factor when the number of MNL segments, K is not constant.
In particular, we show that there is no polynomial time algorithm (polynomial in
n,K and the input size) with an approximation factor better than O(1/K1−δ) for
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any constant δ > 0 for mMNL-Assort unless NP ⊆ BPP . This implies that if we
require a near-optimal algorithm for mMNL-Assort, a super-polynomial dependence
on the number of mixtures is necessary.
[3] show that the assortment optimization problem is hard to approximate within
a factor of O(1/K1−δ) for any δ > 0 when the choice model is given by a distribution
over K rankings by an approximation preserving reduction from the independent
set problem. We adapt the reduction in [3] to show a hardness of approximation
mMNL-Assort.
Theorem 2.7. There is no polynomial time algorithm (polynomial in n,K and the
input size) that approximates mMNL-Assort within a factor O(1/K1−δ) for any con-
stant δ > 0 unless NP ⊆ BPP .
Proof. We prove this by a reduction from the independent set problem. In a maximum
independent set problem, we are given an undirected graph G = (V,E) where V =
{v1, . . . , vn}. The goal is to find a maximum cardinality subset of vertices that are
independent.
We construct an instance of mMNL-Assort as follows. We have one product and
one MNL segment corresponding to each vertex in G. Therefore, n = K = |V | in the
MMNL model. For any MNL segment k corresponding to vk ∈ V , we only consider
a subset of products corresponding to a subset of neighbors of vk in G. In particular,
we consider the following utility parameters.
uj,k =

1 if j = k or j = 0
n2 if (vj, vk) ∈ E and j < k
0 otherwise
pi = n




, k ∈ [n]
(2.15)
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where θ ∈ [1/2, 1] is an appropriate normalizing constant. Note that the utility of
any product j ∈ [n] for segment k ∈ [n], uj,k > 0 only if (vj, vk) ∈ E and j < k.
We first show that if there is an independent set, I ⊆ V where |I| = t, we can
find an assortment with revenue θt/2. Consider the set of products, S corresponding
to vertices in I, i.e.,
S = {j | vj ∈ I}.
Then, it is easy to observe that the revenue of S is exactly θ · t/2.
Next, we show that if there is an assortment S with expected revenue R(S), then
there exists an independent set of size at least b2 ·R(S)/θc. For any segment k ∈ [K],
let Rk denote the contribution of segment k to the expected revenue of assortment
S, i.e.,










We show Rk ≥ θ/2 or Rk ≤ (2θ)/n2. Let
N(k) = {j | (vj, vk) ∈ E, j < k}.
Case 1 (N(k) = ∅): If k /∈ S, then Rk = 0. On the other hand, if k ∈ S, then


















n3(k−1) + n2 ·∑j∈N(k) n3(j−1)

















We can now construct an independent set, I as follows:
I = {vk ∈ V | k ∈ S,N(k) = ∅} .
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We claim that I is an independent set. For the sake of contradiction, suppose there
exist vi, vj ∈ I (i < j) such that (vi, vj) ∈ E. Since vi, vj ∈ I, i, j ∈ S and
N(i) = N(j) = ∅. Moreover, since i < j and (vi, vj) ∈ E, i ∈ N(j) which implies
N(j) 6= ∅; a contradiction. Therefore, I is an independent set. Also,






where the second equality follows from (2.17). Therefore, if I∗ is the optimal indepen-
dent set and R∗ is the optimal expected revenue of the corresponding mMNL-Assort








Consequently, an α-approximation for MMNL-Assort implies an O(α)-approximation
for the maximum independent set problem. Since the maximum independent set is
hard to approximation within a factor better than O(1/n1−δ) (where |V | = n = K)
for any constant δ > 0 (see [29]), the above reduction implies the same hardness of
approximation for mMNL-Assort.
The above theorem shows that mMNL-Assort is hard to approximate. The ap-
proximation preserving reduction from the independent set problem gives several in-
teresting insights. First, note that each MNL segment in the reduction only contains
a subset of products corresponding to a subset of vertices in the neighborhood of the
corresponding vertex. This is quite analogous to the consideration set model consid-
ered in [39] where a local neighborhood defines the consideration set. Such graphical
model based consideration set instances are quite natural and our reduction shows
that mMNL-Assort is hard even for these naturally occurring instances. Therefore, our
reduction gives a procedure to construct naturally arising hard benchmark instances
of mMNL-Assort that may be of independent interest.
We can extend the hardness of approximation even for the continuous relaxation
of mMNL-Assort.
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There is no approximation algorithm (with running time polynomial in K) that has
an approximation factor better than O(1/K1−δ) for any constant δ > 0 unless NP ⊆
BPP .
We present the proof in Appendix A.3.
In this chapter, we have studied Capa and provided a flexible algorithmic frame-
work to derive FPTAS for various RUM models. For these models, a near-optimal al-
gorithm is best possible since even MNL-Capa is NP-hard. Moreover, for mMNL-Assort,
we strengthen the known hardness result (mMNL-Assort is NP-hard under a mixture
of 2 MNL) and show that when the number of mixtures is arbitrary, the problem
becomes hard to approximate within any reasonable factor. In particular, this pre-
cludes a polynomial dependence on the number of mixtures. Recall that from a
richness standpoint, the MNL model and the mixture of MNL model sit at the two
extremes of the spectrum within the class of RUM models. The stark difference be-
tween MNL-Assort and mMNL-Assort in terms of tractability for even the simplest




Approximation algorithms for assortment optimization
problems under a Markov chain based choice model
In this chapter, we focus on assortment optimization problems under a Markov chain
based choice model. MC-Assort admits a polynomial time algorithm through an LP
reformulation of the problem [10]. We start by showing in Section 3.2 that adding
a cardinality constraint makes the problem much harder. In particular, MC-Card is
NP-hard to approximate within a factor better than some given constant, even when
all products have uniform prices. It is interesting to note that, while MC-Assort can be
solved optimally in polynomial time, MC-Card is APX-hard. In contrast, in both the
MNL and NL models, Assort and Card have the same complexity. We also consider
the case of totally-unimodular (TU) constraints on the assortment. We show that
MC-TU is hard to approximate within a factor of O(n1/2−ε) for any fixed ε > 0, where
n is the number of products. This result drastically contrasts that of [23], who prove
that MNL-TU model can be solved in polynomial time.
The harness results motivate us to consider approximation algorithms for MC-Card
and MC-Capa. For the special case when all product prices are equal, we show in
Section 3.3.1 that we can obtain a (1−1/e)-approximation for MC-Card using a greedy
algorithm. In fact, for this special case of uniform prices, we can get a (1 − 1/e)-
approximation for more general constraints such as a constant number of capacity
constraints and matroid constraint.
In Section 3.3.2 we show that a simple greedy algorithm fails when the prices
are arbitrary. This motivates us to consider an alternative approach to solving this
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problem. In particular, we introduce a new algorithmic framework in Section 3.3.3.
The algorithm is based on a “local-ratio” paradigm that builds the solution itera-
tively. In each iteration, the algorithm makes an appropriate greedy choice and then
constructs a modified instance such that the final objective value is the sum of the
objective value of the current solution and the objective value of the solution in the
modified instance. Therefore, the local-ratio paradigm allows us to capture the ex-
ternality of our action in each iteration on the remaining instance by constructing an
appropriate modified instance; thereby, linearizing the revenue function even though
the original objective function is non-linear. This technique may be of independent
interest.
We next show how to use this framework to solve various assortment optimization
problems. In Section 3.4, we give an alternative exact algorithm to MC-Assort. Section
3.5 gives a 2-approximation algorithm for MC-Card and 3.6 gives a 3-approximation
algorithm for MC-Capa. On top of these worst-case guarantees, we show in Section 3.7
through numerical experiments that our constant factor algorithm exhibit very good
practical performance (both in terms of approximation and running time). Finally,
in Section 3.8, we consider a robust variant of the assortment optimization problem
(MC-Rob) and show how similar ideas can be applied to design an exact algorithm
for this setting. Furthermore, we give insights into the structure of the optimal
assortment for MC-Rob.
Finally, in Section 3.9, we consider a special case of Markov chain model when
the underlying Markov chain has a constant rank. Under this extra assumption, we
can leverage the tools developed in Chapter 2 to design a near optimal algorithm
for MC-Capa. The running time of the algorithm is exponential in the rank of the
underlying Markov chain. We therefore obtain an FPTAS only when the rank is
constant.
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3.1 Markov chain model
We denote the universe of n products by the setN = {1, 2, . . . , n} and the no-purchase
option by 0, with the convention that N+ = N ∪ {0}. We consider a Markov chain
M with states N+ to model the substitution behavior of customers. This model is
completely specified by initial arrival probabilities λi for all states i ∈ N+ and the
transition probabilities ρij for all i ∈ N+, j ∈ N+. If a retailer chooses to offer a
subset of products S to consumers, then the corresponding states in S of the Markov
chain become absorbing states. A customer arrives in state i with probability λi if
the state is absorbing. Otherwise, the customer transitions to a different state j 6= i
and the process continues until the customer reaches an absorbing state. In other
words, the probability of a random customer purchasing product i with S being the
offer set of products is the probability that the customer reaches state i before any
other absorbing states in the underlying Markov chain. As before, let pi denote the
price of product i.
Following [10], we assume that for each state j ∈ N , there is a path to state
0 with non-zero probability. For a given offer set S ⊆ N , let π(i, S) be the choice
probability that item i is chosen when the assortment S is offered. We have






λjρj,kρk,i + . . .
Additional notation. For any (possibly empty) pairwise-disjoint subsets U, V,W ⊆
N+, let Pj(U ≺ V ≺ W ) denote the probability that starting from j, we first visit
some state in U before visiting any state in V ∪W , and subsequently visit some state
in V before visiting any state in W , with respect to the transition probabilities ofM.
Let P(U ≺ V ≺ W ) = ∑nj=1 λjPj(U ≺ V ≺ W ). Note that with this notation, we
can write π(i, S) = P(i ≺ S+\{i}) where S+ = S ∪ {0} for all S ⊆ N (in this case,
W = ∅).
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3.2 Hardness of approximation
In this section, we present our hardness of approximation results for the constrained
assortment optimization problem under the Markov chain choice model.
3.2.1 APX-hardness for cardinality constraint with uniform
prices
We show that MC-Card is APX-hard, i.e., it is NP-hard to approximate within a given
constant. In particular, we prove this result even when all products have uniform
prices.
Theorem 3.1. MC-Card is APX-hard, even when all products have equal prices.
Proof. We establish the claim via a gap preserving reduction from minimum vertex
cover on 3-regular (or cubic) graphs. We refer to this problem as VCC. This problem
is known to be APX-hard (see [1]). In other words, for some constant α > 0, it is
NP-hard to distinguish whether the minimum-cardinality vertex cover is of size at
most k or at least (1 + α)k for cubic graphs.
Consider an instance I of VCC, consisting of a cubic graph G = (V,E) on n ver-
tices V = {v1, . . . , vn}. We can assume that k > |E|/3, or otherwise, the distinction
between the two cases above is easy. We construct an instance M(I) of MC-Card
as follows. Each vertex vi ∈ V corresponds to a product i of N . In addition, we
also have the no-purchase option 0. For each vertex v ∈ V , let N(v) denote the
neighborhood of v in G, i.e., N(v) = {u : (u, v) ∈ E}, consisting of exactly 3 vertices.
Now, for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N+ the transition probabilities are defined as
ρij =
 1/4 if vj ∈ N(vi) or j = 00 otherwise.
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Finally, for all items i ∈ N , we have an arrival rate of λi = 1/n and a price of pi = 1.
Out of these products, at most k can be selected.
The goal in VCC is to choose a minimum-cardinality set of vertices such that every
edge is incident to at least one of the chosen vertices. Let U∗ ⊆ V be a minimum
vertex cover in G. We show that the instanceM(I) satisfies the following properties:














where S∗ is the optimal assortment for M(I). This implies that MC-Card cannot be
approximated within factor larger than 1− α
16
, unless P = NP. To see this, note that










is monotone-increasing in k, meaning that
the maximum value attained is 1− α
16
.
Case (a): |U∗| ≤ k. In this case, we can augment U∗ with k − |U∗| additional
vertices chosen arbitrarily from V \ U∗, and obtain a (not-necessarily minimum)
vertex cover U with |U | = k. Now, consider the assortment S = {i : vi ∈ U}, which
is indeed a feasible solution. Since all prices are equal to 1, we can write the expected
revenue of this set as














Pi(S ≺ 0). (3.1)
When starting at any state i /∈ S, the Markov chain moves to 0 with probability 1/4
and gets absorbed. With probability 3/4, the Markov chain moves from i to one of
the vertices in N(i). Since U is a vertex cover, it follows that N(i) ⊆ S. Therefore,
Pi(S ≺ 0) = 3/4 for all i /∈ S. Based on these observations for the optimal assortment
S∗, we have













Case (b): |U∗| ≥ (1 + α)k. Let S be some assortment consisting of k products.
In this case, equation (3.1) is still a valid decomposition of R(S), and we need to
consider two cases for products i /∈ S. If N(i) ⊆ S, then Pi(S ≺ 0) = 3/4 as in
case (a). However, when N(i) * S, there exists j ∈ N(i) such that j /∈ S. Therefore,
there is a probability of 1/16 that starting from i the Markov chain moves to j and































To upper bound the latter term, let V (S) be the set of vertices of V corresponding
to S, i.e., V (S) = {vi : i ∈ S}. Let Ē(S) be the set of edges that are not covered
by V (S). We have (2 · |Ē(S)|) = ∑i/∈S,N(i)*S |N(i)\S|. The important observation
is that |Ē(S)| ≥ αk. Otherwise, V (S) can be augmented to a vertex cover via the
addition of fewer than αk vertices, contradicting |U∗| ≥ (1 + α)k. Now,
|Ē(S)| ≥ αk ≥ α
3
· |E| = αn
2
,
where the second inequality follows from k > |E|/3, and the last equality holds since
















Since the above upper bound on R(S) holds for any assortment S of k products, this
must also be true for the maximum-revenue one, S∗.
3.2.2 Totally-unimodular constraints
We show that MC-TU is NP-hard to approximate within factor O(n1/2−ε), for any
fixed ε > 0 for the Markov chain model. This result drastically contrasts that of
[23], who proved that the assortment optimization problem with totally-unimodular
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constraints can be solved in polynomial time when consumers choose according to
the MNL model.
Theorem 3.2. MC-TU cannot be approximated in polynomial-time within a factor
O(n1/2−ε), for any fixed ε > 0, unless P = NP .
To establish our inapproximability results for MC-TU, we demonstrate that totally-
unimodular constraints in the Markov chain model capture the distribution over rank-
ings model as a special case. [3] show that even Assort under a general distribution
over rankings model is hard to approximate within factor O(n1−ε) for any fixed ε > 0
(n is the number of substitutable products). We present the proof in Appendix B.1.
3.3 Local ratio based algorithm design
3.3.1 Special case: uniform price products
When all prices are equal, we show that the revenue function is submodular and mono-
tone. Using the classical result of [59], we have that a greedy algorithm guarantees a
(1− 1/e)-approximation for MC-Card for this special case of uniform prices. We start
with a few definitions. It is worth mentioning that, from a practical point of view, the
uniform-price setting turns the objective function into that of maximizing sales prob-
ability. This scenario is very common when products are horizontally-differentiated,
i.e., differ by characteristics that do not affect quality or price, such as iPads coming
in a variety of colors, or yogurt with different amounts of fat-content.
Definition 3.1. A revenue function R : 2N → R+ is monotone when for all S ⊆ N
and i ∈ N , we have R(S ∪ {i}) ≥ R(S).
Definition 3.2. A revenue function R : 2N → R+ is submodular when for all S ⊆
T ⊆ N and i ∈ N\T , we have R(S ∪ {i})−R(S) ≥ R(T ∪ {i})−R(T ).
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Theorem 3.3. When all products have uniform prices, the revenue function R(·) is
submodular and monotone.
Proof. Let p be the price of every product in N . Since products prices are identical,
for every subset S and product i ∈ N\S, we have
R(S ∪ {i}) = R(S) + p · P(i ≺ 0 ≺ S).
Recall that P(i ≺ 0 ≺ S) is the probability that the Markov chain visits state i
and then visits state 0 without visiting any state in S. When all prices are equal,
the marginal increase in revenue by adding product i is only due to the additional
demand that product i is able to capture. Consequently, R(·) is monotone as the
quantity p · P(i ≺ 0 ≺ S) is non-negative. Moreover, the submodularity of R follows
from the fact that for all S ⊆ T , we have
R(S ∪ {i})−R(S) = p · P(i ≺ 0 ≺ S) ≥ p · P(i ≺ 0 ≺ T ) = R(T ∪ {i})−R(T ).
Therefore, from the classical result of [59] for maximizing a monotone submodular
function subject to a cardinality constraint, we know that the greedy algorithm gives
a (1 − 1/e)-approximation bound for MC-Card with uniform prices. Algorithm 4
describes this procedure in detail. Note that for uniform prices, when |S| < k < n,
Algorithm 4 Greedy Algorithm
1: Let S be the set of states picked so far, starting with S = ∅.
2: While |S| < k and there exists i ∈ N\S such that R(S ∪ {i})−R(S) ≥ 0,
(a) Let i∗ be the item for which R(S ∪ {i}) − R(S) is maximized, breaking ties
arbitrarily.
(b) Add i∗ to S.
3: Return S.
the condition in Step 2 that there exists i ∈ N\S such that R(S ∪{i})−R(S) ≥ 0 is
redundant as the revenue function is monotone, which is not necessarily true for the
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case of arbitrary prices. We include this condition to describe the greedy algorithm
for the general case and to discuss implications for arbitrary prices.
More general constraints for uniform prices. For the special case of uniform
prices, since the revenue function is monotone and submodular, we can exploit the
existing machinery for approximately maximizing submodular monotone functions
subject to a wide range of constraints (see, for instance, [47], [14], [45], [17]). This
way, constant-factor approximations can be obtained for the assortment optimization
under the Markov chain model for more general constraints. For instance, [45] give a
(1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm for maximizing a monotone submodular function
under a fixed number of knapsack (capacity) constraints, and [17] give a (1 − 1/e)-
approximation for maximizing a monotone submodular function under a matroid
constraint.
3.3.2 Bad examples for arbitrary prices
The approximation guarantees we establish for uniform prices do not extend to the
more general setting with arbitrary prices, even for MC-Card. In what follows, we
point out the drawbacks of the natural greedy heuristics, including Algorithm 4, in
approximating MC-Card for arbitrary prices. Intuitively, the performance of Algo-
rithm 4 for general prices can be bad since it can make a low-price product absorbing
that subsequently blocks all probabilistic transitions going into high price products.
We formalize this intuition in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For arbitrary instances of MC-Card with a cardinality constraint of k,
Algorithm 4 can compute solutions whose expected revenue is only O(1/k) times the
optimum.
Proof. Consider the following instance of MC-Card with n = k + 1 items, where k is
the upper bound specified by the cardinality constraint. We have a state s and states
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i = 0, . . . , k. The arrival rates are all equal to 0, except for λs which is equal to 1.
Moreover
pi =
 (1/k) + ε if i = s1 if i = 1, . . . , k, ρij =

1/k if i = s and j = 1, . . . , k
1 if i = 1, . . . , k and j = 0
0 otherwise,
where ε ≤ 1/(2k). Figure 3.1 provides a graphical representation of this instance.














Figure 3.1: A bad example for Algorithm 4.
i = 1, . . . k. Once s is selected, adding any other state cannot increase the revenue.
Therefore, the greedy algorithm gives a revenue of (1/k) + ε. However, the optimal
solution is to offer items 1 to k, which gives a revenue of 1 in total. When ε tends to
0, the approximation ratio goes to 1/k.
In fact, we can show that the above example is the worst possible and Algorithm 4
gives a 1/k-approximation for MC-Card.
Lemma 3.2. Algorithm 4 guarantees a 1/k-approximation for MC-Card.
We present the proof of the above lemma in Appendix B.2.
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Modified greedy algorithm. The bad instance for Algorithm 4 shows that the
algorithm may focus too much on local improvements in each iteration, without
taking into account the information of the entire network induced by the probability
transition matrix or the number of remaining iterations. Therefore, we consider a
modified greedy algorithm that accounts for the Markov chain structure by using
the optimal solution to the unconstrained assortment problem, where there is no
restriction on the number of products picked. This solution can be computed via an
algorithm proposed by [10] (we also give an alternative strongly-polynomial algorithm
for the unconstrained problem in Section 3.4). Intuitively, the products picked by the
unconstrained optimal assortment should not block each other’s demand too much.





P(i ≺ U∗+\{i}) · pi. (3.3)
A natural candidate algorithm takes the k products with the largest P(i ≺ U∗+\{i})·pi
value within an unconstrained optimal solution, and sets these states to be absorbing.
Algorithm 5 describes this procedure.
Algorithm 5 Greedy Algorithm on Optimal Unconstrained Assortment
1: Let U∗ be an optimal solution to the unconstrained problem.
2: Sort products of U∗ in decreasing order of P(i ≺ U∗+\{i}) · pi.
3: Return S = {top k products in the sorted order}.
We show in the following lemma that even Algorithm 5 performs poorly in the
worst case. In fact, we present an example where every subset of k items of the
optimal solution U∗ has revenue a factor k away from the optimal.
Lemma 3.3. There are instances where the revenue obtained by Algorithm 5 is far
from optimal by a factor of k/|U∗| where k is the upper bound in the cardinality
constraint.
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Proof. Consider the following instance of the problem with n+2 products (or states).
We have a state s and states i = 1, . . . , n and state 0 corresponding to the no-purchase
option. The arrival rates are all equal to 0, except for λs which is equal to 1. Moreover
pi =
 1− ε if i = s1 if i = 1, . . . , n, ρij =

1/n if i = s and j = 1, . . . , n
1 if i = 1, . . . , n and j = 0
0 otherwise,












Figure 3.2: A bad example for Algorithm 5.
example, the unconstrained optimal assortment is U∗ = {1, . . . , n}, and the greedy
algorithm on U∗ selects k products among U∗, meaning that a total revenue of k/n is
obtained. However, the optimal solution of the constrained problem is to only offer
item s, which gives a revenue of 1− ε. As ε tends to 0, the approximation ratio goes
to k/|U∗|.
The poor performance of Algorithm 5 on the above example illustrates that an
optimal assortment for the constrained problem may be very different from that
of its unconstrained counterpart. Hence, searching within an unconstrained optimal
solution for a good approximate solution to the constrained problem can be unfruitful
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in general. It is worth noting that the lower bound of k/|U∗| for Algorithm 5 is tight,
as stated in the following lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix B.3.
Lemma 3.4. Algorithm 5 guarantees a k/|U∗|-approximation algorithm to MC-Card.
The analysis of the two greedy variants for the cardinality constrained assortment
optimization under the Markov chain model provides important insights that we use
towards designing a good algorithm for the problem.
3.3.3 High-level ideas for algorithm design
As the example in Figure 3.1 illustrates, Algorithm 4 could end up with a highly
suboptimal solution due to picking products that cannibalize, i.e. block, the demand
for higher price products. Picking the highest price product will eliminate such a
concern. However, a high price product might only capture very little demand, and
therefore, generate very small revenue as illustrated in the example in Figure 3.2.
When there is a capacity constraint on the assortment, picking such products may
not be an optimal use of the capacity. This motivates us to choose the highest price
product in an appropriate consideration set. Intuitively, the consideration set will
consist of products that generate sufficiently high incremental revenue.
We first give a high-level description of our algorithm that builds the solution
iteratively. Let Mt denote the problem instance in any iteration t. The algorithm
(ALG) considers the following two steps in each iteration t:
1. Greedy Selection. Define an appropriate consideration set Ct of products, and
pick the “highest price” product from Ct.
2. Instance Update. Construct a new instance, Mt+1, of the constrained assort-
ment optimization problem with appropriately modified product prices and
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transition probabilities such that
ALG(Mt) = ∆t + ALG(Mt+1),
where ALG(·) is the revenue of the solution obtained by the algorithm on a
given instance, and ∆t is the incremental revenue in the objective value from
the item selected in iteration t.
The instance update step linearizes the revenue function even though the original
revenue function is non-linear, which is crucial for our iterative solution approach. We
can also view the update rule as a framework to capture the externality of our actions
in each iteration of the algorithm. To completely specify the algorithm, we need to
provide a precise definition for the consideration set in the greedy step and for the
instance update step. For both MC-Card and MC-Capa, the instance update step is
similar, as explained in Section 3.3.4. The consideration set, however, depends on the
particular optimization problem being considered and will be defined later on. The
intuition is to include products whose incremental revenue is above an appropriately
chosen threshold. Our algorithm can be viewed in a local-ratio framework (see, for
instance, [6], [5] and [7]). Therefore, we will interchangeably refer to the instance
updates as local-ratio updates. However, we would like to note that the local-ratio
framework does not provide a general recipe for designing an update rule or analyzing
the performance bound. In most algorithms in this framework, the update rule follows
from a primal-dual algorithm. However, for MC-Capa, we do not even know of any
good LP formulation and the instance update rule requires new ideas.
3.3.4 Instance update in local ratio algorithm
Notation. Given an instanceM of the Markov chain model, we define an updated
instance M(S) given that S is made absorbing by modifying the product prices as
well as the probability transition matrix. Note that we index the updates by a set
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S. Therefore, the instance Mt introduced in the preceding discussion is going to be
thought of as M(St−1), where St−1 denotes the set of products picked up to (and
including) step t− 1. For an instanceM(S), we will denote by pSi the updated price
of product i, and by ρSij the updated transition probabilities for every i ∈ N , j ∈ N+.
Note that we do not change the arrival rate to any state, i.e., λSi = λi for all i ∈ N .
We also denote by RS : 2N → R the revenue function associated with the instance
M(S) and by PS(·) the probability of any event with respect to the instance M(S).
Price update. First, we introduce the price updates, such that when S is made
absorbing, we account for the revenue generated by every state j ∈ S. To this end,
consider a unit demand at state i /∈ S. This unit demand generates a revenue of pi
when i is made absorbing. On the other hand, when i is not absorbing, this unit
demand at i generates a revenue of∑
j∈S
Pi(j ≺ S+\{j}) · pj.
The above revenue (which was already accounted for by S) is lost when i is also made
absorbing in addition to S. Hence, the net revenue per unit demand at i when we





which we denote as the adjusted price pSi . Note that the adjusted prices can be
negative, corresponding to the situation where adding a product decreases the overall
revenue. The price update is explicitly described in Figure 3.3.
Transition probabilities update. Since the subset of states S is set to be ab-
sorbing, we will simply redirect the outgoing probabilities from all states in S to 0.
This is described in Figure 3.3.
We would like to note that the probabilities Pi(j ≺ S+\{j}), needed for our price













1 if i ∈ S and j = 0
0 if i ∈ S and j 6= 0
ρij otherwise.
Figure 3.3: Instance update in local-ratio algorithm.
with λi = 1 and λ` = 0 for ` 6= i. Therefore, these quantities can be efficiently
computed via traditional Markov chain tools (see, for instance, [? ]).
3.3.5 Structural properties of the updates
We first show that the local-ratio updates allow us to linearize the revenue function.
Lemma 3.5. R(S1 ∪ S2) = R(S1) +RS1(S2) for every S1, S2 ⊆ N .
Proof. Assume without lost of generality that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, since the products in
S1 ∩ S2 all have 0 as their adjusted price and we can then apply the proof to S2\S1.























PS1(i ≺ S2+\{i})Pi(j ≺ S1+\{j})pj.
With the definition of ρS1 , note that all products of S1 are redirected to 0. This,
together with the fact that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ implies that for all i ∈ S2, we have PS1(i ≺
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P(j ≺ (S2 ∪ S1)+\{j})pj +
∑
i∈S2
P(i ≺ (S2 ∪ S1)+\{i})pi
=R(S1 ∪ S2),
where the second equality holds since∑
i∈S2
P(i ≺ (S2 ∪ S1)+\{i})Pi(j ≺ S1+\{j}) = P(S2 ≺ j ≺ S1+\{j}),
as by the Markov property, both the left and right terms in the above equality denote
the probability that we will visit some state in S2 before any state in S1+, followed
by state j ∈ S1 before any other state in S1+.
The next lemma shows that the composition of two local ratio updates over subsets
S1 and S2 is equivalent to a single local ratio update over S1 ∪ S2. This property is
crucial for repeatedly applying local-ratio updates.
Lemma 3.6. Let S1 ⊆ N be some assortment, and let M1 = M(S1). For any S2
with S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, the instance M1(S2) is identical to the instance M(S1 ∪ S2) in
terms of product prices and transition probabilities.
It suffices to verify that (pS1i )
S2 = pS1∪S2i for all S1,S2 and i /∈ S1∪S2, as the above
identity clearly holds for the transition matrix updates. The proof is similar to that
of Lemma 3.5, and is presented in Appendix B.4. Putting the previous two lemmas
together gives the following claim.
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Lemma 3.7. RS1(S2 ∪ S3) = RS1(S2) + RS1∪S2(S3) for any pairwise-disjoint sets
S1, S2, S3 ⊆ N .
3.4 Unconstrained assortment optimization
As a warmup, we first present an alternative exact algorithm for MC-Assort by using
the local-ratio framework. Our algorithm is based on the observation that it is always
optimal to offer the highest price product for the unconstrained problem, as it does not
cannibalize the demand of other products. The latter property is implied by a slightly
more general claim, formalized as follows. For any x ∈ R, let [x]+ = max(x, 0).
Lemma 3.8. Let S ⊆ N . For any product i /∈ S with price pi ≥ [maxj∈S pj]+, we
have R(S ∪ {i}) ≥ R(S).
Proof. From Lemma 3.5, we have that
R(S ∪ {i}) = R(S) +RS({i}) = R(S) + PS(i ≺ 0) · pSi .
Now, pi ≥ [maxj∈S pj]+ and
pSi = pi −
∑
j∈S
Pi(j ≺ S+ \ {j}) · pj ≥ 0,
which implies R(S ∪ {i}) ≥ R(S).
The Algorithm. Based on the above lemma, we present an alternative exact algo-
rithm for MC-Assort. In particular, we define the consideration set in each iteration
to be the set of all products. Therefore, we select the highest adjusted price prod-
uct in every iteration (breaking ties arbitrarily) and update the prices and transition
probabilities according to the local ratio updates described in Figure 3.3. This se-
lection and updating process is repeated until all adjusted prices are non-positive, as
explained in Algorithm 6.
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Algorithm 6 Local Ratio for Unconstrained Assortment
1: Let S be the set of states picked so far, starting with S = ∅.
2: While there exists i ∈ N\S such that pSi ≥ 0,
(a) Let i∗ be the item for which pSi is maximized, breaking ties arbitrarily.
(b) Add i∗ to S.
3: Return S.
Theorem 3.4. Algorithm 6 computes an optimal solution for MC-Assort.
Proof. The correctness of Algorithm 6 is based on the observation that it is always
optimal to offer the highest adjusted price product, as long as this price is non-
negative. Suppose product 1 is the highest price product. From Lemma 3.8, we get
R(S ∪ {1}) ≥ R(S) for any assortment S. Therefore, we can assume that product 1
belongs to the optimal assortment. From Lemma 3.5, we can write
max
S⊆N
R(S) = R({1}) + max
S′⊆N\{1}
R{1}(S ′).
It remains to show that, when we get to an iteration where our current absorption
set is X, and the adjusted price of every state in the modified instanceM(X) is non-
positive, then X is an optimal solution to M. To see this, by repeated applications
of Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, we have
max
S⊆N
R(S) = R(X) + max
S′⊆N\X
RX(S ′).
However, since the adjusted price of every state in the instanceM(X) is non-positive,
we must have RX(S ′) ≤ 0 for all S ′ ⊆ N\X. Hence, it is optimal not to make any
state in M(X) absorbing, which implies that X is an optimal solution to M.
Implications. Our algorithm for MC-Assort provides interesting insights for some
known results about both the optimal stopping problem and MNL-Assort. [10] relate
MC-Assort to the optimal stopping time on a Markov chain (see [20]). In this problem,
we need to decide at each state i whether to stop and get the reward pi, or transition
according to the transition probabilities of the Markov chain. Moreover, there is an
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absorbing state 0 with price p0 = 0. Algorithm 6 for MC-Assort gives an alternative
strongly polynomial time algorithm for the optimal stopping problem.
[10] prove that the MNL choice model is a special case of the Markov chain
based choice model. By analyzing Algorithm 6 to solve MNL-Assort, we can recover
the structure of the optimal assortment being nested by prices, i.e., the optimal
assortment consists of the ` top-priced items for some `. We give an explicit expression
for our local ratio updates when the underlying choice model is MNL in Appendix B.5.
3.5 Cardinality constrained assortment
optimization
In this section, we present a (1/2−ε)-approximation for MC-Card, for any fixed ε > 0.
Following the local-ratio framework described in Section 3.3.3, our algorithm for the
cardinality constrained case also selects a product with high adjusted price in each
step from an appropriate consideration set. The consideration set is defined to avoid
picking products that have a high adjusted price but capture very little demand. In
particular, the consideration set includes only products whose incremental revenue is
at least a certain threshold.
The Algorithm. Our algorithm is iterative and selects a single product in each
step. Let St be the set of selected products by the end of step t, starting with S0 = ∅.
We use σt to denote the product picked in step t, meaning that St = {σ1, . . . , σt}. At
every step t ≥ 1, we select the highest adjusted price product (with respect to pSt−1 ,
breaking ties arbitrarily) among products in the following consideration set:
Ct =
{





where S∗ is the optimal solution, k is the cardinality bound, and α ∈ (0, 1) is a param-
eter whose value will be optimized later. Note that Ct is defined at the beginning of
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step t, whereas St is defined at the end of step t, and includes the product selected in
this step. Once the item σt is selected, we recompute the adjusted prices via the local
ratio update described in Figure 3.3, and update the consideration set to get Ct+1.
The algorithm terminates when either k products have already been picked (i.e., upon
the completion of step k), or when the consideration set Ct becomes empty.
Guessing the value of R(S∗). Since the optimal revenue R(S∗) is not known
a-priori, we need to describe how the value of R(S∗) is approximately guessed to
complete the algorithm’s description. A natural upper bound for R(S∗) is R(U∗),
when U∗ is the optimal unconstrained solution. From Lemma 3.4, we know that




∗)(1 + ε)j, j = 1, . . . , J
J = min {j ∈ N : Bj ≥ R(U∗)} .
(3.4)
Note that J = O(1
ε
log k). For each guess Bj for the true value of R(S
∗), we run the
algorithm, and eventually return the best solution found over all runs. Algorithm 7
describes the resulting procedure for a particular choice of Bj and threshold α for the
consideration set. Algorithm 8 describes the full procedure for any given ε > 0.
Algorithm 7 Algorithm with guess Bj and threshold α
1: Let S be the set of states picked so far, starting with S = ∅.
2: For all S, let C(S) = {i ∈ N\S : RS({i}) ≥ α·Bj
k
}.
3: While |S| < k and C(S) 6= ∅,
(a) Let i∗ be the product of C(S) for which pSi is maximized, breaking ties arbi-
trarily.
(b) Add i∗ to S.
4: Return S.
3.5.1 Technical lemmas
Prior to analyzing the performance guarantee of our algorithm, we present two tech-
nical lemmas. We start by arguing that the revenue function is sublinear for general
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Algorithm 8 Local-ratio Algorithm for MC-Card with threshold α
1: Given any ε > 0, let J and Bj, j ∈ [J ] be as defined in (3.4).
2: For all j ∈ [J ], let Sj be the solution returned by Algorithm 7 with guess Bj and
threshold α
3: Return arg maxj∈[J ] R(Sj).
product prices.
Lemma 3.9. For all S1, S2 ⊆ N consisting only of non-negative priced products,
R(S1 ∪ S2) ≤ R(S1) +R(S2).
Proof. We have that
R(S1 ∪ S2) =
∑
j∈S1
P(j ≺ (S1 ∪ S2)+ \ {j}) · pj +
∑
j∈S2\S1




P(j ≺ (S1)+ \ {j}) · pj +
∑
j∈S2
P(j ≺ (S2)+ \ {j}) · pj
= R(S1) +R(S2),
where the first inequality follows as for any j ∈ Si (i = 1, 2), P(j ≺ (S1∪S2)+\{j}) ≤
P(j ≺ (Si)+ \ {j}).
Next, we establish a technical lemma that allows us to compare the revenue of
the optimal solution R(S∗) with the revenue of the set returned by our algorithm,
R(St). First, note that the consideration sets along different steps are nested (i.e.,
C1 ⊇ C2 ⊇ · · · ). Therefore, once a product disappears from the consideration set,
it never reappears. This allows us to partition the products of S∗ according to the
moment they disappear from the consideration set (since either their adjusted revenue
becomes too small or they get picked by the algorithm). More precisely, let Z0 = S
∗
and for all t ≥ 1, we define the following sets:
• Zt = S∗ ∩ Ct denotes the products of S∗ which are in the consideration set Ct.
• Yt = Zt−1\Zt denotes the products of S∗ which disappear from the consideration
set during step t− 1.
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• Y +t = {i ∈ Yt : pSt−1i ≥ 0} denotes the products of Yt which have a non-negative
adjusted price at step t.
Note that these sets are all defined at the beginning of step t. The following lemma
relates the adjusted revenue of items in Zt−1 and Zt in terms of the marginal change
in revenue, R(St)−R(St−1).
Lemma 3.10. For all t ≥ 1, R(St)−R(St−1) ≥ RSt−1(Zt)− (RSt(Zt+1) +RSt(Y +t+1)).
Proof. Recall that, by definition, Zt contains the products of S
∗ that are in the
consideration set at the beginning of step t. Since our algorithm picks the highest




i ≥ 0 for
all products i ∈ Zt. Therefore, by Lemma 3.8,
RSt−1(Zt) ≤ RSt−1(Zt ∪ {σt}). (3.5)
We now consider two cases, depending on whether the product σt appears in the
optimal solution S∗ or not.
Case (a): σt /∈ S∗. From Lemma 3.7, RSt−1(Zt ∪ {σt}) = RSt−1({σt}) + RSt(Zt).
Consequently, from inequality (3.5), we have
RSt−1(Zt) ≤ RSt−1({σt}) +RSt(Zt)
= RSt−1({σt}) +RSt(Zt+1 ∪ Yt+1)
≤ RSt−1({σt}) +RSt(Zt+1 ∪ Y +t+1)
≤ RSt−1({σt}) +RSt(Zt+1) +RSt(Y +t+1),
where the second inequality holds since removing all negative adjusted price products
can only increase net revenue, and the last inequality follows from Lemma 3.9. Adding
R(St−1) on both sides of the inequality yields the desired inequality by Lemma 3.5.
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Case (b): σt ∈ S∗. From Lemma 3.7, RSt−1(Zt) = RSt−1({σt}) + RSt(Zt\{σt}).
Then, similar to the previous case, we have
RSt(Zt\{σt}) ≤ RSt((Zt+1 ∪ Y +t+1)\{σt}) ≤ RSt(Zt+1) +RSt(Y +t+1\{σt}).
Note that RSt(Y +t+1\{σt}) = RSt(Y +t+1) since pStσt = 0 and σt is an absorbing state in
M(St). Adding R(St−1) on both sides of the inequality concludes the proof.
From the above result, we obtain the following claim.




Proof. By summing the inequality stated in Lemma 3.10 over j = 1, . . . , t, we obtain









Since every product in S∗ must have non-negative price and S∗ = Z1∪Y1 by definition,
we have R(S∗) ≤ R(Z1) +R(Y1) by sublinearity of the revenue function (see Lemma
3.9). Combining these two inequalities concludes the proof.
3.5.2 Analysis of the local-ratio algorithm
We show that the local-ratio algorithm gives a (1/2− ε)-approximation for MC-Card
for any fixed ε > 0. In particular, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5. For any fixed ε > 0, Algorithm 8 gives a (1/2 − ε/2)-approximation
for MC-Card. Moreover, the running time is polynomial in the input size and 1/ε.
Proof. For a fixed ε > 0, let j∗ be such that R(S
∗)
1+ε
≤ Bj∗ ≤ R(S∗). Let B = Bj∗ and
consider the solution returned by Algorithm 7 with guess B and threshold α. We
consider two cases based on the condition by which the algorithm terminates.
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1. If the algorithm stops after completing step k, then by linearity of the revenue
when using the local ratio updates (Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6), the resulting solution




RSt−1({σt}) ≥ αB ≥
α
1 + ε
·R(S∗) ≥ (1− ε)αR(S∗),
where the above inequality holds since the product σt belongs to the consider-
ation set Ct, and therefore R
St−1({σt}) ≥ αB/k.
2. Now, suppose the algorithm stops at the end of step k′ < k, after discovering
that Ck′+1 = ∅. From Lemma 3.11, we get
R(Sk′) +R




Now, since Ck′+1 = ∅, this implies that Zk′+1 = ∅. Moreover, from Lemma 3.9,
we also have RSj−1(Y +j ) < |Y +j | · α ·B/k for all j = 1, . . . , k′ + 1. Therefore,
k′+1∑
j=1






|Y +j | ≤ αB ≤ αR(S∗),
where the second inequality holds since
∑k′+1
j=1 |Y +j | ≤ k and the last inequality
holds as B ≤ R(S∗). Therefore,
R(Sk′) ≥ R(S∗)− αR(S∗) = (1− α) ·R(S∗).
This shows that the approximation ratio attained by our algorithm is
min {(1− ε)α, 1− α} .
Picking α = 1/2 we obtain a (1/2− ε/2)-approximation for MC-Card.
Running time. Algorithm 8 considers J = O(1
ε
log n) guesses for R(S∗). For
any given guess Bj, the running time of Algorithm 7 is polynomial in the input size.
Therefore, the overall running time of Algorithm 8 is polynomial in the input size
and 1/ε.
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Tight example. We show that Algorithm 8 is tight in the following sense: consider
Algorithm 7 with input guess as the true value of R(S∗) and threshold α = 1/2, then
there are instances for which the approximation ratio is 1/2. In particular, we consider
an instance with 3 products. The Markov chain has 4 states N+ = {s, 1, 2, 0}. The
prices are: ps = 1, p1 = p2 = 2. The arrival rate for state s is λs = 1 and all
other states have an arrival rate of zero. The transition probabilities are given in
Figure 3.4. Consider the cardinality constrained assortment problem with cardinality
bound, k = 1. The optimal assortment is S∗ = {s} with R(S∗) = 1. With guess
R(S∗) and α = 1/2, the consideration set in the first step is {s, 1, 2}, and therefore
Algorithm 7 picks either 1 or 2, obtaining a revenue of R(S∗)/2.
We would like to note that our algorithm runs Algorithm 7 for different guesses
Bj, j = 1, . . . , J and returns the best solution across all runs. Therefore, the perfor-
mance bound of our algorithm is at least (1/2−O(ε)) and possibly better. In fact, in
our computational study, we observe that the empirical performance of our algorithm
is significantly better than the theoretical bound of (1/2 − O(ε)). We describe the
computational study in Section 3.7. It is an interesting open question to provide a
tighter analysis of the approximation bound for Algorithm 8 that returns the best










Figure 3.4: A tight example for Algorithm 8.
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3.6 Capacity constrained assortment
optimization
In this section, we show how to approximate MC-Capa within factor 1/3− ε, for any
fixed ε > 0. Recall that, unlike the simpler cardinality case, now each product i has
an arbitrary weight wi, and we have an upper bound W on the available capacity. We
assume without loss of generality that each product individually satisfies the capacity
constraint, i.e., wi ≤ W for all i ∈ N .
The Algorithm. We describe a local-ratio based algorithm, similar in spirit to
the one for the cardinality constrained problem, by suitably adapting the way con-
sideration sets are defined. For this purpose, instead of considering products whose
incremental absorption revenue exceeds a certain threshold, we only consider products
whose incremental absorption revenue per unit of weight exceeds a certain threshold.
Again, our algorithm selects a single product in each step. Let St be the set of
selected products by the end of step t, starting with S0 = ∅. We use σt to denote
the product picked in step t, meaning that St = {σ1, . . . , σt}. At every step t ≥ 1,
we select the highest adjusted price product (with respect to pSt−1 , breaking ties
arbitrarily) among products in the following consideration set:
Ct =
{








where S∗ is the optimal solution, W is the capacity bound, and α ∈ (0, 1) is a
parameter whose value will be optimized later. Once the product σt is selected, we
recompute the adjusted prices via the local ratio update described in Figure 3.3. This
selection and update process is repeated in every step until either the consideration
set becomes empty or adding the current product violates the capacity constraint.
Let t′ be such a step. In the former case, we stop and return St′−1. In the latter
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case, we take either St′−1 or {σt′}, depending on which of these sets has a larger total
revenue.
Guessing R(S∗). As in the case of cardinality constraints, since the value of R(S∗)
is unknown, we need to approximately guess the value R(S∗). We will use a procedure
similar to the one given in Section 3.5, with the exception of utilizing 1|U∗|R(U
∗) as
a lower bound (see proof of Lemma 3.2 in Appendix B.2), where U∗ is the optimal




∗)(1 + ε)j, j = 1, . . . , J
J = min {j ∈ N : Bj ≥ R(U∗)} .
(3.6)
Note that J = O(1
ε
log n). Algorithm 9 provides a description of our approximation
algorithm for Capa, given a particular guess Bj for R(S
∗) and threshold α, while
Algorithm 10 describes the complete procedure.
Algorithm 9 Algorithm with guess Bj and threshold α
1: Let S be the set of states picked so far, starting with S = ∅.
2: For all S, let C(S) = {i ∈ N : RS({i})
wi





i∈S wi < W and C(S) 6= ∅,




i∈S∪{i∗}wi < W , add i
∗ to S.
(c) Else return the highest revenue set among {i∗} and S.
4: Return S.
Algorithm 10 Local-ratio Algorithm for MC-Capa with threshold α
1: Given any ε > 0, let J and Bj, j ∈ [J ] be as defined in (3.6).
2: For all j ∈ [J ], let Sj be the solution returned by Algorithm 9 with guess Bj and
threshold α
3: Return arg maxj∈[J ] R(Sj).
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3.6.1 Analysis
To analyze the above algorithm, it is convenient to have a technical lemma similar
to Lemma 3.11. By defining the same sets Yt and Zt with respect to the optimal
assortment S∗ to MC-Capa and the adapted consideration sets Ct, the exact same
lemma holds. We therefore do not restate this claim and its proof, as these are
identical to those of Lemma 3.11. The following theorem shows that the local-ratio
algorithm gives a (1/3− ε)-approximation for MC-Capa for any fixed ε > 0.
Theorem 3.6. For any fixed ε > 0, Algorithm 10 gives a (1/3− ε/3)-approximation
for MC-Capa. Moreover, the running time is polynomial in the input size and 1/ε.
Proof. For a fixed ε > 0, let j∗ be such that R(S
∗)
1+ε
≤ Bj∗ ≤ R(S∗). Let B = Bj∗ and
consider the solution returned by Algorithm 9 with guess B and threshold α. We
consider two cases based on the condition by which the algorithm terminates. Let t′
be the step at which the algorithm terminates.
1. Suppose we stop the algorithm since adding the product σt′ violates the capacity
constraint, that is,
∑t′
t=1wσt > W . In this case, we return either St′−1 or {σt′},
depending on which of these sets has a larger revenue. We argue that this choice
guarantees a revenue of at least αR(S∗)/2, since





























≥ α · R(S
∗)
2(1 + ε)





where the third to last inequality holds since max{∑t′−1t=1 wσt , wσt′} ≥ W/2 and
the second to last inequality follows as B ≥ R(S∗)/(1 + ε).
2. On the other hand, suppose the algorithm terminates since Ct′+1 = ∅. Using
Lemma 3.11 adapted to the capacitated case, we have
R(St′) +R




Since Ct′+1 = ∅, this implies that Zt′+1 = ∅. Moreover, from Lemma 3.9, for all
j = 1, . . . , t′ + 1, we have










wi ≤ W . Consequently,
∑t′+1
j=1 R
Sj−1(Y +j ) < αB ≤ αR(S∗), and
therefore,
R(St′) ≥ R(S∗)− αR(S∗) = (1− α)R(S∗).








By setting α = 2/3, we obtain an approximation factor of (1/3− ε/3).
Running Time. Algorithm 10 considers J = O(1
ε
log n) guesses of R(S∗). Each run
of Algorithm 9 for a given guess is polynomial time. Therefore, the overall running
time of Algorithm 10 is polynomial in the input size and 1/ε.
Tight example. Our analysis is tight in the following sense. When Algorithm 10
is run with the true value of R(S∗), there are instances for which the approximation
ratio is 1/3. For example, consider the instance given in Figure 3.5. For a capacity
bound of W = 1, the optimal assortment is S∗ = {b, c}. Initially, all the products are
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in the consideration set and the algorithm picks product a, the highest price product.
In the next step, no product can be added to the assortment. The algorithm therefore
returns S = {a} since R({a}) > R({d}) and yields a revenue of R(S∗)/3+O(ε). When


































Figure 3.5: A tight example for Algorithm 10.
3.7 Computational experiments
In this section, we present our results from a computational study to test the per-
formance of Algorithm 8 for MC-Card. In particular, we focus on testing: i) the
performance of our algorithm with respect to an optimal algorithm, and ii) the run-
ning time of this algorithm. We first present a mixed-integer programming (MIP)
formulation of MC-Card.
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3.7.1 A mixed-integer programming formulation






s.t. αi + βi −
n∑
j=1
ρjiβj = λi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n




αi ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0, yi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
(3.7)
Lemma 3.12. The mixed-integer program (3.7) is an exact reformulation of MC-Card.





s.t. αi + βi −
n∑
j=1
ρjiβj = λi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
αi ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
(3.8)
Let (α, β) be an extreme point solution to the above LP, and let S = {i : αi > 0}.
[30] show that αi is the choice probability π(i, S) when the assortment S is offered
under the Markov chain choice model. Hence, the objective value
∑n
i=1 αiri equals to
R(S). By adding the indicator variables yi, we are restricting ourselves to the subset
of feasible solutions where at most k of the αi-s are allowed to be strictly positive.
Note that the extreme points of this polytope, corresponding to the projection of
the feasible space of the MIP down to the (α, β) coordinates, are exactly the set of




We proceed by describing the families of random instances being tested in our compu-
tational experiments. Here, each product’s price pi is uniformly distributed over the
interval [0, 1]. Note that since we present statistics regarding approximation factors,
any constant here will give identical results, so the choice of 1 is arbitrary. In each
instance, we compute the optimal unconstrained assortment U∗ using the LP given
by [? ]. We then choose the cardinality constraint k uniformly between 1 and |U∗|/2.
For the transition probabilities ρij and the arrival rates λi, we test our algorithm on
three different settings:
1. We generate n2 independent random variables Xij, each picked uniformly over
the interval [0, 1]. We then set ρij = Xij/
∑n
j=0Xij for all i, j such that i 6=
j. Since we do not allow self-loops (i.e. ρii = 0), the number of random
variables needed is n2. For the arrival rates, we then generate n independent
random variables Yi, each picked uniformly over the interval [0, 1], and set
λi = Yi/
∑n
j=1 Yj for all i 6= 0.
2. In this setting, we sparsify the transition matrix of setting 1. More precisely,
we additionally generate n2 independent random variable Zij, each following
a Bernoulli distribution with parameter 0.2. For all i, j such that i 6= j, we
set ρij = ZijXij/
∑n
j=0 ZijXij, where Xij are generated as in setting 1. This
is equivalent to eliminating each transition (i, j) with probability 0.8 and then
renormalizing. The arrival rates are generated similarly to setting 1.
3. The transition matrix in this last setting is one of a random walk. More
precisely, we generate n2 independent random variable Xij, each following a
Bernoulli distribution with parameter 0.5. We then set ρij = Xij/
∑n
j=0 Xij for
all i, j such that i 6= j. We also generate n random variables Yi, each following
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Setting n
Approximation Ratio # instances within x% of OPT
# instances
Average Minimum 2% 5% 10% 20%
1 30 0.9783 0.7771 664 812 972 998 1,000
2 30 0.9784 0.7734 662 858 956 995 1,000
3 30 0.9830 0.7693 708 884 976 998 1,000
1 60 0.9803 0.8671 622 838 997 1,000 1,000
2 60 0.9796 0.8094 621 888 982 1,000 1,000
3 60 0.9854 0.8885 693 941 998 1,000 1,000
1 100 0.9763 0.9132 52 79 100 100 100
2 100 0.9782 0.8882 59 91 99 100 100
3 100 0.9848 0.9142 70 97 100 100 100
Table 3.1: Performance of Algorithm 8 for MC-Card.
a Bernoulli distribution with parameter 0.5, and set λi = Yi/
∑n
j=1 Yj for all
i 6= 0.
3.7.3 Results
We examine how our algorithm performs in term of both approximation and running
time. Table 3.1 shows the approximation ratio of Algorithm 8 (with ε = 0.1) for
the different settings and the different values of n. As can be observed, the actual
performance of our algorithm is significantly better than its worst case theoretical
guarantee. Indeed, in all settings tested, the average approximation ratio is always
above 0.97. Moreover, the worst approximation ratio over all instances is above 0.77.
The running time of our algorithm also scales nicely. Table 3.2 shows the per-
formance of Algorithm 8 in terms of running time for setting 2. The running times
are very similar for the other settings. On the other hand, while the MIP running
time can be competitive in some cases, it blows up when the number of products n
gets large (see Table 3.2). Note that for n = 100, 12 out of the 100 instances had a
running time of at least 30 minutes. For n = 200, we set a time limit of 2 hours for
the MIP. Out of the 20 random instances generated, 16 reached the time limit with-
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n
Average Running Time Maximum Running Time
# instances
Algorithm 8 MIP Algorithm 8 MIP
30 0.18 0.17 0.67 0.25 1,000
60 0.74 0.67 1.25 29.34 1,000
100 3.18 278.20 9.16 10,226.98 100
200 31.98 ** 47.38 ** 20
Table 3.2: Running time of Algorithm 8 and the MIP for setting 2. ** Denotes the
cases when we set a time limit of 2 hours.
out terminating. Therefore, these numerical experiments suggest that Algorithm 8
is computationally efficient and that its numerical performance is significantly bet-
ter than the theoretical worst-case guarantee. Numerical experiments conducted for
Algorithm 10 yield similar observations for MC-Capa.
3.8 Robust assortment optimization
In this section, we consider a robust assortment problem under the Markov chain
model. To formulate the robust assortment problem, for any given offer set S, we let
π(i, S,P ) be the choice probability that product i is chosen when the assortment S
is offered and the transition probabilities are given by the matrix P = (ρi,j)i∈N ,j∈N+ .





π(i, S,P ) · pi.
The uncertainty in the parameters of the Markov chain model is represented by
an uncertainty set P ∈ Rn×n. In our model, we want to find an assortment S
that maximizes the worst-case expected revenue over all model parameters P ∈ P ,






We further make the following assumption on the form of the uncertainty set.
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Assumption 3.1. The uncertainty set is a row-wise uncertainty. In particular,
P = ×ni=1Pi,
where Pi ⊆ {(ρi1, . . . , ρin) ∈ Rn+ | ρi1 + . . . + ρin ≤ 1} is a convex set of uncertain
probability transition vectors (ρij)
n
j=1 out of state i.
We start by giving some structural properties of the optimal solution. These are
in the same spirit than those known for MNL-Rob [67]. We further show that we can
adapt our local-ratio framework presented in Section 3.3.3 to give a exact algorithm
for MC-Rob. Finally, we provide some comparative statistics and operational insights.
Notation Let S∗ be an optimal assortment for MC-Rob. Moreover, for all P ∈
P , let S∗(P ) be an optimal assortment when the transition matrix is given by P .
Similarly, let P ∗(S) be the worst case matrix P for assortment S.
3.8.1 Characterization of the optimal assortment
For each product i and set S, we define Ri(S,P ) as the expected revenue when









Note that even if i ∈ S, Ri(S,P ) assumes that we transition out of i. In the following
lemma, we characterize when adding a product increases the expected revenue.
Lemma 3.13 (When is adding a product beneficial?). For any assortment S and
i /∈ S, the following three statements are equivalent.
(a) pi ≥ minP∈P Ri(S,P ),
(b) pi ≥ minP∈P Ri(S ∪ {i},P ),
(c) minP∈P R(S,P ) ≤ minP∈P R(S ∪ {i},P ).
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Proof. We first prove that (a) is equivalent to (b) and then that (a) is equivalent to
(c).
(a) =⇒ (b). We prove that pi < minP∈P Ri(S∪{i},P ) =⇒ pi < minP∈P Ri(S,P ).
Let P ∗ = P ∗(S). We have by Markov property,
Ri(S ∪ {i},P ∗) = P ∗(i ≺ S+|i)pi + (1− P ∗(i ≺ S+|i))Ri(S,P ∗).
Furthermore, we have by assumption and definition of P ∗,
Ri(S ∪ {i},P ∗) ≥ min
P∈P
Ri(S ∪ {i},P ) > pi.
Combining the first equality with the second inequality yields
.(1− P ∗(i ≺ S+|i))Ri(S,P ∗) ≥ (1− P ∗(i ≺ S+|i))pi.




Ri(S,P ) = Ri(S,P ∗) > pi.
(b) =⇒ (a). Similarly, we prove that pi < minP∈P Ri(S,P ) =⇒ pi < minP∈P Ri(S∪
{i},P ). Let P ∗ = P ∗(S ∪ {i}). We have,
Ri(S ∪ {i},P ∗) = P ∗(i ≺ S+|i)pi + (1− P ∗(i ≺ S+|i))Ri(S,P ∗)




(a) =⇒ (c). We prove the last two implications using the following fact. For
a fixed set S, consider the dynamic problem where for any random walk on the
Markov chain, an adversary is allowed to choose a new transition matrix P ∈ P
before every transition in order to minimize the expected revenue. Note that by the
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Markov property, any knowledge of previous past transitions cannot contribute to
the decision. Moreover, because of Assumption 3.1, i.e. the row-wise structure of
the uncertainty set, the adversary only needs to choose a single row at a time. This
implies that there exists a stationary policy, corresponding to a single matrix P ∈ P
to that problem. In particular, if we let R̂(S,P ) be the revenue of a problem where
we follow P but if we reach i we switch to P ∗(S), we have
min
P∈P
R̂(S,P ) = min
P∈P
R(S,P ).
However, by assumption, we have for all P ∈ P
R̂(S,P ) ≤ R(S ∪ {i},P ).
Minimizing both sides with respect to P ∈ P yields the desired result.
(c) =⇒ (a). We prove that
pi < min
P∈P
Ri(S,P ) =⇒ min
P∈P
R(S,P ) > min
P∈P
R(S ∪ {i},P ).
Let R̂(S,P ) be the revenue of a problem where we follow P but if we reach i we
switch to P ∗(S). By the above discussion, we have
min
P∈P
R̂(S,P ) = min
P∈P
R(S,P ).
However, by assumption, we have for all P ∈ P
R̂(S,P ) > R(S ∪ {i},P ).
Minimizing both sides with respect to P ∈ P yields the desired result.
Another interesting implication of the proof of Lemma 3.13 is that P ∗(S) also
minimizes Ri(S,P ∗(S)) for all i. In other words, the worst case matrix P for a
given set S is independent of the arrival rate λ. We will see that the optimal robust
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assortment is also independent of λ. Using the same proof ideas, we get the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.1. For all set S and i /∈ S, we have
pi ≥ Ri(S,P ) =⇒ Rj(S ∪ {i},P ) ≥ Rj(S,P ),∀j 6= i.
We now provide a structural property of the optimal robust assortment S∗. The
result shows that the optimal robust assortment consists of products i ∈ [n] whose
revenues exceed a particular value, which corresponds to the expected revenue the
optimal assortment S∗ gets when transitioning out of i.
Theorem 3.7 (Characterization of the optimal robust assortment). There exists an
optimal assortment S∗ such that
S∗ =
{
i : pi ≥ Ri(S∗,P ∗(S∗))
}
.
Proof. We first show that {i : pi ≥ Ri(S∗,P ∗(S∗))} ⊆ S∗. Suppose on the contrary
that there exists a product i such that pi ≥ Ri(S∗,P ∗(S∗)) and i /∈ S∗. By Lemma
3.13, minP∈P R(S
∗ ∪ {i},P ) ≥ minP∈P R(S∗,P ). Therefore, S∗ ∪ {i} is also an
optimal assortment.
To complete the proof, we show that S∗ ⊆ {i : pi ≥ Ri(S∗,P ∗(S∗))}. Assume
on the contrary that there exists a product i ∈ S∗ such that pi < Ri(S∗,P ∗(S∗)).
By Lemma 3.13, minP∈P R(S
∗,P ) > minP∈P R(S
∗ ∪ {i},P ). This contradicts the
optimality of S∗ and concludes the proof.
Note that when P is a singleton, this provides an alternative characterization of
the optimal assortment when there is no uncertainty, i.e. for MC-Assort. Moreover,
in the case of the MNL model, which is a special case of the Markov chain based
choice model, Ri(S,P ) is independent of i and we recover the characterization of the
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optimal solution given in [67] for the case where there is no uncertainty. However,
note that this result does not imply the characterization of the robust solution for
MNL obtained in [67]. Indeed, a row-wise uncertainty set for the Markov chain model
is not the same as having an uncertainty set of the MNL parameters.
3.8.2 Computing the optimal assortment
For the MNL model, Theorem 3.7 implies that the optimal robust assortment is nested
by revenue since the threshold is independent of the product. Therefore, it provides
a very efficient way of computing the optimal assortment. Indeed, one only needs to
enumerate over the n possible nested assortment and return the revenue maximizing
one. In our setting, it is not a priori clear how to compute the optimal assortment
using the characterization of Theorem 3.7. However, using the ideas developed in
this chapter, in particular, the local ratio framework, we give an efficient algorithm
to find S∗. In particular, we give a sequential algorithm which adds a product at
every step and finishes with an optimal assortment. Interestingly, the greedy step
will be similar to that of Algorithm 6 and we will see how to appropriately modify
the update step to accommodate for the parameters uncertainty.
The following lemma allows us to decide which product to add at every step.
Lemma 3.14 (Which product to add next?). Let S be a given assortment and P ∈ P






If pi∗ −Ri∗(S,P ) ≥ 0, then for all S ′ ⊆ [n]\S ∪ {i∗}, we have
min
P∈P
R(S ∪ S ′ ∪ {i∗},P ) ≥ min
P∈P
R(S ∪ S ′,P ).
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Proof. For a given Q ∈ P and S ′ ⊆ [n]\S ∪ {i∗}, we have
Ri
∗
(S ∪ S ′,P ) =
∑
j∈S∪S′




Q(j ≺ (S ∪ S ′)+|i∗)pj +
∑
j∈S′
Q(j ≺ (S ∪ S ′)+|i∗)pj.




P (k ≺ S+|j)pk ≤ pi∗ −
∑
k∈S
P (k ≺ S + |i∗)pk,
which implies
pj ≤ pi∗ +
∑
k∈S
P (k ≺ S+|j)pk −
∑
k∈S




(S ∪ S ′,Q) ≤
∑
j∈S









P (k ≺ S+|j)pk −
∑
k∈S

















Q(k ≺ (S ∪ S ′)+|i∗) +
∑
j∈S′





(Ak(Q)− P (k ≺ S+|i∗)pk,
where for all Q ∈ P ,
Ak(Q) = Q(k ≺ (S ∪ S ′)+|i∗) +
∑
j∈S′
P (k ≺ S+|j)Q(j ≺ (S ∪ S ′)+|i∗).
Note that for all k ∈ S, by the Markov property, we have
Ak(P ) = P (k ≺ S+|i∗).





(S ∪ S ′,Q) ≤ pi∗ .
87
Using Lemma 3.13 concludes the proof.
Motivating by Lemma 3.14, we build a consideration set at every step and add
the highest adjusted price product to our current assortment. We stop when the
consideration set becomes empty. Algorithm 11 describes the procedure in more
detail.
Algorithm 11 Algorithm for MC-Rob
1: Let S be the set of states picked so far, starting with S = ∅.
2: For all S, let C(S) = {i : pi ≥ minP∈P Ri(S,P )}
3: While there exists i ∈ C(S),
(a) Let i∗ be the product for which pi−minP∈P Ri(S,P ) is maximized, breaking
ties arbitrarily.
(b) Add i∗ to S.
4: Return S.
Theorem 3.8. Algorithm 11 returns an optimal assortment to MC-Rob.
The correctness of the algorithm follows from inductively using Lemma 3.14. Note
that the running time of Algorithm 11 is polynomial in the time needed to compute
minP∈P R
i(S,P ) for a given S. Note that this algorithm can be interpreted through
our local ratio framework where the greedy rule corresponds to picking the highest
adjusted price product and the update step consists of updating all prices according
to the following update rule:
p̂i = pi −min
P∈P
Ri(S,P ).
Note how this is a robust version of the update presented in Figure 3.3.
Polyhedral uncertainty set. We show how to efficiently compute minP∈P R
i(S,P )
when each Pi is a polyhedron. For a given assortment S, we can find P ∗ using the
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following linear program, where P i is the ith row of P ,
max λTg
gi = pi,∀i ∈ S
gi ≤ minP i∈Pi(P i)Tg,∀i /∈ S
g ≥ 0.
Taking the dual in the minimization yields for all i
min gTP i = max (bi)Tx
QjP i = bi (Qi)Tx ≤ g
P i ≥ 0
Therefore, the problem is equivalent to solving the following linear program.
max λTg
gi = pi,∀i ∈ S
gi ≤ (bi)Tx, ,∀i /∈ S
(Qi)Tx ≤ g,∀i /∈ S
g ≥ 0.
Note that when solving the above linear program, we will have for all i /∈ S, g∗i =
Ri(S,P ∗(S)).
3.8.3 Comparative statistics and operational insights












Proof. Suppose by contradiction that maxS minP∈P R(S,P ) < minP∈P maxS R(S,P ).
Our assumption implies that
R(S∗,P ∗(S∗)) < R(S∗(P ∗),P ∗(S∗)).
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By Lemma 3.14, we know that S∗(P ∗) ⊆ S∗. Therefore, there exists {i1, . . . , iK}
such that
S∗ = S∗(P ∗) ∪ {i1, . . . , iK}.
By Theorem 3.7, for all k ∈ [K],
pik ≥ Rik(S∗(P ∗) ∪ {i1, . . . , iK},P ∗).
Therefore, for all k = 1, . . . K − 1,
pik ≥ Rik(S∗(P ∗) ∪ {i1, . . . , iK−1},P ∗)
by Corollary 3.1. Iterating this procedure, we get that
pi1 ≥ Ri1(S∗(P ∗),P ∗)
which contradicts the optimality of S∗(P ∗).
Note that for general uncertainty sets, this relations is not true. We can restate
the min-max relation by saying that the optimal robust assortment is also optimal
for its worst case matrix, i.e.
S∗ = S∗(P ∗(S∗)).
We next prove that the robust assortment corresponds to the largest optimal assort-
ment among {S∗(P ) : P ∈ P}.





Proof. By Theorem 3.9, we have





By Theorem 3.7, note that for all P ∈ P ,
S∗(P ) = {i : pi ≥ Ri(S∗(P ),P )}
= {i : pi ≥ max
S
Ri(S,P )}









Ri(S,P )} = S∗.
We next analyze how the robust assortment changes with the uncertainty set.
It turns out that to protect against larger uncertainty in the model parameters, we
should offer a larger assortment. This result is stated in the next corollary, whose
proof follows immediately from Theorem 3.15.
Corollary 3.2 (Larger uncertainty implies larger assortment). For any P1 ⊆ P2,
min
P∈P1
R(S,P ) ≤ min
P∈P2
R(S,P ) and S∗1 ⊆ S∗2 ,
where S∗i is the optimal assortment when the uncertainty set is Pi.
The next corollary shows that as the revenue of each product increases by the
same additive increment, the robust optimal assortment becomes larger. For any
δ ≥ 0, let S∗δ be the optimal assortment when all the revenues are increased by δ.
Corollary 3.3 (Additive incremental revenues lead to larger robust assortment). For
any δ ≥ 0,
S∗ ⊆ S∗δ .
Proof. For any assortment S, P ∈ P and i ∈ S, we have
Ri(Sδ,P ) ≤ R(S,P ) + δ.
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Ri(Sδ,P ) + δ.
Therefore,
S∗ = {i : pi ≥ Ri(S∗,P ∗(S∗)} ⊆ {i : pi + δ ≥ Ri(S∗δ ,P ∗(S∗δ )} = S∗δ .
3.9 Near optimal algorithm under constant rank
As a consequence of Theorem 2.7, no near-optimal algorithm is possible for MC-Capa
in general. In order to get a near-optimal algorithm, we need to make additional
assumptions on the structure of the Markov chain. We explore one such assumption
in this section. In particular, we assume that the matrix of transition probabilities has
a fixed rank K and propose a FPTAS for MC-Capa when the rank K is constant using
ideas from Chapter 2. [30] study the network revenue management problem under
the Markov chain model and give a linear programming based algorithm. They show
that for any assortment S and i ∈ S, the choice probabilities π(i, S) can be computed
using the following system of linear equations.









We leverage this formulation to give an FPTAS for MC-Capa. In order to leverage
the algorithmic ideas of Chapter 2, we express the revenue of any assortment as a
function of a small number of linear terms.
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3.9.1 Rank one Markov chain
We begin with the case where K = 1, i.e. a rank one underlying transition probability
matrix. [10] show that special cases of rank one Markov chain models are equivalent
to the MNL model or the Generalized Attraction Model (GAM). When K = 1, we
can without loss of generality assume that there exist (ui)i∈[n]+ and (vi)i∈[n]+ such that
for all (i, j) ∈ [n]+ × [n]+, ρij = uivj. The system of equations (3.9) then becomes.




βi = λi + vi
∑
j /∈S
βjuj, ∀i /∈ S.







































This reformulation allows us to use the machinery from Chapter 2. In particular, for
given guesses (`, h, g), we try to find, using a dynamic program, a minimum weight
















Ideas from Algorithm 2 can be adapted straightforwardly to this setting to get an
FPTAS.
Theorem 3.10. When the underlying Markov chain has rank one, MC-Capa admits
an FPTAS.
We give the details of the algorithm and the proof of correctness in Appendix B.6.
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3.9.2 Constant rank markov chain
We extend the result to a constant rank Markov chain model in a similar way we
extended the FPTAS from MNL to a mixture of MNL. Let K be the rank of the






j for some (u
k
i )i∈[n]+ and
(vi)i∈[n]+ for all k ∈ [K]. The system of linear equations (3.9) becomes








j ,∀i ∈ S








j ,∀i /∈ S.
For all k ∈ [K], let Lk = ∑j /∈S βjukj . We can rewrite for all i /∈ S,


































































Instead of guessing numerators and denominators, we guess the entries of Q(S) and
b(S). In particular, for given guesses Q̃ and b̃ as well as a guess `, we find, using a









j ≥ Q̃km,∀(k,m) ∈ [K,K], and
∑
j /∈S













Note that this guarantees the desired approximation because all the entries of Q(S)
and b(S) are non-negative. Consequently, Lk is increasing as a function of any of
these entries. This is very similar to the setting for mMNL-Capa and we can adapt
Algorithm 15 to get an FPTAS for this problem. Note that the running time is
exponential in the rank K.
Theorem 3.11. There is an FPTAS for MC-Capa when the rank of the underlying
Markov chain is constant.
In this chapter, we have studied a wide variety of assortment problems under the
Markov chain model. [10] show that the Markov chain model generalizes the MNL
model and approximates a mixture of MNL. We help assess its tractability: it is less
tractable than the MNL model, as our hardness results show, but more tractable than
a mixture of MNL. In particular, we are able to develop a new algorithmic frame-
work which lead to efficient and practical algorithms for different variant assortment




Mallows-smoothed distribution over rankings approach for
modeling choice
In this chapter, we address the two key computational challenges that arises when
using a mixture of Mallows model: (a) efficiently computing the choice probabilities
and hence, the expected revenue, for a given offer set S and (b) finding a near-optimal
assortment.
In Section 4.2, we present an efficient procedure to compute the choice proba-
bilities π(i, S) exactly under a general mixture of Mallows model. We exploit the
structural symmetries in the Mallows distribution to derive an efficiently computable
closed-form expression for the choice probabilities for a given offer set under the
mixture of Mallows distribution. In particular, we first consider a single Mallows
distribution and show that the choice probabilities under the Mallows distribution
can be expressed as a discrete convolution. Using fast Fourier transform, the choice
probabilities can be computed in O(n2 ·log n) time where n is the number of products.
Therefore, we obtain a procedure with running time O(K · n2 · log n) to compute the
choice probabilities for a fixed offer set under a mixture of K Mallows distribution.
In Section 4.3, we present a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for a
large class of constrained assortment optimization for the mixture of Mallows model
including cardinality constraints, knapsack constraints, and matroid constraints. Our
PTAS holds under the assumption that the no-purchase option is ranked last in the
modal rankings for all Mallows segments in the mixture. Under the above assumption
and for any ε > 0, our algorithm computes an assortment with expected revenue
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at least (1 − ε) times the optimal in running time that is polynomial in n and K
but depends exponentially on 1/ε. The PTAS is based on establishing a surprising
sparsity property about near-optimal assortments, namely, that there exist a near-
optimal assortment of size O(1/ε). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
provably near-optimal algorithm for the assortment optimization under Mallows or
the mixture of Mallows model in such generality.
In Section 4.4.1, we present a compact mixed integer linear program (MIP) with
O(K ·n3) variables, O(n) binary variables and O(K ·n3) constraints for the constrained
assortment optimization under a general mixture of Mallows model with K segments.
The compact formulation is based on an alternative efficient procedure to compute
the choice probabilities for a fixed offer set exactly. In particular, we exploit the
repeated insertion method (RIM) introduced by [25] for sampling rankings according
to the Mallows distribution and show that the choice probabilities for the Mallows
model can be expressed as the unique solution to a system of linear equations that can
be solved in O(n3) time. This gives us an alternate procedure to efficiently compute
the choice probabilities for a fixed offer set exactly. While this is less efficient than
using fast Fourier transform (O(n3) versus O(n2 · log n)), it allows us to formulate a
compact MIP for the constrained assortment optimization problem under a general
mixture of Mallows model. Our MIP formulation holds for general mixture of Mallows
model and does not require any assumption on the rank of no-purchase in the modal
rankings.
We conduct numerical experiments to test the computational performance of the
MIP. In particular, we implement a variable bound strengthening and observe that
the MIP is efficient for reasonably sized assortment optimization problems. Therefore,
the MIP provides a practical approach for assortment optimization under a general
mixture of Mallows model.
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4.1 Model and problem statement
Notation. We consider a universe N of n products. In order to distinguish products
from their corresponding ranks, we let N = {a1, . . . , an} denote the universe of
products, under an arbitrary indexing. Preferences over this universe are captured
by an anti-reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive relation , which induces a total
ordering (or ranking) over all products; specifically, a  b means that a is preferred to
b. We represent preferences through rankings or permutations. A complete ranking
(or simply a ranking) is a bijection σ : N → [n] that maps each product a ∈ N to
its rank σ(a) ∈ [n], where [j] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , j} for any integer j. Lower
ranks indicate higher preference so that σ(a) < σ(b) if and only if a σ b, where σ
denotes the preference relation induced by the ranking σ. For simplicity of notation,
we also let σi denote the product ranked at position i. Thus, σ1σ2 · · ·σn is the list of
the products written by increasing order of their ranks. Finally, for any two integers
i ≤ j, let [i, j] denote the set {i, i+ 1, . . . , j}.
Mallows model. The Mallows model is a member of the distance-based ranking
family models (see [58]). This model is described by a modal ranking ω, which
denotes the central or modal permutation, and a concentration parameter θ ∈ R+,







σ exp(−θ · d(σ, ω)) is the normalization constant, and d(·, ·) is the




1l[(σ(ai)− σ(aj)) · (ω(ai)− ω(aj)) < 0].
In other words, d(σ, ω) counts the number of pairwise disagreements between the
permutations σ and ω. It can be verified that d(·, ·) is a distance function that is right-
invariant under the composition of the symmetric group, i.e., d(π1, π2) = d(π1π, π2π)
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for every π, π1, π2, where the composition σπ is defined as σπ(a) = σ(π(a)). This
symmetry can be exploited to show that the normalization constant ψ(θ) has a closed-






Note that ψ(θ) depends only on the concentration parameter θ and does not depend
on the modal ranking. Intuitively, the Mallows model defines a set of consumers whose
preferences are “similar”, in the sense of being centered around a common permuta-
tion, where the probability for deviations thereof are decreasing exponentially. The
similarity of consumer preferences is captured by the Kendall-Tau distance metric.
Mixture of Mallows model. The mixture of K Mallows models is given by K
segments where for each segment k = 1, . . . , K, we are given its probability µk and
the Mallows distribution with modal ranking ωk and concentration parameter θk.









Choice probabilities computation. We first focus on efficiently computing the
probability that a product a will be chosen from an offer set S ⊆ N under a given
mixture of Mallows model. When offered the subset S, the customer is assumed to
sample a preference list according to the mixture of Mallows model and then choose
the most preferred product from S according to the sampled list. Therefore, the




λ(σ) · 1l[σ, ai, S], (4.1)
99
where 1l[σ, ai, S] indicates whether σ(ai) < σ(aj) for all aj ∈ S, j 6= i. Note that the
above sum runs over n! preference lists, meaning that it is a priori unclear if π(ai, S)
can be computed efficiently.
Assortment optimization. Once we are able to compute the choice probabilities,
we consider the assortment optimization problem. In the assortment optimization
problem, each product a has an endogenously fixed price pa. Moreover, there is an
additional product aq that represents the outside option (no-purchase), with price
pq = 0 that is always included in the assortment. Let S ⊆ 2N be denote a set of
feasible assortments. We assume that S satisfied the following assumption:
Assumption 4.1. Let S be the set of feasible assortments. We assume that S
satisfies the following properties.
• (Membership) For any S ⊆ N , it is easy to test whether S ∈ S or not.
• (Closure) For any S ∈ S and T ⊆ S implies that T ∈ S .
This is a fairly general assumption satisfied for a large class of constraints in-
cluding cardinality constraints, multi-dimensional knapsack constraints and matroid
constraints. The goal in the assortment optimization problem is to determine a fea-







π(a, S ∪ {rq}) · pa. (4.2)
We would like to note that even the unconstrained version where S contains all
possible subsets of N is hard to approximate within a factor better than O(1/n1−ε)
under a general distribution over permutation model [3].
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4.2 Choice probabilities: closed-form expression
In this section, we show that the choice probabilities can be computed efficiently under
the Mallows model. Note that this directly give a efficient procedure to compute the
choice probabilities under a mixture of Mallows model. Without loss of generality,
we assume from this point on that the products are indexed such that the central
permutation ω ranks product ai at position i, for all i ∈ [n]. The next theorem shows
that, when the offer set is contiguous, the choice probabilities enjoy a rather simple
form. Using these expressions as building blocks, we further derive a closed-form
expression for general offer sets.
Theorem 4.1 (Contiguous offer set). Suppose S = a[i,j] = {ai, . . . , aj} for some
1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n. Then, the probability of choosing product ak ∈ S under the Mallows
model with modal ranking ω and concentration parameter θ is given by
π(ak, S) =
e−θ·(k−i)
1 + e−θ + · · ·+ e−θ·(j−i) .
The choice probability under a general offer set has a more involved structure for






e−θ·` and ψ(q,m, θ) = ψ(m, θ) · ψ(q −m, θ).
In addition, for a collection of M discrete functions hm : Z → R, m = 1, . . . ,M
such that hm(r) = 0 for any r < 0, their discrete convolution is defined as




h1(r1) · · ·hM(rM).
Theorem 4.2 (General offer set). Suppose S = a[i1,j1] ∪ · · · ∪ a[iM ,jM ] where im ≤ jm
for 1 ≤ m ≤ M and jm < im+1 for 1 ≤ m ≤ M − 1. Let Gm = a[jm,im+1] for
1 ≤ m ≤ M − 1, G = G1 ∪ · · · ∪ GM , and C = a[i1,jM ]. Then, the probability of
choosing ak ∈ a[i`,j`] can be written as
π(ak, S) = e
−θ·(k−i1) ·
∏M−1
m=1 ψ(|Gm| , θ)
ψ(|C| , θ) · (f0 ? f̃1 ? · · · ? f̃` ? f`+1 ? · · · ? fM)(|G|),
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where:
• fm(r) = e−θ·r·(jm−i1+1+r/2) · 1ψ(|Gm|,r,θ) , if 0 ≤ r ≤ |Gm|, for 1 ≤ m ≤M .
• f̃m(r) = eθ·r · fm(r), for 1 ≤ m ≤M .
• f0(r) = ψ(|C| , |G| − r, θ) · e
θ·(|G|−r)2/2
1+e−θ+···+e−θ·(|S|−1+r) , for 0 ≤ r ≤ |G|.
• fm(r) = 0, for 0 ≤ m ≤M and any r outside the ranges described above.
Proof. At a high level, deriving the expression for a general offer set involves breaking
down the probabilistic event of choosing ak ∈ S into simpler events for which we can
use the expression given in Theorem 4.1, and then combining these expressions using
the symmetries of the Mallows distribution.
For a given vector R = (r0, . . . , rM) ∈ RM+1 such that r0 + . . . rM = |G|, let h(R)
be the set of permutations which satisfy the following two conditions: i) among all
the products of S, ak is the most preferred, and ii) for all m ∈ [M ], there are exactly
rm products from Gm which are preferred to ak. We denote this subset of products
by G̃m for all m ∈ [M ]. This implies that there are r0 products from G which are














where ξ(σ, i, j) = 1l[(σ(ai)− σ(aj)) · (ω(ai)− ω(aj)) < 0]. For all σ, we can break
down the sum in the exponential as follows:
∑
i,j
ξ(σ, i, j) = C1(σ) + C2(σ) + C3(σ),
where
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• C1(σ) contains pairs of products (i, j) such that ai ∈ G̃m for some m ∈ [M ] and
aj ∈ S,
• C2(σ) contains pairs of products (i, j) such that ai ∈ G̃m for some m ∈ [M ] and
aj ∈ Gm′\G̃m′ for some m 6= m′,
• C3(σ) contains the remaining pairs of products.
For a fixed R, we show that C1(σ) and C2(σ) are constant for all σ ∈ h(R).
Part 1. C1(σ) counts the number of disagreements (i.e., number of pairs of products
that are oppositely ranked in σ and ω) between some product in S and some product
in G̃m for any m ∈ [M ]. For all m ∈ [M ], a product in ai ∈ G̃m induces a disagreement








ξ(σ, i, j) =
M∑
m=1
rm · (jm − i1 + 1).
Part 2. C2(σ) counts the number of disagreements between some product in any G̃m























































Computing the inner sum requires a similar but more involved partitioning of the
permutations as well as using Theorem 4.1. The details are presented in Appendix
C.1. In particular, we can show that for a fixed R,
∑
σ∈h(R) e
−θ.C3(σ) is equal to








ψ(rm, θ) · ψ(|G|m − rm, θ)
.
Putting all the pieces together yields the desired result.
Due to representing π(a, S) as a discrete convolution, we can efficiently compute
this probability using fast Fourier transform in O(n2 · log n) time (see for instance
[21]), which is a dramatic improvement over the exponential sum (4.1) that defines
the choice probabilities. Note that for a mixture of K Mallows, this implies that we
can compute the choice probability π(a, S) in O(K · n2 · log n) time.
4.3 A PTAS for the assortment optimization
In this section, we present a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for the
assortment optimization problem under the mixture of Mallows model described by
(4.2). In other words, for any accuracy level ε > 0, we compute an assortment with
expected revenue at least (1−ε) times the optimal. For every fixed ε, the running time
is polynomial in n and K. For ease of exposition, we first focus on a single Mallows
model and thus drop the index corresponding to the Mallows segment. At the end of
the section, we explain how the results extend to a mixture of Mallows model. Before
describing the algorithm, we introduce a number of structural properties relative to
the Mallows distribution.
4.3.1 Probabilistic claims
We first show that for any pair of products (ai, aj) such that i < j (i.e. ai is preferred
to aj in ω), and for a permutation σ drawn from a Mallows distribution, we have
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P (ai σ aj) ≥ 1/2 . Note that when θ = 0, since the distribution is uniform, we have
P (ai σ aj) = 1/2. Moreover, when θ → ∞, P (ai σ aj) = 1. Our result extends
these extreme cases to all values of θ.
Claim 4.1. For any pair of products (ai, aj) such that i < j, if σ is drawn from a
Mallows distribution, we have,




Proof. Let A = {σ : ai σ aj} and B = {σ : ai ≺σ aj}. We consider the bijection
f : A→ B which switches ai and aj. More precisely, for all σ ∈ A,
f(σ)(ak) =

σ(ai) if k = j
σ(aj) if k = i
σ(ak) otherwise
.
We show that for all σ ∈ A, d(σ, ω) ≤ d(f(σ), ω) which in turn implies the desired
result. Note that for any σ ∈ A, we have
d(f(σ), ω)− d(σ, ω) = 1 +
∑
k:aiσakσaj
[ξ(f(σ), i, k)) + ξ(f(σ), j, k)− ξ(σ, i, k))− ξ(σ, j, k)],
where ξ(σ, i, j) = 1l[(σ(ai)− σ(aj)) · (ω(ai)− ω(aj)) < 0]. Since ai ω aj, we have
three cases to consider.
Case 1: ai ω ak ω aj. In that case, ξ(f(σ), i, k))+ξ(f(σ), j, k) = 2 and ξ(σ, i, k))+
ξ(σ, j, k) = 0.
Case 2: ak ω ai. In that case, ξ(f(σ), i, k)) + ξ(f(σ), j, k) = 1 and ξ(σ, i, k)) +
ξ(σ, j, k) = 1.
Case 3: aj ω ak. In that case, ξ(f(σ), i, k)) + ξ(f(σ), j, k) = 1 and ξ(σ, i, k)) +
ξ(σ, j, k) = 1.
In each case, ξ(f(σ), i, k)) + ξ(f(σ), j, k)− ξ(σ, i, k))− ξ(σ, j, k) ≥ 0, which concludes
the proof.
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We also extend this result to a tuple of products (i1, . . . , im). More precisely, if
i1 < · · · < im (i.e. ai1 is the most preferred product of (ai1 , . . . , aim) in ω), then
if σ is drawn from a Mallows distribution, we have P (ai1 σ aij ,∀j ≥ 2) ≥ 1/m.
Again, note that when θ = 0, we have P (ai1 σ aij ,∀j ≥ 2) = 1/m. Moreover, when
θ →∞, P (ai1 σ aij ,∀j ≥ 2) = 1.
Claim 4.2. For any tuple of products (ai1 , . . . , aim) such that i1 < · · · < im, if σ is
drawn from a Mallows distribution, we have




Proof. Let Ak = {σ : aik σ ai` ,∀` 6= k} be the set of permutations in which aik
appears first among ai1 , . . . , aim . For a fixed pair (k,m) such that k < m, consider
the bijection f : Am → Ak which switches m and k. More precisely, for all σ ∈ Am,
f(σ)(`) =

σ(ak) if ` = m
σ(am) if ` = k
σ(a`) otherwise
.
The proof of Claim 4.1 shows that for all σ ∈ Am, d(σ, ω) ≤ d(f(σ), ω). This in turn
implies that for all k < m,
P (aik σ ai` ,∀` 6= k) ≥ P (aim σ ai` ,∀` 6= m),
and concludes the proof.
4.3.2 A PTAS for the assortment optimization problem
We now present a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for the assortment
optimization problem under the Mallows distribution under an additional assump-
tion. Our algorithm is based on establishing a surprising sparsity property, proving
the existence of small-sized near-optimal assortments, crucially utilizing certain sym-
metries in the distribution over permutations.
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Description of the algorithm. Let S∗ be the optimal assortment. Let M = 1/ε,
where without loss of generality, assume that M takes an integer value. We enumerate
all possible subsets of S of size less or equal than M and return the best candidate
assortment. Algorithm 12 describes the procedure.
Algorithm 12 Computing choice probabilities
1: Let Ŝ = arg maxS∈S {R(S) : |S| ≤M}.
2: Return Ŝ.
Assumption 4.2. The outside option is ranked last in the central permutation ω,
i.e. q = n.
Theorem 4.3. Under Assumption 4.2, Algorithm 12 is a PTAS for the assortment
optimization problem (4.2) under the Mallows distribution.
Proof. We first argue the correctness of the algorithm, i.e., that the assortment re-
turned is a (1 − ε)-optimal solution. Again, let S∗ be the optimal assortment. Note
that if |S∗| < M , then S∗ is one of the candidate assortments we examine, and there-
fore the algorithm returns the optimal solution. We therefore assume that |S∗| ≥M .
In this case, let Sε consists of the M highest revenue product of S
∗. Note that Sε
is among the candidate assortment constructed by the algorithm. Moreover, it is a
feasible assortment by Assumption 4.1. We show that Sε is (1 − ε)-optimal using a
sample-path analysis. In particular, let σ be a fixed preference list. Let R(σ, S) be




1l[σ, a, S] · ra.
We consider two cases.
Case 1. We first assume that aq σ ai for all i ∈ Sε. In this case, R(σ, Sε) = 0. On
the other hand, offering a single product ai is always a feasible solution. Therefore,
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by Claim 4.1,




where ai∗ is the highest price product. Moreover, note that all product in S
∗\Sε have
revenue smaller or equal to ri∗ . Therefore, any product in S
∗\Sε has revenue less or
equal than 2 · R(S∗). This implies that R(σ, S∗) ≤ 2 · R(S∗).
Case 2. In this case, we assume that in the permutation σ, there exists a product
ai ∈ Sε such that ai  aq and R(σ, Sε) = rai . We show that R(σ, Sε) ≥ R(σ, S∗).
Indeed, suppose that there exists a product aj is in S
∗\Sε such that aj σ ai. Since
Sε contains the M highest revenue product of S
∗, it must be that rj ≤ rj. Therefore,
R(σ, Sε) ≥ R(L, S∗).
We now combine the two cases. For case 1 to happen, note that aq has to be
preferred to all products from Sε. From Claim 4.2, this event occurs with probability
at most 1/|Sε| = 1/M = ε. Consequently,
R(S∗)−R(Sε) =P (Case 1) · E [R(S∗)−R(Sε)|Case 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+ P (Case 2) · E [R(S∗)−R(Sε)|Case 2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E[R(S∗)|Case 2]
≤ε · E [R(S∗)|Case 2]
≤2 · ε · R(S∗).
From a running time perspective, the number of candidate assortment is equal to
n1/ε. By Theorem 4.2, we can compute R(S) for any assortment S in O(n3 · log(n)).
Therefore the overall running time of the algorithm is O(n1/ε · n3 · log(n)).
Extension to a mixture of Mallows model. The PTAS extends to a mixture
of Mallows model as long as Assumption 4.2 holds for each segment. Indeed, since the
probabilistic claims hold for each segment, we can adapt the proof of Theorem 4.3 to
the case of a mixture of Mallows model. Moreover, we would like to emphasize that the
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running time scales linearly inK, the number of segments of the Mallows model. More
precisely, Algorithm 12 returns a (1−ε)-optimal assortment in O(K ·n1/ε ·n3 · log(n)).
The PTAS presented in this section provides an approximation algorithm with
provable guarantees for a special case of a mixture of Mallows model. However, it
requires Assumption 4.2 to hold. We next present an alternative way of solving the
assortment optimization problem using a MIP formulation which does not require
any assumption. To this end, we first present an alternative method for computing
the choice probabilities by means of dynamic programming.
4.4 Integer programming formulation
While Section 4.2 allows computing the choice probabilities efficiently, the approach
does not lend itself to solving the assortment optimization problem. For that reason,
we present an alternative algorithm for computing the choice probabilities which
will then lead to a MIP formulation for the unconstrained assortment optimization
problem.
4.4.1 Choice probabilities: a dynamic programming
approach
In what follows, we present an alternative algorithm for computing the choice prob-
abilities under a Mallows model. Again, note that this directly implies an efficient
algorithm for computing the choice probabilities under a mixture of Mallows model.
Our approach is based on an efficient procedure to sample a random permutation
according to a Mallows model with modal ranking ω and concentration parameter θ.
The random permutation is constructed sequentially, as explained in Algorithm 13.
Lemma 4.1 (Theorem 3 in [49]). The repeated insertion procedure generates a ran-
dom sample from a Mallows distribution with modal ranking ω and concentration
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Algorithm 13 Repeated insertion procedure
1: Let σ = {a1}.
2: For i = 2, . . . , n, insert ai into σ at position s = 1, . . . , i with probability
αi,s =
e−θ·(i−s)
1 + e−θ + · · ·+ e−θ·(i−1) .
3: Return σ.
parameter θ.
Based on the correctness of this procedure, we describe a dynamic program to
compute the choice probabilities of a general offer set S. The key idea is to decompose
these probabilities to include the position at which a product is chosen. In particular,
for i ≤ m and s ∈ [m], let π(i, s,m) be the probability that product ai is chosen (i.e.,
appears first among products in S) at position s after the m-th step of Algorithm 13.
In other words, π(i, s,m) corresponds to a choice probability when restricting N to





We compute π(i, s,m) iteratively for m = 1, . . . , n. In particular, in order to compute
π(i, s,m+ 1), we use the correctness of the sampling procedure. Specifically, starting
from a permutation σ that includes the products a1, . . . , am, the product am+1 is
inserted at position j with probability αm+1,j, and we have two cases to consider.
Case 1: am+1 /∈ S. In this case, π(m + 1, s,m + 1) = 0 for all s = 1, . . . ,m + 1.
Consider a product ai for i ≤ m. In order for ai to be chosen at position s after am+1
is inserted, one of the following events has to occur:
i) ai was already chosen at position s before am+1 is inserted, and am+1 is inserted
at a position ` > s,
ii) ai was chosen at position s− 1, and am+1 is inserted at a position ` ≤ s− 1.
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Consequently, we have for all i ≤ m,
π(i, s,m+ 1) =
m+1∑
`=s+1
αm+1,` · π(i, s,m) +
s−1∑
`=1
αm+1,` · π(i, s− 1, k)
= (1− γm+1,s) · π(i, s,m) + γm+1,s−1 · π(i, s− 1,m),
where γm,s =
∑s
`=1 αm,` for all m, s.
Case 2: am+1 ∈ S. Consider a product ai with i ≤ m. This product is chosen at
position s only if it was already chosen at position s and am+1 is inserted at a position
` > s. Therefore, for all i ≤ m, π(i, s,m+ 1) = (1− γm+1,s) · π(i, s,m). For product
am+1, it is chosen at position s only if all products ai for i ≤ m are at positions ` ≥ s
and am+1 is inserted at position s, implying that






Algorithm 14 summarizes this procedure.
Algorithm 14 Computing choice probabilities
1: Let S be a general offer set. Without loss of generality, we assume that a1 ∈ S.
2: Let π(1, 1, 1) = 1.
3: For m = 1, . . . , n− 1,
(a) For all i ≤ m and s = 1, . . .m+ 1, let
π(i, s,m+ 1) = (1− γm+1,s) · π(i, s,m) + 1l[am+1 /∈ S] · γm+1,s−1 · π(i, s− 1,m).
(b) For s = 1, . . . ,m+ 1, let






4: For all i ∈ [n], return π(ai, S) =
∑n
s=1 π(i, s, n).
Theorem 4.4. For any offer set S, Algorithm 14 returns the choice probabilities
under a Mallows distribution with modal ranking ω and concentration parameter θ.
This dynamic programming approach provides an O(n3) time algorithm for com-
puting π(a, S) for all products a ∈ S simultaneously. Moreover, as explained in the
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next section, these ideas lead to an algorithm to solve the assortment optimization
problem.
4.4.2 Assortment optimization: integer programming
formulation
Building on Algorithm 14 and introducing a binary variable for each product, we can
reformulate the assortment optimization problem (4.2) under a mixture of Mallows
model as a mixed inter program (MIP). Although the MIP formulation does not enjoy
the theoretical guarantees of the PTAS (i.e. upper bound on the running time), it
does not require Assumption 4.2 to hold. Again, we start with a single Mallows
model. In particular, we give a MIP with only O(n3) variables and constraints, with
only n 0-1 variables. We assume for simplicity that the first product of S (say a1)
is known. Since this product is generally not known a-priori, in order to obtain an
optimal solution to problem (4.2), we need to guess the first offered product and
solve the above integer program for each of the O(n) guesses. We would like to note
that the MIP formulation is presented for the unconstrained assortment optimization
problem but is quite powerful and can handle a large class of constraints on the
assortment (such as cardinality and capacity constraints).
Theorem 4.5. Conditional on a1 ∈ S, the following mixed integer program (MIP)
computes an optimal solution to the unconstrained assortment optimization problem
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pi · π(i, s, n)
s.t. π(1, 1, 1) = 1, π(1, s, 1) = 0, ∀s = 2, . . . , n
π(i, s,m+ 1) = (1− wm+1,s) · π(i, s,m) + yi,s,m+1, ∀i, s,∀m ≥ 2
π(m+ 1, s,m+ 1) = zs,m+1, ∀s,∀m ≥ 2
yi,s,m ≤ γm+1,s−1 · π(i, s− 1,m− 1), ∀i, s,∀m ≥ 2
0 ≤ yi,s,m ≤ γm+1,s−1 · (1− xm), ∀i, s,∀m ≥ 2





π(i, `,m− 1), ∀s,∀m ≥ 2
0 ≤ zs,m ≤ αm+1,s · xm, ∀s,∀m ≥ 2
x1 = 1, xq = 1, xm ∈ {0, 1}
Proof. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be a feasible binary vector to the MIP and let S = {ai :
xi = 1}. Note that there is a one to one correspondence between feasible vector x to
the MIP and feasible assortment S such that a1 ∈ S and aq ∈ S. Consequently, we







pi · π(i, s, n)
s.t. π(i, s,m+ 1) = (1− wm+1,s) · π(i, s,m) + yi,s,m+1, ∀i, s,∀m ≥ 2
π(m+ 1, s,m+ 1) = zs,m+1, ∀s,∀m ≥ 2
0 ≤ yi,s,m ≤ 1l[am+1 /∈ S] · γm+1,s−1 · π(i, s− 1,m− 1), ∀i, s,∀m ≥ 2





π(i, `,m− 1), ∀s,∀m ≥ 2
π(1, 1, 1) = 1
Note that it is always optimal to set yi,s,m and zs,m at their upper bound because all
the coefficients in the objective function are non-negative. The correctness of Algo-
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rithm 14 then shows that the MIP is an equivalent formulation of the unconstrained
assortment optimization problem under a Mallows model.
We now present the MIP formulation for the unconstrained assortment optimiza-
tion problem for a mixture of Mallows model. Again, we want to emphasize that the
binary variables allow capturing a wide variety of constraints.
Theorem 4.6. Conditional on a1 ∈ S, the following mixed integer program (MIP)
computes an optimal solution to the unconstrained assortment optimization problem




pi · µk · πk(i, s, n)
s.t. πk(1, 1, 1) = 1, πk(1, s, 1) = 0, ∀s = 2, . . . , n, ∀k
πk(i, s,m+ 1) = (1− wm+1,s) · πk(i, s,m) + yki,s,m+1, ∀i, s, k,∀m ≥ 2
πk(m+ 1, s,m+ 1) = zks,m+1, ∀s, k, ∀m ≥ 2
yki,s,m ≤ γm+1,s−1 · πk(i, s− 1,m− 1), ∀i, s, k,∀m ≥ 2
0 ≤ yki,s,m ≤ γm+1,s−1 · (1− xωk(am)), ∀i, s, k,∀m ≥ 2





πk(i, `,m− 1), ∀s, k, ∀m ≥ 2
0 ≤ zks,m ≤ αm+1,s · xωk(am), ∀s, k, ∀m ≥ 2
x1 = 1, xq = 1, xm ∈ {0, 1}
4.5 Numerical experiments
In this section, we examine the numerical performance of the MIP. We consider the
following simulation setup for a single Mallows model. Product prices are sampled
independently and uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1]. The modal ranking
is fixed to the identity ranking with the outside option ranked at the top. The outside
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option being ranked at the top is characteristic of applications in which the retailer
captures a small fraction of the market and the outside option represents the (much
larger) rest of the market. Indeed, most of the customers visiting a website or a store
leave without making a purchase. Because the outside option is always offered, we
need to solve only a single instance of the MIP (described in Theorem 4.5). Note
that in the more general setting, the number of MIPs that must be solved is equal
the minimum of the rank of the outside option and the rank of the highest revenue
item. Because the MIPs are independent of each other, they can be solved in parallel.
We solved the MIPs using the Gurobi Optimizer version 6.0.0 on a computer with
processor 2.4GHz Intel Core i5, RAM of 8GB, and operating system Mac OSX El
Capitan. In order to improve the running time of the MIP, we first strengthen the
big-M constraints. We describe this strengthening below.
Strengthening of the MIP formulation. We use some structural properties
of the optimal solution to tighten some of the upper bounds involving the binary
variables in the MIP formulation. In particular, for all i, s, and m, we replace the
constraint
yi,s,m ≤ γm+1,s−1 · (1− xm),
by the following constraint
yi,s,m ≤ γm+1,s−1 · ui,s,m · (1− xm),
where ui,s,m is the probabliity that product ai is selected at position (s− 1) after the
mth step of Algorithm 13 when the offer set is S = {ai∗ , aq}, i.e. when only the highest
priced product is offered. Since we know that the highest price product is always
offered in the optimal assortment, this is a valid upper bound to π(i, s − 1,m − 1)
and therefore a valid strenghtening of the constraint. Similarly, for all s and m, we
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replace the constraint,
zs,m ≤ αm+1,s · xm,
by the following constraint
zs,m ≤ αm+1,s · vs,m · xm,
where vs,m is equal to the probability that product that product i is selected at
position ` = s, . . . , n when the offer set is S = {aq} if ai w ai∗ , and S = {aq, ai∗}
otherwise. Again using the fact that the highest price product is always offered in
the optimal assortment, we can show that this is a valid upper bound.
Results and discussion. Table 4.1 shows the running time of strengthened MIP
formulation for different values of e−θ and n. For each pair of parameters, we gener-
ated 50 different instances.
n e−θ
Without strengthening With strengthening
Average (s) Max (s) Average (s) Max (s)
10 0.8 4.60 5.64 4.65 7.17
10 0.9 4.72 5.80 4.58 5.73
15 0.8 19.04 27.08 17.4 18.73
15 0.9 21.30 28.79 19.67 23.61
20 0.8 65.43 87.48 48.08 58.09
20 0.9 222.19 626.08 105.30 189.93
25 0.8 ** ** 143.21 183.78
25 0.9 ** ** 769.78 1,817.98
Table 4.1: Running time of the strengthened MIP for various values of e−θ and n.
(**the solver did not terminate in 8 hours)
We would like to note that the strengthening improves the running time consid-
erably. Under the initial formulation, the MIP did not terminate after several hours
for n = 25 whereas it was able to terminate in a few minutes with the additional
strengthening. Our MIP obtains the optimal solution in a reasonable amount of time
for the considered parameter values. Outside of this range, i.e. when e−θ is too small
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or when n is too large, there are potential numerical instabilities. The strengthening
we propose is one way to improve the running time of the MIP but other numerical
optimization techniques may be applied to improve the running time even further.
Finally, we emphasize that the MIP formulation is necessary because of its flexibility
to handle versatile business constraints (such as cardinality or capacity constraints)
that naturally arise in practice.
In this chapter, we have studied the mixture of Mallows model. Despite being
a distribution over rankings whose support is exponential, we show that this dis-
tribution is still very tractable. Using the symmetries of the Mallows distribution,
we develop efficient procedures to compute choice probabilities and give tractable
approaches to the assortment optimization problem. Therefore, smoothing a sparse




Design of Futures Contract for Risk-averse Online
Advertisers
5.1 Introduction
Why does advance selling (i.e., buyers purchasing items before they actually become
available for use) occur? There are several explanations for this widespread phe-
nomenon, some of which have been well studied in the academic literature. One
reason is that sellers can benefit by more accurately forecasting demand, reducing
the risk of either insufficient inventory or overproduction and wastage, thus manag-
ing their production costs and supply chains more effectively. To incentivize buyers to
provide such forecasts, sellers often offer discounts for pre-ordering, commonly seen in
the publishing and manufacturing industries. Another reason is that it allows sellers
to segment the market by using a price discrimination strategy, which is typical in
the travel and tourism industries: For example, leisure travelers with more flexibility
get a lower price for booking flights or hotel rooms far in advance, while relatively
price-insensitive business travelers pay a higher price for urgent last-minute bookings.
In both these cases, as it has been shown in the Marketing literature, advance selling
induces a discounted price for the consumers that are willing to commit and buy in
advance (see, e.g., [69] and [28]).
A slightly different setting is that of futures contracts in finance, which emerged
in the fifties. These contracts allow sellers and buyers to agree upon a price of a
commodity (e.g., oil) that will be delivered at a specified future date. Here, the
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contract exists to protect both buyers and sellers from uncertainty in future prices
(often due to unpredictable factors such as market fluctuations, weather, or supply-
demand mismatches). Since both parties benefit from advance selling, the price is not
necessarily discounted; it usually depends on risk factors that leads to a no-arbitrage
pricing policy (see, e.g., [41] and [38]).
In this chapter, we study a different case for advance selling, that does not appear
to have been considered before in the literature in this form: In a supply-constrained
world, particularly with variable demand, buyers may face significant uncertainty in
both pricing and allocation. To reduce this uncertainty, risk-averse buyers may be
willing to pay a premium for an advance purchase that guarantees they will both (a)
receive the item being sold and (b) pay a fixed price. That is, a risk-averse buyer
can hedge against the possibility of a ‘stock out’ (i.e., not receiving the item) due to
high demand, and against the possibility of a high price that prevents the buyer from
spending her budget in a controlled manner.1 Our motivating application throughout
this chapter will be that of Internet display advertising, which inspired this work, but
these ideas apply to other settings, such as pricing cloud computing services.
One of the main goals of this chapter is to propose a model for advance selling for
Internet advertising, and to show that it is beneficial for both sellers (publishers of
Internet content, who sell advertising space) and buyers (advertisers purchasing the
right to display their ad adjacent to the content). Traditionally, display advertising
is sold in two ways: First, through reservation contracts sold in advance, where an
advertiser enters into an agreement with a publisher, paying a fixed price for its
ads to be shown to a specified volume of visitors to the publisher’s website, perhaps
satisfying certain additional criteria. For example, Nike may pay $50,000 to have its
ads shown to 5 million espn.com website users who are based in the US and frequently
1The idea of buyers paying premiums for higher levels / quality of service has been studied in
the literature, but as we shall see, our work differs from this in important ways.
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visit the basketball section of the website. Reservation contracts have guaranteed
spend from the advertiser, and guaranteed number of impressions (an impression or
ad view occurs when one ad is shown to a user) by the publisher. Second, display
advertising may be sold through real-time bidding, in which advertisers and publishers
meet through an exchange platform (such as Google’s DoubleClick Ad Exchange).
When a user visits the publisher’s website, the exchange may request real-time bids
from multiple advertisers and run an auction, awarding the ad slot to the highest
bidder. This is usually a second-price auction for each individual impression, with no
guarantees to either publisher or advertiser; in some cases, instead of an auction, the
seller posts a fixed price.
Reservations and Market Maker: Typically, costs per impression are several
times higher for reservation contracts than for auction purchases, even though auc-
tions allow advertisers more fine-grained tracking and targeting of their ads to indi-
vidual users. Why is this the case? One of the main insights of this chapter is an
explanation for this difference; we model buyers as risk-averse rational agents that fol-
low commonly used utility models, and show that they are willing to pay a premium
for the guaranteed impression volume and guaranteed prices offered by reservations,
providing higher revenue to publishers.2 Recent independent work [37] in the context
of pricing for Cloud Computing has also posited risk aversion as the reason for the
existence of a guaranteed option at a higher price relative to the expected clearing
price of an auction; see our discussion of related work. Further, we go beyond this
qualitative insight, mathematically characterizing the appropriate premiums. In par-
ticular, we propose a new type of contract, referred to as Market-Maker contracts,
2One might note that there is a large and ever-increasing supply of Internet content; in such
a supply-rich world, why should advertisers pay reservation premiums, since they can always buy
ads on other websites? In line with our reasoning, the large mass of small publishers barely sell
reservation contracts, instead using auction-based platforms like Google’s AdSense. However, there
is a limited supply of high-quality content; large publishers with such differentiated content and
audiences (such as The New York Times, The Economist, or YouTube) are indeed the most likely
to sell reservation contracts and charge high premiums.
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that can replace or complement reservations: For risk-averse buyers concerned about
having to pay an unpredictable high price, or possibly not receiving impressions at
all, the Market-Maker is a system that quotes a price higher than the expected price
of an impression. Buyers can choose whether to pay this higher price or take their
chances in the open auction. The Market-Maker contract guarantees (like reserva-
tion contracts) that buyers who purchase it will receive their impressions. It is then
the responsibility of the Market-Maker to purchase these impressions on behalf of its
buyers, even if it has to pay a price higher than it charged the buyers.
Advantages of Market-Maker: We first claim that compared to a world with no
contracts or guaranteed sales, the addition of the Market-Maker benefits both buyers
and sellers:
• Since the risk-averse buyers obtain guarantees, they may derive higher utility
even though they pay the Market-Maker a higher price.
• This higher price obtained from buyers can be passed on to the seller as addi-
tional revenue (after deducting a share for the Market-Maker’s assumption of
risk).
In settings that currently offer both contracts and auctions, such as Internet display
advertising, the Market-Maker can replace existing forms of contracts, by automating
reservations. There are multiple advantages to Market-Maker as an alternative to
reservations:
• The current sales process for reservations involves considerable manual effort
and long-term human negotiations; some publishers report up to $10,000 in
costs to service a single guaranteed reservation advertising campaign [61], which
can be a sizable fraction of the total campaign spend. Offering publishers an
automated option that provides a reservation-like premium can allow them to
obtain more revenue at lower costs.
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• Currently, advertisers can only practically sign contracts with a small number
of publishers, and vice versa. An automated system like the Market-Maker
can scale better to a larger number of buyers and sellers, reducing search and
transaction costs for such contracts, and extend to more complex contracts with
finer targeting.
We next describe our model and contributions in more detail.
5.1.1 Contributions
At a high level, we make the following contributions:
• Framework to study guarantee-based premiums. We introduce a framework for
mathematically analyzing the benefits of guarantees for risk-averse Internet
advertisers. We consider the addition of guaranteed-delivery sales to the two
predominant existing modes of real-time-bidding based sales. The first is fixed-
price deals (commonly called preferred deals, a part of private marketplaces),
in which the seller invites buyers to participate at a posted price determined
by the seller. The other is the classic second-price auction setting. We study
the benefits of adding a Market-Maker purchase option which provides buyer
guarantees in each of these settings.
• Equilibrium buyer behavior analysis. The introduction of a new option for
buyers changes the equilibrium that would exist without this option. We assume
that buyers choose their preferred option to maximize their utilities, and study
several common utility models. We use an envy-based utility model in the
fixed-price / preferred deals setting and two widely used utility models, namely
CARA and Standard deviation models, for the auction setting. For each of
these settings, and each of these utility models, we characterize how to set the
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Market-Maker price, and analyze the equilibrium buyer behavior in the presence
of this additional Market-Maker option.
• Reducing allocation and price uncertainties. In the new equilibrium after the
addition of a Market-Maker option, we show that buyers who opt for the Market-
Maker reduce both their allocation uncertainty and price uncertainty. In par-
ticular, compared to the equilibrium clearing price that would have existed in
the absence of the Market-Maker, the Market-Maker charges a premium above
this price as a fee that buyers pay for reducing their allocation and price un-
certainties.
• Pareto improvement in seller’s revenue and sum of buyer utilities. We show
that in all the settings we consider, adding the Market-Maker contract can only
increase both the seller’s revenue and the sum of buyer utilities. For some
commonly used buyer value distributions, we further prove that this increase is
significant.
We now describe these contributions more fully, including some of the challenges
faced, and surprising observations.
Throughout this chapter, we assume for simplicity that there is a large inventory I
of identical, indivisible items. Each buyer is interested in exactly one unit of inventory,
and has a private value drawn independently from a common distribution F .3
In preferred deals sold on Ad Exchanges, sellers and buyers agree on a fixed
(posted) price per impression, but there is no guarantee that buyers will bid in any
volume, nor does the seller guarantee that there will be any inventory available to
bid on, let alone sufficient inventory for all the buyers interested in purchasing at
3In practice, a seller’s inventory may be segmented into different sections with different values,
but each segment can be treated independently. Similarly, buyers typically want to buy a large
number of impressions d, but one can break up each such buyer into d single-unit buyers. In reality,
buyers may have different valuation distributions, overlapping targeting, etc., and extending our
model to some of these more realistic cases is an interesting direction for future work.
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the posted price. When multiple buyers bid at this price, the impression is allocated
randomly to one of them. This motivates an envy-based utility model, where a
buyer receives negative utility for not being allocated even though he was willing
to pay the price at which another buyer was. In the absence of the Market-Maker,
we show examples where the total welfare can be significantly lower than optimal,
but flexibility in adding a second pricing option (i.e. the Market-Maker option) can
result in near-optimal welfare. Further, adding the Market-Maker option can result
in a Pareto improvement in both the seller revenue and the utility for each buyer.
In the auction setting, we assume a standard multi-unit auction (that is, the I
items are sold to the I highest bidders at a price equal to the the (I+1)th-highest bid).4
However, there is an additional layer of complexity in analyzing the equilibrium both
with and without the Market-Maker. When utilities are not quasi-linear, it is not
clear how buyers should bid at all, since it is not immediately obvious that a second-
price auction (or its generalization to the multi-unit case) is truthful. For example,
buyers may choose to shade their bids in order to decrease their pricing uncertainty
by avoiding a small probability of a very high price. We prove that the auction is
indeed truthful in the standard risk-aversion models we consider, demonstrating the
robustness of the second-price auction even in the presence of risk aversion. Armed
with these results, we can analyze outcomes in the auction setting.
In the auction setting, we first consider the case in which all buyers exhibit the
same degree of risk aversion (though this is perhaps unrealistic, it provides useful
insights for heterogenous degrees of risk aversion, which we consider later, and is
interesting in its own right). We show that there is a unique Market-Maker price such
that (a) the Market-Maker runs no risk of defaulting (which could be a possibility if
more than I buyers choose this option) and (b) at least one buyer opts for the Market-
4In reality, there are I repeated second-price auctions, but if buyers are paying a price higher
than the (I + 1)th bid, they have an incentive to lower their bids. Therefore, we assume that all I
items are sold at this price.
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Maker (if no buyer opts for it, it serves no purpose). We prove this by showing that
for any price p quoted by the Market-Maker, there is a threshold value v(p) such that
any buyer with value at least v(p) will choose the Market-Maker, and no buyer with
lower value will choose it. This also results in the somewhat counter-intuitive fact
that even the buyers with very high values (who have zero allocation uncertainty,
since they know they will always win in the auction) will choose the Market-Maker;
this is because in the homogenous risk-aversion case, the Market-Maker only changes
prices, and not the allocation, meaning that the premium is paid purely to reduce
pricing uncertainty. At this unique Market-Maker price, we show that there is a
Pareto increase in both the seller revenue and the sum of buyer utilities.
We then consider the more realistic case of heterogenous risk aversion; here, the
Market-Maker can change the allocation in addition to reducing pricing uncertainty.
In particular, a more risk-averse buyer may buy the Market-Maker contract and win
an impression, while a less risk-averse buyer with a higher value who decided to take
a chance may be left unallocated. Now, the Market-Maker price is no longer unique,
and we characterize the range of feasible Market-Maker prices. We prove that there
exists at least one price that gives a Pareto improvement in the seller revenue and
the sum of buyer utilities; choosing other points in the range allows trading off these
two objectives.
We believe that a significant strength of our paper is that all the results described
above for the auction setting hold in both the models we consider (though the proofs
are quite different), showing that our results are robust and not tied to a particular
model for risk aversion.
5.1.2 Related Literature
As we discussed, this chapter is related to several streams of literature.
In the Marketing community, the topic of advance selling has received great at-
125
tention in the last two decades (see, e.g., [69], [70] and [28]). In [69], the authors
show that advance selling allows sellers to improve profits. In particular, they prove
that when buyers are homogeneous in the advance period purchase, advance selling
can attain the profits from first degree price discrimination (even when the seller
cannot price discriminate in the consumption period). Subsequently, [70] extend the
treatment to competitive environments and show that the relative profit advantage
from advance selling in a competitive market can be higher or the same relative to a
setting with a monopolist.
In the Operations Management community, advance selling was also studied (see,
e.g., [63], [19], [15] and [12]). The work by [63] study advance selling in a newsvendor
setting. The authors examine the advance selling price and inventory decisions in a
two-period setting, and conclude that advance selling is not always optimal. In [19],
the authors study a supply chain setting with a manufacturer who produces and sells
a seasonal product to a retailer under uncertain supply and demand. They model
the problem as a Stackelberg game and study the impact of advance selling on both
the manufacturer and the retailer. In [15], the author studies how the allocation of
inventory risk impacts the supply chain efficiency under advance-purchase discount
contracts. It is shown that if firms consider advance-purchase discounts, then the
coordination of the supply chain and the arbitrary allocation of its profit is possible.
In [12], the authors study a model that uses the acquired advance sales information
to decide the capacity. They derive a threshold policy that determines when to stop
acquiring advance sales information and show that advance selling can improve profit
significantly. Finally, the recent article [16] studies a similar problem as this chapter in
the context of an online multi-unit auction. In their model, the seller faces a Poisson
arrival stream of consumers who can get the product from the auction or from a list
price channel. Each consumer maximizes his own surplus, and must decide either to
buy at the posted price and get the item at no risk, or to join the auction and wait
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until its end. This chapter differs by explicitly modeling the risk aversion of buyers
in the utility function, instead of assuming different arrival times that are Poisson
distributed. In addition, we focus on studying how to design and set the price of the
advance selling option and we study the impact on the buyers and the sellers. We
note that in both the Marketing and Operations Management literatures, most of
the previous works on advance selling aim to mitigate the uncertainty in the buyer’s
valuation (or the consumption level). One of the key messages is that advance selling
helps the seller to increase its profit by offering a discounted price to the buyers
who can commit to make the purchase in advance. In this chapter, however, the
motivation is different in nature as our goal is to capture the risk aversion of buyers
(or advertisers) and to offer a premium price for the Market-Maker contract. In this
paper, we show that in addition to the benefit for the buyers, it also increase the
revenue of the seller.
In the Finance literature, futures contracts are a very well studied area of research
(see, [41], [40], [38] and the references therein). As we previously mentioned, the
financial contract exists to protect both buyers and sellers from uncertainty in future
prices. Since both parties benefit from advance selling, the price is not necessarily
discounted and usually depends on risk factors that leads to a no-arbitrage pricing
policy. A large number of strategies that aim to price such contracts were developed
and implemented but this is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Finally, several relatively recent papers in the CS/Econ community are also re-
lated. Notably, [37] independently considered the problem of guaranteed and spot
markets coexisting, specifically in the cloud computing market. One important differ-
ence is that their model assumes that the seller is the agent offering the two options,
and explicitly sets aside inventory for the purchasers of the guarantee. In contrast,
our market maker cannot set aside inventory, as it is not the seller;5 it bids in the auc-
5Individual publishers in the display advertising context are unlikely to have the scale and/or
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tion to obtain inventory for its buyers, and hence makes a loss with some probability
(though it makes a profit in expectation). As such, this service can be offered by any
arbitrary third party wiling to accept the arbitrage risk, though it is likely to be the
exchange, passing on a large portion of the profits to publishers. A few other papers
consider settings in which buyers can pay more to get a higher chance of winning an
item, but they are not motivated by risk aversion: [74] describes how publisher can
sell an options contract that gives advertisers the right to buy ads later at a particular
price; their work differs from ours by focusing on reducing seller revenue volatility
by accepting lower average revenue. [56] studies how publishers can increase revenue
by bundling impressions and offer advertisers a fixed take-it-or-leave-it price. In this
work, advertisers who buy a bundle do receive a guarantee, but they are not moti-
vated to do so by risk aversion; instead, if they reject the bundle, they are barred from
the auction. Finally, [18] describes a modified auction where for each item, buyers
are offered the choice between paying a high fixed price, or taking their chances in a
lottery; the authors show that this tool can extract additional revenue particularly
in thin auctions where only a single buyer is likely to have a high value.
Structure of the chapter. We first study the case of a posted price in Section
5.2. In Section 5.3, we consider the case where ads are sold via auctions and extend
our analysis to this setting. In Section 5.4, we run computational experiments on
commonly used distributions to illustrate the lift in revenue and buyer utilities that
we get from adding the Market-Maker contract.
5.2 Posted price
In this section, we consider a setting with a posted price contract which corresponds to
the fixed-price cpm deals in the online advertising world. More precisely, online adver-
technological sophistication to offer such a service.
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tisers can sign contracts at a pre-determined posted price set by the seller. Typically,
these types of contracts do not provide any guarantee of delivery to the advertisers;
they only provide a price guarantee if allocated. Our goal is to study the benefits
of introducing a new additional type of contract, called the Market Maker contract,
that provides a delivery guarantee. The seller will offer both types of contracts to
advertisers, who can then choose between the two options.
5.2.1 Model
Consider a single seller or publisher (e.g., a website such as the New York Times
selling online ads). Let I be the amount of inventory (number of ads available), and
N be the number of buyers or advertisers interested in purchasing this inventory. For
simplicity, we assume that all the inventory units are identical,6 that each buyer is
interested in a single unit, and each unit is equally valuable to all N buyers. For
example, the seller wants to sell I ads slots for a specific day next month or for a
special event (e.g., Valentine’s day). We assume that I and N are deterministic and
known to the seller7 (for instance, the publisher has a reasonably accurate estimate
based on the number of users that visited his website in the past, and similarly
the number of buyers with whom he has long-term relationships with). Each buyer
has a private valuation v drawn i.i.d. from some discrete distribution F . We focus
specifically on discrete distributions because several aspects of the buyer population
like re-marketing buyers etc. make the distribution bimodal or multi-modal and
discrete distributions model this well8. The seller decides upon a posted price p
6This is indeed the case if we partition the inventory/user-eyeballs that the seller has available
into several segments based on the feature-list of each user, and focus on each segment separately.
Within each segment, buyers have the same value for any unit.
7Even with I and N deterministic we show that an additional market-maker price can signifi-
cantly increase seller revenue, buyer utilities, and efficiency of allocation.
8For the continuous distribution case where even a single price is enough to optimize welfare
and efficiency.
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and then, the inventory is randomly allocated among all the buyers with valuation
that exceeds p. The random allocation mechanism is motivated by the fact that
the buyers arrive in a random order, and are served on a first-come-first-serve basis.
Consequently, depending on I, N and the buyers’ value distribution, some buyers may
not be served even though their valuations are above p. (Indeed this happens with real
world fixed-price cpm deals, and is part of the reason why these deals don’t promise
allocation guarantees). This phenomenon makes such buyers experience envy: the
inability to purchase a good that was priced below their value, whereas another buyer
could. We consider a utility model for the buyer that captures her envy when a good
is not allocated. More precisely, we consider the following utility model:
U(v, p, β) =

v − p if v ≥ p and allocated an item at price p
−β · (v − p) if v ≥ p and not allocated an item
0 otherwise.
If the valuation v is less than the posted price p, the buyer perceives 0 utility. If v ≥ p,
the buyer is interested in purchasing the item. If the buyer is allocated, her utility is
equal to the quasilinear utility v − p, and if she is not allocated (due to the random
allocation mechanism), she perceives a negative utility equal to −β · (v − p), where
β represents the envy parameter of the buyer, and could be different for different
buyers. In this case, the buyer can afford the item, and seeing others receiving the
item, makes her perceive a disutility/envy.
Welfare vs Efficiency. Efficiency of an outcome is the sum of valuations of buyers
who were allocated. Welfare of an outcome is the sum of utilities of all buyers and
sellers. With quasilinear utilities, welfare = efficiency. But with the envy-based utility
we study, some buyers could experience disutility due to envy and therefore, we have
welfare ≤ efficiency.
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Market-Maker price. We study the effect of adding a Market Maker contract
here, namely, we provide an additional price pM along with the guarantee that buyers
who pay pM are guaranteed to get an item, and those who pay p will enter a uniformly
random lottery along with other buyers who also paid p, and the remaining inventory
after serving the market-maker confirmed buyers will be distributed in this random
fashion.
Fluid assumption. We assume N is large enough such that for each point x in the
support of F , the number of buyers with value less than x is exactly N(1−F (x)). I.e.,
when N is large, concentration bounds puts this number very close to N(1− F (x)),
and the fluid assumption makes this exactly at N(1 − F (x)). This assumption is
to simplify exposition and avoid notational clutter from concentration bounds that
doesn’t add any insight.
Further, we assume that the distribution F is non-trivial, namely, there is at least
one point x in the support of F such that N(1 − F (x)) < I. In words, there is at
least point in the support of F where the supply is not exhausted completely. If F is
trivial, by definition of triviality, no collection of prices is enough to give allocation
guarantees, and we therefore ignore this case.
5.2.2 Results
The main message is that adding a market-maker price will simultaneously (some-
times only weakly) increase seller’s revenue and sum of buyer’s utilities. We now
establish this result in the posted-price setting. In fact in this setting, we also show
that adding the market-maker price also increases efficiency of allocation, namely the
sum of valuations of the buyers who get allocated.
We analyze the effect of adding a market-maker price to an existing posted price.
If the posted-price was already not exhausting supply, it does not make sense to add a
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market-maker at a higher price. Assume therefore that the prior posted price exhausts
the supply. Among all supply exhausting prices, the chosen one could have optimized
revenue or welfare or efficiency etc.. But we show in the following theorem that
there exists a single price that simultaneously optimizes seller’s revenue, efficiency of
allocation and total welfare in the system (sum of utilities of seller and buyers). It
therefore unambiguously establishes that the single posted price that existed before
Market-Maker was added should have been p−. We then show that offering a market
maker price of pM simultaneously with p− Pareto improves all quantities of interest.
The definitions of p− and pM are given in the statement of Theorem 5.1
Notation. We will often be interested in the quantity F<(x) = Pr[v < x], as
opposed to the regular cdf F (x) = Pr[v ≤ x].
Theorem 5.1. For any I, N and non-trivial value distribution F , and arbitrarily
heterogeneous risk averse parameters (βi for buyer i), the following are true.
1. Let S = {p in support of F : N(1− F<(p)) ≥ I} be the finite set of prices that
exhaust supply. Let p− = maxp∈S p. In the domain S, revenue, welfare and
efficiency are all optimized simultaneously at p−.
2. There exists a market-maker price pM such that offering prices pM and p− to
buyers (with pM guaranteeing allocation), will:
a) attain optimal efficiency: E(pM , p−) is exactly the sum of the I highest
values;
b) attain optimal welfare, and no buyer experiences envy: W (pM , p−) =
E(pM , p−);
c) strictly increase revenue: R(pM , p−) > R(p−), except, when N(1−F<(p−)) =
I we have R(pM , p−) = R(p−);
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d) strictly increase at least one buyer’s utility: there exists an i for which
U(vi, (p
M , p−), β) > U(vi, p
−, βi), except when N(1−F<(p−)) = I we have
U(vi, (p
M , p−), β) = U(vi, p
−, βi) for all i.
e) weakly increase each buyer’s utility: for each i, we have U(vi, (p
M , p−), βi) ≥
U(vi, p
−, βi).
Proof. We prove the theorem in two parts.
Proof of part-1 Consider the smallest point larger than p− in the support of F .
Call it p+. Note that N(1 − F<(p−)) ≥ I by definition of set S (note that S 3 p− )
and N(1− F<(p+)) < I.
1. Revenue: Since the market clears for all prices in S, the revenue R(p) for any
p ∈ S is exactly I · p. Since p− is the maximum price in S, among all p ∈ S,
the revenue R(p) is maximized at p−.
2. Efficiency: Consider any price p ≤ p−. Let Ip be the number of buyers with
value at least p. Note that Ip > I whenever p ≤ p−. Let v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vIp be the







As we decrease p, Ip increases, making the inventory open to more and more
lower value buyers, at the cost of decreased probability of allocation for high
value buyers. It immediately follows that E(p) increases with p and the optimal
efficiency among points in S is obtained at p−.
3. Welfare: Let p ∈ S, Ip and v1 ≥ . . . vIp be defined as before. Welfare at p, which












βi · (vi − p).
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The first term constitutes the quasi-linear utility of the buyers plus the seller’s
revenue (that’s why the prices cancel each other and don’t appear). The second
term constitutes the envy experienced by buyers. Note that since Ip decreases
as p increases, the first term clearly increases with p. In the second term, the
factor (1− I
Ip
) clearly decreases with p, and so does the factor vi− p. Thus the
second term decreases with p. Thus W (p) increases with p, showing that W (p)
is maximized at p− among all prices p ∈ S.
Proof of part-2 Consider posting a Market-maker price of pM = p−+ε for a tiny ε.
We analyze the buyer behavior equilibrium, namely, which set of buyers will purchase
at Market-Maker price of pM , and which set of buyers will buy at p−.
Claim 5.1. The unique equilibrium at prices (pM , p−) is as follows. When N(1 −
F<(p
−)) = I, the top I buyers get allocated at the price of p−, and no buyers will every
choose the Market-Maker price, and no buyer experiences envy, and optimal welfare
and efficiency are already achieved without Market-Maker. But if N(1−F<(p−)) > I,
buyers with v ≥ p+ will purchase at Market-Maker price of pM = p− + ε, and buyers
with v = p− will opt for a price of p− and enter a lottery to randomly share the left
over I−Ip+ items (left over after Market-Maker serves Ip+ buyers with values at least
p+). Buyers with v < p− do not get allocated.
Proof of Claim. The proof for N(1− F<(p−)) = I is immediate. We prove the other
case in the claim in three parts:
1. Buyers with v < p− do not face any envy even if unallocated since both prices
are strictly larger than p−, and hence will go unallocated.
2. Buyers with v = p− will also face no envy because their quasi-linear utility
when opting for a price of p− is exactly v − p− = 0. Thus they will prefer to
get a 0 utility than opting for pM and getting negative utility.
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3. To see that all the Ip+ buyers with v ≥ p+ will opt for the Market-Maker price
of pM : suppose on the contrary only 0 ≤ d < Ip+ buyers with v ≥ p+ opt for
Market-Maker price of pM . Under this equilibrium, consider the utility of a
buyer i with value vi ≥ p+ who has not opted for the Market-Maker. There are





(vi − p−)− βi
(





−, βi) < vi − p− because I − d ≤ I < Ip− . Thus, there exists a
sufficiently small ε such that U(vi, p
−, βi) < vi − (p− + ε) = vi − pM . Thus it
was strictly sub-optimal for the buyer to have not opted for the Market-Maker
price. This proves the claim.
Armed with the claim, we now show prove the theorem.
1. Optimal efficiency achieved: E(pM , p−) is the optimal efficiency achievable, i.e.,
it is the sum of the highest I values. This is immediate because the highest Ip+
values pick Market-Maker price and are guaranteed to get allocated. All the
remaining buyers who get allocated are at the next highest possible value after
p+, namely p−. It does not matter which among the buyers with v = p− are
getting allocated, so randomness in allocation for those buyers will not affect
efficiency.
2. Optimal welfare achieved: We show that W (pM , p−) = E(pM , p−). As explained
in Section 5.2.1, welfare is always at most efficiency. Since we have already
shown that E(pM , p−) is optimal, if we now show that W (pM , p−) = E(pM , p−),
it follows that welfare is also optimal at pair (pM , p−). To establish that, all we
have to show is that no buyers experience envy in the equilibrium allocation
(i.e., there is no loss in utility due to envy), and then it immediately follows
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that welfare = efficiency. Clearly buyers with value v ≥ p+ don’t experience
envy because they choose the Market-Maker price and are guaranteed to get
allocated. Buyers with value v = p− have 0 quasi-linear utility, and therefore
even if they don’t get allocated due to the randomness in allocation, they don’t
experience envy. This proves the optimality of welfare.
3. Strictly increase revenue: The fact that R(pM , p−) > R(p−) (in the case when
N(1 − F<(p−)) > I) immediately follows from noting that R(p−) = I · p−,
and R(pM , p−) = Ip+(p
− + ε) + (I − Ip+)p− > R(p−) (our equilibrium behavior
analysis says that Ip+ buyers purchase at a price of p
M when N(1−F<(p−)) > I)
. When N(1− F<(p−)) = I, no buyer chooses pM , and revenue is R(pM , p−) =
R(p−).
4. Strictly increase at least one buyer’s utility: Buyers with value v ≥ p+ get strictly
higher utility after adding Market-Maker option, i.e., if vi ≥ p+, we have
vi − pM > U(vi, p−, βi) (we proved this while deriving the equilibrium).
5. Weakly increase each buyer’s utility: To show that for all buyers i, U(vi, (p
M , p−), βi) ≥
U(vi, p
−, βi), note that buyers with values v ≤ p− get 0 utility before and af-
ter adding Market-Maker price. Buyers with value v ≥ p+ experience a strict
increase in utility as was just discussed in point 4 above.
In Theorem 5.1, we show that the price pair (pM = p− + ε, p−) optimizes welfare
and efficiency, and Pareto improves other quantities of interest. While the ε was to
just show existence, in practice one could significantly increase the Market-Maker
price beyond p− and significantly increase revenue. We demonstrate this for a few
distributions in Section 5.4
While Theorem 5.1 establishes that Market-Maker price can simultaneously im-
prove all quantities of interest, while also achieving optimal welfare and optimal
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efficiency, it does not quantify the extent of improvement that Market-Maker can
provide. To do this, we show in Theorem 5.2 that having just a single posted price
can lead to really bad welfare, i.e., we show that there exist distributions for which
the single posted-price’s welfare can be arbitrarily small as β gets very large.
Theorem 5.2. Even when the risk aversion parameter β is the same across all buyers,




Proof. Consider a setting where the support of F has two values v2 and v1 > v2. We




< I, i.e., the number of buyers Iv1 with
value at least v1 is strictly smaller than I, namely at a price of v1, we don’t exhaust




= (1 + β) · v1 · Iv1 . (Note that we just
have imposed 2 constraints so far, and we have 3 degrees of freedom namely v1, v2
and F (v2).). In this case, the optimal welfare is given by:













We next compute the welfare evaluated at both values v1 and v2. Note that the values
v1 and v2 are the only two relevant candidates for the posted price.











· v1 · Iv1 − β(1−
I
N
)(v1 − v2)Iv1 +
I
N
· v2 · (N − Iv1).
Note that we have included seller’s revenue also in this welfare, and that’s why the
first term has just v1 instead of v1 − v2, and similarly that’s why the third term has
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just v2 instead of v2 − v2. Now, set N >> I >> Iv1 , and ignore the term IN in the
above expression (except for the I
N
in the last term because it has a large multiplier,
namely N − Iv1). This gives us
W (v2) ' 0− β(v1 − v2)Iv1 +
I
N
· v2 · (N − Iv1)
≤ v2I + βv2Iv1 − βv1Iv1 (by ignoring the term
I
N
· v2 · Iv1)










Now consider W (v2)
W ∗














This completes the proof.
As β grows large, the welfare grows arbitrarily bad with a single price, i.e., there is
a lot of disutility in the system because of the envy that arises out of random allocation
hurting high value buyers. Note that even at β = 0, the welfare approximation by a
single price is at least a factor 2. Where as, like we saw in Theorem 5.1, the addition
of a single Market-Maker price, gives us the optimal welfare and efficiency for all β.
While we skip the proof here, it turns out that the factor 2 +β is tight, i.e., there
is a single posted price that can give a 2 + β approximation to optimal welfare.
5.3 Auctions
In this section, we consider the most popular setting for Internet advertising, where
the publisher sells the items via an auction mechanism, instead of a posted price. Note
that a large fraction of real-time bidding exchanges operate under such a mechanism.
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Buyers can post a bid for the item in real-time, and the I inventory units are allocated
to the I highest bidders. More precisely, the I highest bidders win the auction, and
they all pay the (I+1)-th bid, also called the auction clearing price. This mechanism
is called a standard multi-unit auction and generalizes the second price auction, and is
very common in both the academic literature and in practice. Our goal is to study the
benefit of adding the Market Maker contract in such an auction setting. In particular,
we show that it allows the seller to significantly increase both seller revenue and sum
of buyer utilities.
5.3.1 Model
As discussed, we consider a setting where the items are allocated by running a second
price auction. Note that buyers can suffer from two types of uncertainty: (i) allocation
uncertainty, and (ii) price uncertainty. In other words, the buyers are not guaranteed
to be allocated and if they are, the clearing price is also uncertain.
Fluid assumption. As in the posted-price setting, we make the fluid assumption
that N is large, and consequently, the number of buyers with each value in the support
of F is deterministic (i.e., it is so concentrated that it is effectively deterministic).
A consequence of the fluid assumption is that when N is deterministic, the auction
clearing price, which is just the I + 1-th order statistic among N draws from N is
also deterministic. Thus, there is no uncertainty in allocation or pricing when N
is deterministic. Note that this is unlike in the posted-prices setting where even
at deterministic N there was significant allocation uncertainty due to the uniformly
random allocation used when demand exceeded supply. The auction on the other
hand is efficient, and doesn’t have this issue. Therefore, adding the Market Maker
contract when N is deterministic is not relevant. In reality, N is very often unknown
and we study the stochastic N case in this section.
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N from discrete distribution, v from continuous or discrete distribution
F . In particular, we assume that N has a finite support distribution supported in
[Nmin, Nmax]. The buyer values could be drawn from either discrete or continuous
distribution. Note that the utility model used in Section 5.2 is not relevant here. In
particular, the auction is efficient by nature, and no disutility/envy is perceived by
the buyers. As a result, we consider two different utility models that are commonly
used in the literature and capture the risk-aversion of the buyers.
Note that for each realization of N , we obtain a corresponding clearing price
that is simply a deterministic function of the number of buyers N , due to the fluid
assumption. Under this assumption, there exists a deterministic mapping between
the uncertainty in N and the uncertainty in the clearing price p. Therefore, instead
of considering the uncertainty in N , we use the uncertainty in the clearing price.
In order to model the buyer’s risk aversion, we consider the two following utility
models:
UA(v, b) =
 Ep [(v − p)Ix]− β ·
√







Here, α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 are the parameters of each model that capture the risk
aversion of the buyers, and Ix is the indicator that the buyer is allocated the item
at his bid of b. In addition, Ep and Varp denote the expectation and variance oper-
ators over the distribution of the auction clearing price. These two classes of utility
models are commonly used in the literature and aim to capture the risk aversion of
buyers. The SD model is used in finance (e.g., portfolio optimization) and in various
Marketing applications. The Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) model is a
very commonly used risk aversion model.
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Truthfulness. Before introducing the Market-Maker option, is the I + 1-th price
auction even truthful with the above two utilities? Is it clear that the buyer doesn’t
stand to benefit by over-bidding or under-bidding? It is straight-forward to see this in
the CARA model, but the proof is involved in the SD model. We skip the truthfulness
proof here, and provide it in the full version of the paper.
Lemma 5.1. The I+1-th price auction is truthful under the above two utility models,
i.e.:
1. In the CARA model, ∀α ≥ 0, ∀v′ 6= v, UA(v, v) ≥ UA(v, v′).
2. In the SD model, ∀β ≥ 1 ∀v′ 6= v:
a) If UA(v, v) ≥ 0, then UA(v, v) ≥ UA(v, v′).
b) If UA(v, v) < 0, then UA(v, v′) < 0.
We note the subtlety in Lemma 5.1; we don’t claim that utility never increases by
misreporting one’s bid. We show that if the true utility is positive, one’s misreported
bid never yields anything more than the true utility. If the true utility is negative,
one’s misreported bid could yield higher than the true utility, but it is still negative
as well. An agent with negative utility simply does not participate in the auction,
and gets 0 utility instead.
Is a negative utility at one’s true value meaningful? We claim that it is meaningful.
It means that the agent is so risk averse that any amount of uncertainty in outcome
is enough to cause net disutility to her. Such agents simply don’t participate in the
auction at all. Importantly, Market-Maker helps such buyers by providing a risk-free
option that they will consider purchasing. Namely, the Market-Maker increases the
net buyer participation.
Now that we said that the auction is truthful, we rewrite the utilities by dropping
the bid (bid = value) as:
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UA(v) =
 Ep [(v − p)
+]− β ·
√







Market-Maker and auction. Assume that we now introduce the Market Maker
option at a price pM . The buyer’s utility with valuation v for selecting the Market
Maker contract is given by:
UM(v, pM) =
 (v − p
M)+ (SD model),
1− e−α·(v−pM )+ (CARA model).
Note that in the SD model, the standard deviation term disappears as the value of
pM is deterministic. The Market-Maker bids on behalf of its buyers in the auction. It
bids a very high number (essentially∞) so that it is guaranteed to get allocated. The
only way a Market-Maker can default on its allocation promise is when more than I
buyers choose to buy Market-Maker. The Market-Maker price has to be designed to
avoid this, and yet should not be too high to get 0 or tiny incremental revenue.
Equilibrium behavior. If provided both the market-maker and the auction, how
will the equilibrium buyer behavior be? Which buyer values will choose which option?
The buyers while making this decision know their own values, but do not know the
total number of buyers N who are entering the system. This causes some allocation
and pricing uncertainty in the auction. In the next section, we analyze this setting.
We use our equilibrium behavior analysis to guide how the market-maker price should
be set so that the Market-Maker never defaults, i.e., never gets into a demand-more-
than-supply situation. What will happen to total revenue? What will happen to
total utility? All these in next section.
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5.3.2 Homogeneous risk-aversion
In this section, we consider the setting where all the buyers have the same risk-
aversion parameter (β and α for the SD and CARA models respectively). We will
extend our results for the case of heterogeneous risk-aversion in Section 5.3.3. Our first
result characterizes the equilibrium induced by the coexistence of both the auction
mechanism and the Market Maker contract. In particular, we show that the buyers
with high valuations choose the Market Maker.
Theorem 5.3. For both CARA and SD utility models, and for a given price pM , if
there exists a value ṽ such that UM(ṽ, pM) ≥ UA(ṽ), then for all v ≥ ṽ, UM(v, pM) ≥
UA(v).
Proof. We give separate analyses for the two utility models. For ease of exposition,
we assume that the distribution of values is continuous for this proof.
Proof for SD model : We show that the difference of the Market-Maker and
Auction utilities is increasing, thereby establishing the threshold property. We first
rewrite the utility derived from the auction. Note that if N has a discrete distribution,
then the auction clearing price is discrete as well. Let G(·) denote its cdf and let g(·)
be the probability mass function of the clearing price. A clearing price only exists
only when the game has an equilibrium; we begin by assuming that a clearing price




(v − p) · g(p) · dp− β ·
√
Varp[(v − p)+].










g(p) · dp = G(v).
143

















(v − p)2 · g(p) · dp
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(v − p) · g(p) · dp− 2 · Ep[(v − p)+] ·G(v)
= 2 · Ep[(v − p)+]− 2 · Ep[(v − p)+] ·G(v)
= 2 · Ep[(v − p)+] ·G(v).
Here, G(v) = 1−G(v) denotes the complementary cdf of the auction clearing price.














(UM(v)− UA(v)) = G(v) ·
(







Consequently, the difference in the utility functions is increasing with v, which shows
the desired threshold property.
CARA model Unlike the SD model’s proof, where we studied the derivative of the
difference of utilities, here we study the derivative of the ratio of utilities. As before,
we begin by computing the derivatives of the utility functions. For v ≥ pM , we have:
∂
∂v
UM(v, pM) = e−α·(v−p
M ) ≥ 0,
∂2
∂2v
UM(v, pM) = −α · e−α·(v−pM ) ≤ 0.






e−α·(v−p) · g(p) · dp ≥ 0.
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This shows that UM(·, pM) and UA(·) are both increasing functions in v. In addition,










e−α·(pM−p) · g(p)dp. (5.3)
Note that the ratio in (5.3) is an increasing function of v. Furthermore, we can rewrite



























Here, vmax denotes the maximal value of the valuation v (if the support of v is
unbounded, one can take vmax =∞ and use a limit argument).
Note that for v ≤ pM , UM(v, pM) = 0. Consequently, UA(pM) ≥ UM(pM , pM) =
0. We consider 2 different cases. First, assume that UA(vmax) ≤ UM(vmax, pM) so
that the ratio in (5.4) is larger than 1. Since UA(pM) ≥ UM(pM , pM) = 0, the two
functions UA(·) and UM(·, pM) have to intersect at least once. In other words, there
must exist at least one value v̄ > pM such that UM(v̄, pM) = UA(v̄). In addition, it’s
not possible to have an even number of crossing points. Otherwise, it will contradict
that UA(vmax) ≤ UM(vmax, pM). Assume by contradiction that the number of crossing
points is at least 3. In this case, this contradicts the fact the ratio of derivatives is
increasing in v (using equation (5.3)). Therefore, there exists a single value v̄ such
that for all v ≥ v̄, UM(v, pM) ≥ UA(v).
In the second case, we assume that UA(vmax) > U
M(vmax, p
M) so that the ratio
in (5.4) is smaller than 1. Since the ratio of derivatives is an increasing function of v,
the two functions UA(·) and UM(·, pM) will not intersect. As a result, there cannot
exist any value v such that UM(v, pM) = UA(v). Indeed, since the ratio of derivatives
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always remains strictly less than 1, this would contradict UA(vmax) > U
M(vmax, p
M).
This concludes the proof.
Corollary 5.1. From Theorem 5.3 it follows that for any given pM , there exists
a threshold value v̄(pM) such that for all v ≥ v̄(pM), UM(v, pM) ≥ UA(v), and
UM(v, pM) < UA(v) otherwise.
Note that the threshold result is not immediately intuitive. One would expect
that buyers with very high value feel certain about their allocations, and hence don’t
go for the Market-Maker option. But the opposite is true, as Theorem 5.3 shows. The
reason for this is that although the allocation uncertainty is tiny for high value buyers,
there is significant pricing uncertainty that stems from unknown number of buyers
N ∈ [Nmin, Nmax] (recall that buyers don’t know N when they make the auction vs.
Market-Maker decision).
Engineering the Market-Maker price. Armed with Theorem 5.3, we now con-
sider the question of how the designer should design the Market-Maker price. The
price should be such that the Market-Maker is never over demanded (i.e., never more
than I buyers ask for it), and at the same time, increase revenue for seller and utility
for buyers.
Theorem 5.4. Let pmax be the auction clearing price (without the presence of Market-
Maker) when N = Nmax. Let p
M
∗ be the Market Maker price such that v̄(p
M
∗ ) = pmax.
Then, we have:
1. A closed form formula for pM∗ is given by:
pM∗ =











Here µA and σA are the mean and standard deviation of the auction clearing
price (without the Market-Maker option).
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2. Equilibrium buyer behavior: Buyers with value v ≥ pmax purchase the Market-
Maker option, and buyers with v < pmax buy in the auction. In addition, for
any value v ≥ pmax, we have UA(v) = UM(v, pM∗ ), i.e., buyers who buy Market-
Maker are indifferent between Market-Maker and auction.
3. Rev(auction, pM∗ ) > Rev(auction).
4. Welfare(auction, pM∗ ) > Welfare(auction).
5. The unique feasible Market-Maker price is pM∗ . Any price above p
M
∗ will not
be chosen by any buyer, and any price below pM∗ will make the Market-Maker
default on his promise when Nmax buyers arrive.
Proof. Note that for v ≥ pmax, we have (v − p)+ = v − p for all p. This implies that
(after realizing that since v is fixed, the variance of (v − p) is simply the variance of
p which is σA):
UA(v) =
 v − µA − β · σA (SD model)1− e−α·vEp[eα·p] (CARA model)
=
 v − p
∗
M (SD model)
1− e−α·(v−p∗M ) (CARA model)
= UM(v, p∗M).
Note that this means that all the buyers with value v ≥ pmax are indifferent between
the Market Maker contract and the auction mechanism. We claim that such indiffer-
ent buyers still choose Market-Maker because the price is always fixed at pM∗ whereas
the auction could at times be pmax, where as p
M
∗ ≤ pmax. Note that pM∗ > µA, i.e.,
the Market-Maker marks up the price above the mean auction clearing price, but it
is smaller than the largest value that the auction clearing price can take.
For the revenue claim, note that since only buyers with value v ≥ pmax buy
via Market-Maker the auction clearing price after Market-Maker is introduced never
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changes. I.e., only previously winning buyers continue to win now. Therefore, revenue
from buyers with v < pmax remains the same. Whereas the revenue from buyers with
value more than pmax has increased from µA to µA + βσA. We can show this for the
CARA model as well.
For welfare, note that since the auction clearing price was unaffected, the utility
of auction buyers was not affected. Market-Maker buyers were also unaffected as they
were indifferent. Revenue strictly increases. Thus welfare strictly increases.
For unique feasible price, note that any price above pM∗ is rejected by all buyers.
This is clear because already at pM∗ , buyers were indifferent between auction and
market-maker. When Market-Maker puts a price below pM∗ , when Nmax buyers are
realized Market-Maker will default. Note that currently Market-Maker sells all I
units when Nmax is realized (the threshold pmax by definition has I people above it
because it is obtained as I item auction’s clearing price). If Market-Maker goes any
smaller, it will have more than I demand and will immediately default.
Some remarks.
1. The Market-Maker price of pM∗ strictly increases with risk-parameter α and β
(see Theorem 5.5 below). It also strictly increases with the variance of auction
clearing price σA. This is true for both utility models.
2. Market-Maker clearing price is higher than the average auction clearing price
of µA, but smaller than the highest possible auction clearing price of pmax.
3. Only buyers with value above pmax buy Market-Maker. The mass of these
buyers is (1 − F<(pmax)). And each of these buyers pays pM∗ − µA additional
money in expectation. For the SD model, it is immediate to see this works
out to (1 − F<(pmax))βσA as incremental revenue per buyer. Similarly for the
CARA model, we can derive a closed form using the formula for pM∗ that we
give.
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We next show that the optimal Market Maker price p∗M increases with respect to
the risk aversion parameter (α or β) and with respect to the variance of the auction
clearing price (σA).
Theorem 5.5. p∗M is an increasing function of the risk aversion parameter (α in
CARA and β in SD). In addition, p∗M is an increasing function of σA.
Proof. Note that for the SD model, the results directly follows from the expression
in (5.5). We next prove the result for the CARA model. The first order derivative
with respect to α is given by:
(p∗M)

















Note that h(0) = 0 and therefore, it suffices to show that h′(α) ≤ 0 for all α ≥ 0.




− Ep[p · e
α·p]
Ep[eα·p]
− α · Ep[p
2 · eα·p] · Ep[eα·p]− Ep[p · eα·p]2
Ep[eα·p]2
= −α · Ep[p
2 · eα·p] · Ep[eα·p]− Ep[p · eα·p]2
Ep[eα·p]2
≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Since h′(α) ≤ 0
for all α ≥ 0 and h(0) = 0, we have: h(α) ≤ 0 for all α ≥ 0 and therefore, (p∗M)′(α) ≥ 0
for all α ≥ 0.
In conclusion, we have shown that adding the Market Maker contract allows to
reduce the price uncertainty for high valuation buyers (v > pmax), without changing
the allocation. We also demonstrated that there exists a unique Market Maker price
that increases with both the risk aversion and the variability. Therefore, by assuming
that indifferent buyers choose the Market Maker, the seller can strictly increase its
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revenue without changing the surplus of the buyers. For example, using the SD model,
the revenue increase amounts to F̄ (pmax)βσA. In Section 5.4 in Appendix, we show
computationally that for realistic instances, this revenue increase can be significant.
5.3.3 Heterogeneous risk aversion
So far, we consider that all the buyers have the same risk aversion parameter (either
α or β depending on the utility model). In practice, different buyers may behave
differently with regard to risk. We study the setting where the buyers have hetero-
geneous risk aversion, and show the benefit of adding the Market Maker contract in
such a setting. Let there be k different populations, with ρi mass in population i.
Theorem 5.6. In the heterogeneous risk-averse buyers setting, the Market-Maker
price is not necessarily unique. There exists a range of possible prices depending on
the range of the risk-parameters. But there always exists a single price that strictly
increases seller revenue and system welfare, i.e., offers a Pareto improvement.
Proof. Let β1 < . . . βk be the risk-aversion parameters. Clearly βk is the most risk-
averse buyer. Set the Market-Maker price assuming that the entire population mass
is at βk. I.e., set a price of p
M
∗ = µA +βkσA (and similarly for the CARA model). By
our argument in the homogeneous case, buyers in the k-th population with value at
least pmax will be indifferent between auction and Market-Maker and will purchase
Market-Maker. But the less risk-averse buyers are strictly preferring auction at this
price. At this price, the auction clearing price is unaffected, and revenue strictly
increases, just like the homogeneous setting. This proves the Pareto-improvement
part.
For the range of prices, note that as we keep decreasing the Market-Maker price,
one-by-one the less risk-averse population will switch to Market-Maker till Market-
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Maker defaults. As Market-Maker price falls, and as more agents choose Market-
Maker, the auction clearing price rises.
Homogeneous vs Heterogeneous: Change in allocation A notable aspect of
the heterogeneous Market-Maker dynamics is that a lower value buyer from a higher
risk-averse population gets allocated when a higher value buyer from a lower risk-
averse population doesn’t. To see this, let Nmax buyers be realized, and at Market-
Maker clearing price of pM∗ , the threshold for Market-Maker is exactly pmax for βk
population. At this point there are exactly I buyers with value above pmax and only
Iρk of them take Market-Maker and rest win in auction as they strictly prefer auction.
The rest of the population is fully composed of non-βk buyers. As the Market-Maker
price decreases by a tiny ε, population-k buyers with value just below pmax, who
would have no chance in a pure auction, will now switch to Market-Maker and get
allocated. For every population-k buyer that moves to Market-Maker with value
below pmax, some non-population-k buyer with value above pmax loses in the auction
after Market-Maker because there are only I units available! The natural question is,
why does the buyer who gets edged out not buy the Market-Maker herself instead of
getting 0 utility, given that she can afford Market-Maker? The answer is that such a
buyer doesn’t get 0 utility — she loses her allocation only when Nmax realizes. For
much smaller values of N , she will get allocated in auction and get a much higher
utility. As the Market-Maker price keeps dropping, the auction clearing price keeps
increasing because of migration of low value population-k buyers to Market-Maker.
At some point buyers from population-k − 1 make the switch to Market-Maker and
so on.
While our theorems establish structure of Market-Maker and show the Pareto-
improvement provided by it, we show in the next section that for several commonly
used distributions the lift in revenue and buyer utilities is significant.
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5.4 Computational experiments
We first consider the setting with the auctions and study computationally the benefit
of adding the Market-Maker. Then, we also consider the posted price environment.
5.4.1 Auctions
We first consider the setting with auctions. Our goal is to illustrate and quantify the
results developed in Section 5.3.
5.4.1.1 Homogeneous risk aversion
In Section 5.3.2, we have shown that there exists a unique Market-Maker price p∗M .
In addition, we characterized this optimal price in closed form for both the SD and
the CARA utility models. We also demonstrated that adding the Market-Maker
contract increases the seller revenue without changing the utility of the buyers (as it
does not modify the allocation). More precisely, the revenue increase per buyer that
chooses the Market-Maker contract amounts to F̄ (pmax)β(pM − µA). Our goal is to
show that this revenue improvement is significant relative to the revenue generated
without the presence of the Market-Maker contract. We consider a setting with
uniform valuations between 0 and 1 and two possible values for the number of buyers
N (with equal probability). We assume that these two different values induce two
distinct values of the auction clearing price: pL = 0.2 and pH = 0.8 (each with
probability 0.5). In Figure 5.1, we vary the risk aversion parameter (β for the SD
model and α for the CARA model) and compute the relative revenue improvement
obtained by adding the Market-Maker contract. Note that in both utility models, we
obtain a similar behavior as well as a potentially significant increase in revenue. In
this example, the relative revenue improvement for the SD model when β is between
1 and 2 is between 38% and 76%, whereas for the CARA model, the relative revenue
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improvement is between 3% and 8% (when α is between 1 and 2).
(a) SD model (b) CARA model
Figure 5.1: Relative improvement in the seller revenue by adding the Market-Maker
contract for for the setting with auctions and homogeneous risk aversion.
5.4.1.2 Heterogeneous risk aversion
In Section 5.3.3, we studied the setting where buyers have heterogeneous risk aversion
parameters. Next, we computationally illustrate and quantify the impact of adding
the Market-Maker contract. We consider a setting with two populations of buyers:
β1 = 1 and β2 = 2, i.e., population 2 is more risk averse. We assume that the propor-
tions are equal, i.e., ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.5 and consider two different valuation distributions:
uniform between 0 and 1 and exponential with mean 0.5. For each realization of
the number of buyers N , we independently draw a split of the N buyers into the
two populations. In addition, we consider a setting with two different values of N
that induce two distinct auction clearing prices: pL = 0.2 with probability 0.8 and
pH = 0.8 with probability 0.2.
In Figure 5.2, we plot the relative improvement in the seller revenue and in the
sum of buyer utilities as a function of pM for both uniform and exponential valuation
distributions. One can see that adding the Market-Maker contract yields a clear
Pareto improvement. In other words, both the buyers and the seller will benefit
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from adding the Market-Maker contract. Note that the minimal meaningful value
of pM is such that the buyers in population 2 (i.e., the more risk averse buyers)
are indifferent between the auction and the Market-Maker contract. As we saw in
Section 5.3, this value is given by: min(µA + β2σA, pH) and is denoted by Γ. In this
example, we have: µA = 0.32, β2 = 2 and σA = 0.48 so that Γ = 0.8 (this corresponds
to the rightest point on the x-axis in Figure 5.2). Then, when we start decreasing
pM below Γ, some buyers from population 2 will strictly prefer the Market-Maker
contract. In this case, some buyers from population 2 will choose the Market-Maker
contract, and some buyers from population 1 will be allocated via the auction. As pM
decreases, additional buyers from population 2 will choose the Market-Maker contract.
Consequently, the auction clearing price increases, and some buyers from population
1 are not allocated anymore. In other words, items are secured through the Market-
Maker contract from risk averse buyers at the expense of buyers from population
1 that now lose the auction. We continue decreasing pM until the point where the
Market-Maker defaults. Note that when pM = Γ, the buyers from population 2 are
indifferent between the two options so that the sum of buyers utilities stay the same.
As we start decreasing pM , it yields a Pareto improvement for both the sellers and
the buyers.
In Figure 5.3, we plot the utilities of the buyers for each population separately as
a function of pM . As we decrease pM , we increase the utilities of population 2 (more
risk averse) and decrease the utilities of population 1. This follows from the fact that
additional buyers from population 2 choose the Market-Maker in order to secure an
allocation. At the same time, since the auction clearing price increases, less buyers
from population 1 are allocated so that the utilities of population 1 reduce.
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(a) Uniform valuations (b) Exponential valuations
Figure 5.2: Relative improvement in the seller revenue and the sum of buyer utilities
by adding the Market-Maker contract for the setting with auctions and heterogeneous
risk aversions.
(a) Uniform valuations (b) Exponential valuations
Figure 5.3: Relative changes in the buyer utilities by adding the Market-Maker con-
tract for the setting with auctions and heterogeneous risk aversions.
5.4.2 Posted price
We now consider the setting with a posted price mechanism which is studied in Section
5.2. We next illustrate the fact that having only a posted price mechanism can suffer
from a poor welfare performance, as we have shown in Theorem 5.2. We consider
the setting where the number of buyers N is deterministic and equal to 2I, and the
valuations follow a 2-point distribution (v = 1 with probability 0.1 and v = 0.1
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with probability 0.9). This setting can capture the realistic situation of retargeting
in Internet display advertising. In Figure 5.4, we consider different values of the
envy parameter β (β = 0, 0.3, 0.6) and plot the welfare attained by the posted price
mechanism relative to the optimal welfare W ∗ (for more details, see Section 5.2). One
can see that in this example, the welfare loss is quite significant (about 18%). Note
that in Figure 5.4, the best fixed price yields the same welfare independent of the
value of β. Indeed, when the price is high enough, no buyer experiences any envy
and therefore, the welfare is independent of the parameter β. Recall that we have
shown in Theorem 5.1 that adding the Market-Maker contract recovers the optimal
welfare and at the same time, increases both the seller revenue and the sum of the
buyer utilities.
Figure 5.4: Welfare performance of the posted price for different values of β.
In Figure 5.5, we set the posted price to 0.1 and vary the price of the Market-
Maker contract pM between 0.1 and the value at which the Market-Maker defaults
(i.e., more than I buyers choose this option). We consider two values of β (β = 0.3
and β = 0.6). One can see that for a wide range values of pM , adding the Market-
Maker contract yields a Pareto improvement in both the seller revenue and the sum
of the buyer utilities relative to the case with only a posted price. Note that these
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relative improvements can be very significant (in this example, more than 70% in
both metrics) and their magnitude increase with β.
(a) Setting with β = 0.3 (b) Setting with β = 0.6
Figure 5.5: Relative improvement in the seller revenue and the sum of buyer utilities
by adding the Market-Maker contract.
This illustrates the fact that adding the Market-Maker contract to the existing
posted price mechanism allows to attain a significant Pareto improvement for both
the seller and the buyers.
In conclusion, we saw that the Market-Maker contract improves both the seller
revenue and the sum of buyer utilities. It allows to reduce both the price and alloca-
tion uncertainties for risk averse buyers who are willing to pay a premium over the
expected auction clearing price. In addition, when the buyers have heterogeneous risk
aversions, the Market-Maker contract allows the buyers with a higher risk aversion
to secure a higher probability of being allocated.
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Near optimal algorithms for capacity constrained
assortment under random utility models
A.1 FPTAS for mMNL-Capa
High-level description. Let p (resp. P ) be the minimum (resp. maximum) revenue
and u (resp. U) be the minimum (resp. maximum) value of the utility parameters over
all segments. We assume wlog. that uj,k > 0 for all j, k. Otherwise, we can replace
uj,k by ûj,k = εup/(nR) for all j, k such that uj,k = 0 where u = min {ui,k | ui,k > 0}
. This only changes the objective function by a factor of (1 + ε) (see Appendix A.2).
For a given ε > 0, we use the following set of guesses.
Γε,K = (Γε)
K and ∆ε,K = (∆ε)
K ,
where
Γε = {pu(1 + ε)`, ` = 0, . . . , L1} and ∆ε = {u(1 + ε)`, ` = 0, . . . , L2}, (A.1)
and L1 = O (log (nPU/p) /ε) and L2 = O (log ((n+ 1)U/p) /ε). Note that for con-
stant K, the number of guesses is polynomial in the input size and 1/ε. For a given












We use a dynamic program to find a feasible assortment S such that for all k ∈ [K]∑
j∈S
pjuj,k ≥ hk and
∑
j∈S+
uj,k ≤ gk. (A.3)
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Let us now present the dynamic program. Let I = bn/εc − n and J = d(n +
1)/εe + (n + 1). For each (i, j, `) ∈ [I]K × [J ]K × [n], let F (i, j, `) be the minimum
weight of any subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , `} such that for all k ∈ [K],
∑
s∈S




We can compute F (i, j, `) for (i, j, `) ∈ [I]K×[J ]K×[n] using the following recursion.
F (i, j, 1) =

w1 if 0 ≤ i ≤ p̃1 and j ≥ ũ0 + ũ1
0 if i ≤ 0 and j ≥ ũ0
∞ otherwise
F (i, j, `+ 1) = min{F (i, j, `), w`+1 + F (i− p̃`+1, j − ũ`+1, `)}
(A.4)
Let I (resp. J) be the vector with all components being I (resp. J). In order to show
that (A.4) correctly finds a subset satisfying (A.3), we have the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. For any guess h, g, if there exists a feasible S such that (A.3) is
satisfied, then F (I,J , n) ≤ W . Moreover, if F (I,J , n) ≤ W , then the DP finds a
subset S̃ such that for all k ∈ [K],
∑
j∈S
pj,kuj,k ≥ hk(1− 2ε) and
∑
j∈S+
uj,k ≤ gk(1 + 2ε).
Proof. Consider S satisfying (A.3) for given guesses h, g. Scaling the inequalities















Rounding down and up the previous inequalities gives for all k
∑
j∈S








+ (n+ 1) = J,
which implies that F (I,J , n) ≤ W .
166













≤ gk(1 + 2ε).
We can now present the FPTAS for mMNL-Capa.
Algorithm 15 FPTAS for mMNL-Capa
1: procedure FPTAS(ε)
2: for (h, g) ∈ Γε,K ×∆ε,K do
3: Compute discretization of coefficient r̃i,k and ũi,k using (A.2)
4: Compute F (i, j, `) for all (i, j, `) ∈ [I]K × [J ]K × [n] using (A.4)
5: If F (I,J , n) ≤ W , then let S̃h,g be a the corresponding subset
6: end for
7: return S that maximizes the expected revenue over {S̃h,g, (h, g) ∈ Γε,K ×
∆ε,K}
8: end procedure
Theorem A.1. Algorithm 15 returns an (1 − ε)-optimal solution to mMNL-Capa.





Proof. Let S∗ be the optimal solution to mMNL-Capa and (ˆ̀1, ˆ̀2) such that for all
k ∈ [K]





piui,k ≤ ru (1 + ε)
ˆ̀





ui,k ≤ u (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
2,k .
From Lemma A.1, we know that for (h, g) = (pu (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
1 , u (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
2), Algorithm 15
returns S̃ such that for all k ∈ [K]
∑
i∈S̃
piui,k ≥ pu (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
1,k (1− 2ε) and
∑
i∈S̃+
ui,k ≤ u (1 + ε)
ˆ̀











f(S∗) ≥ (1− 4ε)f(S∗).
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Running Time. We try LK1 · LK2 guesses for the numerators and denominators

















which is polynomial in input
size and 1/ε.
A.2 Assumption of ui,k > 0 in mMNL-Capa
We show that wlog. we can assume ui,k > 0 for all i ∈ [n], k ∈ [K] in the mMNL-Capa
problem. Let u = min {ui,k | ui,k > 0}. Suppose uj,k = 0 for some j, k. Then,
consider the following modified utility parameters for all j, k.
ûj,k =
 εup/(nP ) if uj,k = 0uj,k otherwise
We show that replacing uj,k by ûj,k in mMNL-Capa changes the expected revenue of







































Therefore, for each rational terms in the expression for the expected revenue, both
the numerator and denominator increase by a factor of at most (1 + ε). Let z∗ be the
optimal value of mMNL-Capa and ẑ be the optimal value of the modified problem with
parameters, ûj,k. Using the previous set of inequalities, we have (1−ε)ẑ ≤ z∗ ≤ (1+ε)ẑ
and we can equivalently approximate the modified problem.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 2.8
As in Theorem 2.7, we prove this by a reduction from the independent set problem
where we are given an undirected graph G = (V,E) and the goal is to find a maximum
cardinality subset of vertices that are independent. Let V = {v1, . . . , vn}.
We construct an instance of MMNL-Assort similar to the proof of Theorem 2.7.
We have one product and one MNL segment corresponding to each vertex in G.
Therefore, n = K = |V | and we consider the following utility parameters:
uj,k =

1 if j = k or j = 0
n3 if (vj, vk) ∈ E and j < k
0 otherwise
pi = n




, k ∈ [n]
(A.5)
where θ ∈ [1/2, 1] is an appropriate normalizing constant.
Consider an optimal independent set, I∗ of size t∗. Consider the following assort-
ment
S = {j | vj ∈ I∗}.
It is easy to observe that the expected revenue of S is exactly θt∗/2.
Conversely, consider an optimal fractional assortment x∗ ∈ [0, 1]n with revenue
z∗. Then we show that there exists an independent set of size b2z∗/θc. Let ε = 1/4n.
Consider a modified solution x̃ defined as follows. For all k ∈ [K],
x̃k =




Also, let z̃ be the revenue associated with solution x̃. It is easy to observe that the
revenue of each nest only decreases by at most θε. Consequently,







where the last inequality follows as z∗ ≥ θ/2. For any k ∈ [K], let










We show that for any k ∈ [K], z̃k ≥ θ/(5n) or z̃k ≤ θ/n2. Let
N(k) = {j | j < k, (vj, vk) ∈ E, x̃j ≥ ε}.







Therefore, if x̃k < ε, it implies x̃k = 0 (by construction) and z̃k = 0.






















where the second inequality follows as N(k) 6= ∅ and there exists j ∈ N(k) such that
x̃j ≥ ε. Now, we construct an independent set, I as follows.
I = {vk ∈ V | x̃k ≥ ε, N(k) = ∅} .
Since for all k such that vk ∈ I, N(k) = ∅, we know that I is an independent set
(using an argument similar to proof of Theorem 2.7). From the above case analysis,
we know ∑
k:vk∈I







where the second inequality follows from the fact that z̃k ≤ 2θ/n2 if vk /∈ I. We also
know that z̃ ≥ z∗/2 ≥ θ/4 and z̃k ≤ θ/2 for all k : vk ∈ I. Therefore,



























· z∗ ≤ t∗ ≤ 2
θ
· z∗.
Recall that θ is a constant in [1/2, 1]. Therefore, an α-approximation for the con-
tinuous relaxation of MMNL-Assort implies an O(α)-approximation for the maximum
independent set problem. Since the maximum independent set is hard to approxi-
mation within a factor better than O(1/n1−δ) (where |V | = n = K) for any constant




Approximation algorithms for assortment optimization
problems under a Markov chain based choice model
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2
In an instance of the assortment optimization problem over the distribution over
rankings model, we are given a collection of products N = {1, . . . , n} with prices p1 ≤
· · · ≤ pn, respectively. In addition, we are given an arbitrary (known) distribution
on K preference lists, L1, . . . , LK , each of which specifies a subset of the products
listed in decreasing order of preference. A customer with a given preference list
selects the most preferred product that is offered (possibly the no-purchase option)
according to his/her list. The goal is to find an assortment such that the expected
revenue is maximized. [? ] show that unconstrained assortment optimization over the
distribution over permutations model is hard to approximate within factor O(n1−ε)
for any fixed ε > 0 even for the case where the number of preference lists is equal to
the number of items, i.e., K = n.
We consider an instance I of the assortment optimization problem over distri-
bution over permutations model with n preference lists: L1, . . . , Ln. We construct
a corresponding instance M(I) of the assortment optimization under the Markov
chain model as follows. Each of the original items in N has a separate copy as a
state inM(I) for every list that contains it. More precisely, for every list Li and for
every 1 ≤ j ≤ |Li|, we have a state (j, i) corresponding to the j-th most preferred
item in Li. In addition, there is a state 0 corresponding to the no-purchase option.
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Therefore, the set of states is:
S = {0} ∪ {(j, i) : i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , |Li|}.
The transition probabilities between these states are given by:
ρ((j,i),s) =

1 if j < |Li| and s = (j + 1, i)
1 else if j = |Li| and s = 0
0 otherwise.
In other words, for each list there is a directed path (with transition probabilities
1) over its corresponding states in decreasing order of preference, ending at the no-
purchase option. This is illustrated in Figure B.1. Finally, the arrival rates are defined
by
λ(j,i) =
 ψi if j = 10 otherwise,
where ψi is the probability of list Li. With this construction, each row corresponds




1, 1 2, 1 3, 1 4, 1









Figure B.1: Sketch of our construction for an instance on 4 items, where L1 = (1 
2  3  4), L2 = (1  3  4), L3 = (2  3), and L4 = (1  2  4). Note,
for example, that the state (2, 2) corresponds to the second item of L2, but actually
corresponds to item 3.
In order to obtain a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions to I and
M(I), it remains to ensure that, when item i is offered in I, all of its corresponding
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copies (appearing in the same column) are offered in M(I), and vice versa. This
restriction can be captured by the constraints x(j,i) = x(k,`), for every i, ` ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that j ≤ |Li|, k ≤ |L`| and such that the jth item in Li is the kth item in L`.
This way, we guarantee that each column is either completely picked or completely
unpicked in the instanceM(I). The resulting set of inequalities specifies a constraint
matrix with a single appearance of +1 and −1 in each row, where all other entries are
0. Such matrices are well-known to be totally-unimodular (see, for example, [68]).
To complete the proof, note that the original instance I consists of n items and
n preference lists and therefore, the Markov chain instance M(I) has O(n2) states.
Since the former problem is NP-hard to approximate within factor O(n1−ε), for any
fixed ε > 0, it follows that TU cannot be efficiently approximated within O(n1/2−ε),
unless P = NP . This concludes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
This result is an immediate corollary of the following (more general) claim: Let Sg
be the solution returned by Algorithm 4, and let S be any subset of states. Then,
R(Sg) ≥ R(S)|S| .
To prove this claim, let g be the first item selected by Algorithm 4, which nec-
essarily exists as long as there is an item i with pi > 0. Then, by definition of the
greedy algorithm, we have R({g}) ≥ R({i}) for every item i ∈ S. Therefore,
R(Sg) ≥ R({g}) ≥ 1|S| ·
∑
i∈S
R({i}) ≥ R(S)|S| ,
where the last inequality follows from the sublinearity of the revenue function (Lemma 3.9).
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B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Let Sgu be the set of states selected by Algorithm 5. Note that for every i ∈ Sgu, we



















where S∗ is the optimal solution to Card. Here, the second inequality holds due to
picking the top k states in terms of P(i ≺ U∗+\{i}) values. The last inequality holds
since the optimal unconstrained revenue provides an upper bound on the optimal
revenue in the constrained case.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 3.6
It suffices to verify that (pS1i )
S2 = pS1∪S2i for all S1,S2 and i /∈ S1 ∪ S2, as the above






















PS1i (j ≺ S2+\{j})pj −
∑
j∈S2







Pi(j ≺ (S2 ∪ S1)+\{j})pj −
∑
j∈S2
PS1i (j ≺ S2+\{j})
∑
l∈S1
Pj(l ≺ S1+\{l})pl︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
.


















Pi(l ≺ (S2 ∪ S1)+\{j})pl.
Putting everything together, we get
(pS1i )
S2 = pi −
∑
j∈(S2∪S1)
Pi(j ≺ (S2 ∪ S1)+\{j})pj = pS1∪S2i .
B.5 Application of Algorithm 6 to MNL
In the MNL model, we are given a collection of items, 1, . . . , n, along with the no-
purchase option, which is denoted by item 0. Each item i has a utility parameter ui
and a price pi. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
∑n
i=0 ui = 1. For any
















[10] prove that the MNL choice model is a special case of the Markov chain model.
More precisely, when ρij = uj for all j and λi = ui for all i, the choice probabilities
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Note that in the above update, the subtracted term is independent of i. Therefore,
the ordering of the prices does not change after each update. Since we are picking
the highest adjusted price item at each step, it follows that the optimal assortment is
nested by price, i.e., consists of the top ` priced items, for some `. This is a well known
structural property that we recover here as a direct consequence of our algorithm.
Moreover, the updated prices provide a criteria for when to stop adding items to the
assortment.
B.6 FPTAS for MC-Capa under rank one
assumption



















Without loss of generality, we assume that u0, λ0, v0 > 0. As before, let p (resp. P )
be the minimum (resp. maximum) revenue and u, v (resp. U, V ) be the minimum
(resp. maximum) MNL parameter. We can assume wlog. that p, u, v > 0; otherwise,
we can clearly remove the corresponding item from our collection and continue. For
any given ε > 0, we use the following set of guesses.
Γε = {λ0u(1 + ε)`, ` = 0, . . . , L1},
∆ε = {uv(1 + ε)`, ` = 0, . . . , L2},
Λε = {λ0pvu(1 + ε)`, ` = 0, . . . , L3},
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where L1 = O(log(nU/λ0u)/ε), L2 = O(log(nUV/uv)/ε) and L3 = O(log(n
2PV U/λ0pvu)/ε).
The number of guesses is polynomial in the input size and 1/ε. For a given guess











ujλj ≥ h and
∑
j /∈S
ujvj ≥ g, (B.1)
using a dynamic program. In particular, we consider the following discretized values,
p̃j =
⌊














Let I = bn/εc − n, J = b(n + 1)/εc − (n + 1). We can now present our dynamic
program. For each (i, j, k, `) ∈ [I] × [J ] × [J ] × [n], let F (i, j, k, `) be the minimum





ũs ≥ j and
∑
s/∈S
ṽs ≥ k. (B.3)
We compute F (i, j, k, `) for (i, j, k, `) ∈ [I]×[J ]×[J ]×[n] using the following recursion.
F (i, j, 1) =

w1 if 0 ≤ i ≤ p̃1, j ≤ ũ0, and k ≤ ṽ0
0 if i ≤ 0 and j ≥ ũ0
∞ otherwise
F (i, j, k, `+ 1) = min{F (i, j − ũ`+1, k − ṽ`+1, `), w`+1 + F (i− p̃`+1, j, k, `)}
(B.4)
Using this dynamic program, we construct a set of candidate assortments Sh,g,` for
all guesses (h, g, t) ∈ Γε ×∆ε × Λε. Algorithm 16 details the procedure to construct
the set of candidate assortments.
Algorithm 16 Construct Candidate Assortments
1: For (h, g, t) ∈ Γε ×∆ε × Λε,
(a) Compute discretization of coefficients p̃i, ũi and ṽi using (B.2).
(b) Compute F (i, j, k, `) for all (i, j, k, `) ∈ [I]× [J ]× [K]× [n] using (B.4).
(c) Let Sh,g,t be the subset corresponding to F (I, J, J, n).
2: Return A = ∪(h,g,t)∈Γε×∆ε×ΛεSh,g,t.
Let us show that Algorithm 16 correctly finds a subset satisfying (B.1). In par-
ticular, we have the following lemma.
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Lemma B.1. Let A be the set of candidate assortment returned by Algorithm 16.
For any guess (h, g, t) ∈ Γε × ∆ε × Λε, if there exists S such that W (S) ≤ W and













































































Now that we have constructed a set of candidate assortment, the second part
of the algorithm consist of returning the best possible feasible assortment. We can
therefore present in Algorithm 17 a complete description of the algorithm.
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Algorithm 17 FPTAS for MC-Capa
1: Construct a set of candidate assortment A using Algorithm 16.
2: Return the best feasible solution to MC-Capa from A.
Theorem B.1. Algorithm 17 returns an (1− ε)-optimal solution to MC-Capa. More-
over, the running time is O (log(nU) log(nUV ) log(nPV U)n4/ε6).
Proof. Let S∗ be the optimal solution to MC-Capa and (ˆ̀1, ˆ̀2, ˆ̀3) such that











1− uv(1 + ε)ˆ̀3
)
≤ λ0pvu (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
1+1 ,





uiλi ≤ λ0u (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
2+1 ,





uivi ≤ uv (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
3+1 .
From Lemma B.1, we know that for (h, g, t) = (λ0u (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
2 , uv (1 + ε)
ˆ̀
3 , λ0pvu(1 +
ε)
ˆ̀











uiλi ≥ h(1− 2ε)
∑
i/∈S̃


































≥ `(1− 2ε) ≥ f(S∗)1− 2ε
1 + ε




Mallows-smoothed distribution over rankings approach for
modeling choice
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2 (continued)
In this section, we prove that for a fixed R,
∑
σ∈h(R) e
−θ.C3(σ) is equal to








ψ(rm, θ) · ψ(|G|m − rm, θ)
.
We use a similar approach than in the first part of the proof. Let Γ be the set
of (G̃1, . . . , G̃M) ⊆ (G1, . . . , GM) such that |G̃m| = rm for all m ∈ [M ]. For all
γ = (G̃1, . . . , G̃M) ∈ Γ, let t(γ) be the set of permutations σ which satisfy the
following two conditions:
• σ ∈ h(R).
• for all m ∈ [M ], the subset of products from Gm which is preferred to ak is
exactly G̃m.












• D1(σ) is the sum of disagreements ξ(σ, i, j) over pairs of products (i, j) such
that either i = k and ak σ aj or ak σ ai and ak σ aj.
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• D2(σ) is the sum of disagreements ξ(σ, i, j) over pairs of products (i, j) such
that ai σ ak and aj σ ak.
• for all m ∈ [M ], D3(σ,m) is the sum of disagreements ξ(σ, i, j) over pairs of
products (i, j) such that ai ∈ G̃m and aj ∈ Gm\G̃m.




m∈[M ]D3(σ,m)) is equal to


















the definition of the normalization constant, we have for all m ∈ [M ],

















ψ(rm, θ) · ψ(|Gm| − rm, θ)
,
and concludes the proof.
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